

Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, NGOs, & Glocalization: Implications for Social
Services in Russia
by
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Dedication

To Bradley Gene Wathen, my partner in the adventure of life,
and to Rachel Maria (Wathen) Woehr
and Matthew Bradley Wathen,
gifts from God who have enriched my life beyond measure.

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Abstract

This dissertation contributes to theory development in two areas, globalization and civil society, as they relate to social service provision by nonstate actors in a post-communist region. In Chapter 2, it illustrates the applicability of glocalization (a re-conceptualization of globalization theory) as a conceptual framework in understanding the development of social work education and practice, particularly in the Russian context. In concluding the chapter on glocalization, I advocate for the practice of critical glocalization by social workers. Critical glocalization involves an approach to a new context, particularly an international context, that takes into account ALL of the players, global and local. This approach recognizes and looks for how actors and power interact, with an emphasis on identifying those with less power. In addition, it respects that the active space of glocal interaction produces innovation and change.

Chapters four and five provide unique and rich insight into the Russian context of social work (*sotsialnaya rabota*) and social service provision by nonstate actors and contribute to theory development in the area of civil society. By refining the concept of civic culture framework and applying it to the study of volunteerism and NGO development in social services in Russia, this work illuminates how various stakeholders perceive the developing system and how those perceptions relate to various actions and outcomes in service delivery, service utilization (Chapter 4), and cooperation with the state (Chapter 5). It finds that within stakeholder groups, the civic culture frameworks tend to cluster together and that the frameworks are connected to the actions of individual group members and have consequences for service delivery and utilization. Further, I find that the relative power of stakeholder groups dictates which

frameworks remain dominant, and illustrate how these power configurations affect services. The fifth chapter shows how historical context, foreign influence, and political climate affect civic culture frameworks of NGO leaders, and how two diverging framework patterns develop over time, coinciding with the development of two types of NGOs. This finding illustrates the importance of civic culture frameworks in understanding NGO development in contexts of emerging civil society. In addition, this research provides rich insights into the Russian experience of volunteering and NGO development in social services.

Civic culture frameworks and the concept of glocalization are intimately related. Civic culture frameworks make up the mental discourses of actors in the local, global, and glocal spaces of social services and social policy. In the glocal area particularly, civic culture frameworks are in flux, as people interact with a variety of actors, structures, and discourses, trying to navigate old ideas, global influence, and innovation. Indeed, as described in this dissertation, the influence of local and global forces interacting in the glocal played a part in the forming and changing of civic culture frameworks of various stakeholders in the social service system.

Introduction

This dissertation contributes to theory development in two areas while focusing on the development of social work, volunteerism, and social service NGOs in Russia. First, I argue for the use of “glocalization” as a conceptual framework in social work as superior to “globalization.” I look at the development of social work (sotsialnaya rabota) education and social work professionalization/practice in Russia through the lens of globalization theories. I conclude with a push for the practice of critical glocalization. Critical glocalization takes into account the power of actors in a system and assumes a social justice mindset.

Chapters 3 through 5 develop theory in the area of civil society. By refining the concept of civic culture framework and applying it to the study of volunteerism and NGO development in social services in Russia, I am able to illuminate how various stakeholders perceive the developing system and how those perceptions relate to various actions and outcomes in service delivery, service utilization (Chapter 4), and cooperation with the state (Chapter 5). I find that within stakeholder groups the civic culture frameworks tend to cluster together and that the frameworks are connected to the actions of individual group members and have consequences for service delivery and utilization. Further, I find that the relative power of stakeholder groups dictates which frameworks remain dominant, and illustrate how these power configurations affect services. In Chapter 5, I show how historical context, foreign influence, and political climate affect civic culture frameworks of NGO leaders, and how two diverging framework patterns develop over time, coinciding with the development of two types of NGOs. This finding illustrates the importance of this concept in understanding NGO development in contexts of

emerging civil society. In addition, this research provides rich insights into the Russian experience of volunteering and NGO development in social services.

Because much of the background information for these chapters overlaps, Chapter 1 presents historical and policy information relevant for all of them. The theoretical basis for Chapter 2 is embedded within the chapter, while Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical basis, methodology, and data for Chapters 4 and 5.

The research questions addressed are as follows:

Chapter 2 is an argument for the superiority of glocalization as a conceptual framework to explain change and to facilitate effective social work practice across cultures.

Chapter 4: What civic culture frameworks emerged from the data?

What is the relationship between civic culture frameworks and stakeholder perceptions of NGOs and voluntary action in social services?

How do stakeholder positions in the system and their concomitant frameworks influence service delivery, service utilization, and collaboration with the state?

Chapter 5: What civic culture frameworks are articulated by NGO leaders, and how do historical and current political context play a role in shaping these frameworks and the paths of organizations in one city in Russia?

Since my research for the Chapters 4 and 5 was conducted as a case study of one Russian city, evidence in the form of quotations is presented without identifiers so as to protect the identity of the speakers. In Chapter 5 particularly, I do not identify the type of organization in which the speaker serves as a leader because there are so few grassroots social welfare NGOs in this city. Government action against NGOs is arbitrary and unpredictable, and therefore protecting the confidentiality of my interview subjects is paramount.

Chapter 1: Background

This chapter provides background in Russian culture, social policy and services, and NGO development in the social service arena that is critical in understanding the research that follows.

Background: Authoritarian Structures and Hierarchy

Throughout most of the past 500 years, the governing structures of Russia in its various forms have been authoritarian. From the Tsardom and the Russian Empire to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R. or Soviet Union), government was headed by an authoritarian figure. Even at times in which a group of ruling elite were nominally in power, such as the Politburo during the Soviet Union, the direction of policy and control of power were largely in the hands of an individual leader. From this center flowed a hierarchical system by which government structures maintained power and enforced control. The current president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, has shaped a centralized governing system in Russia out of the democratic experiment of the 1990s. Over his time as both president and prime minister since 2000, he has created what political scholars call a “power vertical” that concentrates power in the presidency ([Teague, 2014](#)). The general population’s respect for authoritarian structures and hierarchy are rooted in this history.

Background: Family and Child Social Policy and Service Provision The Soviet Period

The Soviet Union existed from 1922 to 1991. During that time specific social policies relating to women, families, and children varied somewhat, but some central features of the ideology and system remained constant. Throughout most of its history, the Soviet Union was

governed by a one-party system with a centrally planned economy. This planned economy encompassed every aspect of government, including the provision of social welfare. Social benefits were universal and numerous, though not always generous. In kind benefits included free primary and secondary education, healthcare, nursing homes, orphanages, recreation facilities, child care, after-school activities, and to a large degree, housing ([Balachova, Bonner, & Levy, 2009](#); [Manning & Shaw, 1998](#); [Zimakova, 1993](#)). Cash benefits included retirement pensions, stipends for post-secondary students, and cash payments to new mothers.

Although the welfare system was centrally planned, its implementation largely took place through places of employment ([Manning & Shaw, 1998](#); [Zimakova, 1993](#)). Thus, social welfare provision was strongly linked to labor market participation. The enterprise usually provided childcare (nurseries to age 3, kindergartens for ages 3-7), schools, transportation, pioneer camps, and vacations. The enterprises also paid social benefits such as maternity funds. Since employment was mandatory, social benefits were universal, though there were exceptions. In theory, service provision was the same across the Soviet Union, but in reality, the region of the country and even the rural/urban divide played a large part in what benefits people actually received ([Iarskaia-Smirnova & Romanov, 2009](#)). In addition, some enterprises provided more benefits than others. For example, some provided cafeterias where workers could eat breakfast and lunch, while others did not. The system was also inefficient in that there was often duplication between enterprise services and local government provision of health, education, and housing benefits ([Manning & Shaw, 1998](#)). One great weakness was that “social assistance to the disadvantaged and needy groups was rather limited and therefore was considered the private affair of parents and relatives” ([Iarskaia-Smirnova & Romanov, 2009](#); [Zimakova, 1993](#)). In addition, the retirement pension was tied to the number of years of employment and level of pay

of an individual, not the most equitable system compared to the overall welfare program. Despite these drawbacks, Soviet social policy was successful in providing a minimal standard of living to almost everyone ([Iarskaia-Smirnova & Romanov, 2009](#)).

Family social policy in the Soviet Union evolved over time, but the ideological driver of it was primarily economic. As Zimakova notes, objectives of family policy in general around the world are antipoverty, demographic, economic, or social protection of mothers and children ([1994](#)). Family policy during the Soviet Union focused on maximizing female workforce participation, sometimes combined with pro-natalism ([Teplova, 2007b](#); [Tobis, 2000](#); [Zimakova, 1994](#)). In addition to being obligated to work, women were expected to contribute to society by rearing children: “in raising her children, the mother creates the main value of society -- human beings, working people, those who produce all goods” ([Yanowitch, 1977](#)). Women were expected to “harmoniously combine occupational and family responsibilities” ([Novikova, Iazykova, & Iankova, 1978](#)). During the 1940s, the state became concerned with low birthrates, and introduced “relatively generous maternity allowances” ([Teplova, 2007b](#)). In addition, the state continued to maintain public childcare facilities (often, but not always, tied to the enterprise), and extended paid maternal and childcare leaves. Women could take eighteen months of paid maternal leave, and an additional eighteen months of unpaid leave. These benefits endure to this day, although today as in Soviet times women fear discrimination in the workplace and often don’t take advantage of full leave periods.

Additional family policies benefitted women as well. For example, by law, an enterprise was required to hold a woman’s job for three years after maternity leave, or provide them with a job similar in work and pay upon their return ([Teplova, 2007a](#)). Enterprises were also forbidden from firing pregnant women or women with children under the age of three. These women-

friendly policies did succeed in increasing the labor force participation of women, but birth rates remained low ([Teplova, 2007a](#)). By 1982, almost 90% of adult women were employed or enrolled in education ([Iarskaia-Smirnova & Romanov, 2009](#); [Novikova et al., 1978](#); [Yanowitch, 1977](#)). By 2000, nine years after the fall of the Soviet Union, female labor participation fell to 66% ([Glass, 2008](#)).

The Soviet Union also provided special housing benefits for families. If members of a family living in an apartment had less than five square meters per person, they were put on a list for other living quarters. Unfortunately, it often took 5-10 years to get an apartment, depending the region in which the family was living. Because of this, and because cooperative family living was valued, it was common for living arrangements to be multi-generational.

Social policy for the protection and care of children went through several phases during the Soviet period. Initially, recognition of social problems such as child abuse was limited, but “a tradition of universal preventive services for families and children with strong state control on parents’ compliance with state regulations was developed, including home visitations by pediatricians and nurses for all new parents, and mandatory immunizations and medical and dental check-ups monitored by school personnel. Children’s centers and most schools provided sports, art and other activities for children at no charge”([Balachova et al., 2009](#)). In the 1930s new child protection measures came into force, and children were more easily removed from the home. In this period, the number of children living in residential institutions increased rapidly ([Harwin, 1996](#); [Tobis, 2000](#)). During the 1950s, Khrushchev turned to the use of boarding schools to educate children and free women to work. This marked an even greater turn toward the state accepting responsibility for raising children, although the public strongly opposed it, so it did not become universal policy. In the 1960s, Soviet scholars began to report on the harmful

effects of residential care on children; consequently, mainly socially vulnerable children remained in state care, although some children of staunch communists remained as well ([Tobis, 2000](#)).

Post 1991: Russia

The breakup of the Soviet Union and transition to a government that covered only the Russian territory was economically and socially tumultuous. The collapse of the central economic system accelerated and the ruble devalued multiple times in the 1990s. Enterprises closed or delayed payment of wages and unemployment increased. Corruption, already a problem during Soviet times, continued, but now without any state influence in protecting the most vulnerable in the population. The provision of social services was chaotic, as the state could not afford to underwrite them, and enterprises were cutting them to save costs. In addition, the state moved from the principle of providing universal welfare benefits to targeted and means-tested programs ([Balachova et al., 2009](#); [Standing, 1996](#); [Zimakova, 1994](#)). The state further retreated from social welfare responsibility by delegating them to the regional/local level ([Ferge, 2001](#)). Since 2005, much of the responsibility for social services to families and children has fallen to Russia's 83 regions. Each region is responsible for financing (with the help of federal grants), structuring, and coordinating services ([Trygged, 2009](#)). Unfortunately, some regions have far fewer resources than others, leaving the provision of services uneven across the country. The state has also retreated from social welfare responsibility by insisting that families, especially mothers, are responsible for raising children ([Chandler, 2009](#); [Zimakova, 1994](#)). The 1995 Family Law code, which went into force in 1996, articulated the social policy of the Russian Federation, replacing the 1969 Soviet code ([Guslyakova, 2006](#)). While many cash and in-kind benefits disappeared, some were reaffirmed, including a guarantee to accessible and free primary and secondary education and healthcare, pensions, and payments to invalids. However,

the quality and accessibility of these institutions have also experienced problems ([Titterton, 2006](#)). As two authors summarized in 2000, “it is important to recognize that Soviet socialism provided important social benefits which protected the vast majority of the population from abject misery and poverty. Now those benefits have either diminished or disappeared, and people are left to fend for themselves to a degree seldom required even in the most “free” market economies in the world” ([Field & Twigg, 2000](#)).

Family, maternal, and employment benefits have seen mixed changes since 1991. Maternal benefits are similar, with seventy days leave allowed before the birth of a child, and paid leave for eighteen months after birth (with minimum and maximum benefit amounts defined), and an additional eighteen months of unpaid leave ([Revun, 2009](#)). A mother’s job still has to be kept open or a similar job with the same wage has to be offered at the end of the leave. Unfortunately, in practice this often does not happen, and the laws often function as a disincentive to hiring women, as the employers incur extra costs with extended paid leaves ([Balachova et al., 2009](#); [Teplova, 2007b](#)). Mothers who were not in the labor force when becoming pregnant receive paid benefits from the state for the first 1.5 years. Many of these women are already low-income, and when their child reaches age eighteen months, their economic position often worsens ([Balachova et al., 2009](#); [UNICEF, 2007](#)).

A large difference in family benefits before and since the Soviet regime is in the provision of childcare. Thousands of nurseries and kindergartens have been closed in Russia, and those that are still operating do so with less state assistance ([UNICEF, 1999](#)). The majority of after-school programs, summer camps for children, and recreation and activity centers are now operating on a pay basis, precluding the participation of low-income families. The government does pay a monthly benefit for each child to low-income families, but the amount is negligible –

around \$7 per month. However, the benefit for single parents and larger families is higher ([Chandler, 2007](#)). In summarizing the 1995 Family Law Code, Chandler ([2009](#)) communicated the new position of the government: “The state’s role in family matters was now primarily limited to adjudicating marital disputes and where necessary, protecting children who lacked sufficient care from their parents.” In the 1990s, laws for child support and alimony to spouses staying home full-time to care for a child were strengthened ([Chandler, 2009](#)).

In the area of child welfare policy, changes have been slow. Unfortunately, the number of children needing state care increased dramatically in the 1990s and is still quite high. For example, from 1993 to 1997, the number of registered children in state care increased by 30 per cent and the number in residential institutions increased by 35 per cent (Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the Russian Federation, 1997). State spending for child welfare was low, and child welfare was not on the list of government priorities.

One study examined the persistence of reliance on residential institutions in caring for children, looking at World Bank and other large NGO experiences in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union ([Tobis, 2000](#)). The study identifies the key barriers to change,

“which include financial and organizational pressures to maintain residential institutions; public acceptance of this form of care as appropriate; and the absence of a national social welfare infrastructure, of systematic monitoring and oversight, and of a legislative framework that focuses on protecting the rights of vulnerable individuals. The effects of these barriers are compounded by an arbitrary placement process that does not consider emotional, social, and material strengths and needs. As a result, a vicious cycle is created. The institutions absorb much of the limited government (and often donor) resources that are needed to assist vulnerable groups. The lack of alternatives for families in crisis has pushed governments to rely increasingly on institutions, crowding more people into a deteriorating infrastructure”([Tobis, 2000](#)).

At the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, legislators and policy-makers began to turn their attention to the child welfare situation. “This began as an essentially nationalist discourse in the Duma (Russian Parliament). Increasingly, the plight of children was discursively linked to

Russia's population crisis" ([Chandler, 2009](#)). In President Vladimir Putin's 2006 annual address to the Duma, he outlined several sweeping measures related to children and family policy. One was an increase in government benefits for childbearing and family support: a universal one-time payment at the birth of a child (around \$350), increased monthly child subsidies for low-income mothers, and a universal one-time multi-thousand-dollar payment for each additional child, to be paid when the child reaches the age of majority ([Revun, 2009](#); [Trygged, 2009](#)). There are numerous conditions for receiving the longer-term benefits, and in some cases a family can access that money earlier. However, in most cases they cannot, and since none of the children have reached the age of majority yet, it remains to be seen whether this chunk of money materializes. Since most parents who lose their parental rights do so because they cannot provide adequately for their children's needs ([Schmidt, 2009](#); [Trygged, 2009](#)), this increased state support was supposed to both increase the birth rate as well as keep children out of state care. As mentioned earlier, the low level of monthly support after the child reaches age 1.5 is not sufficient, with the exception of the large chunk of money put "in trust" for the family to access at a later date. However, the monthly support for families with three or more children is significantly greater than for smaller families. Although this benefit is helpful for larger families, it does not help smaller ones. For example, a 2006 World Bank reports states that one-third of poor households in Russia are those with one child, and almost the same proportion are those with two children ([Shaban, 2006, March](#)).

Another of Putin's 2006 goals was to deinstitutionalize all children in the care of the state. Some progress has been made on this front, though as Tobis' ([2000](#)) research pointed out, any change would take concentrated funding and sustained state intervention. On the 20th of February 2012, UNICEF as cited in ([Earle, February 12, 2013](#)) released a report stating that "the

percentage of orphans living in orphanages dropped from 23 percent in 2006 to 16.5 percent in 2009.” At the same press conference, the Kremlin’s children’s ombudsman reaffirmed the government’s commitment to closing all state-run children’s residential facilities. The UNICEF report praised the formation of the state’s Children’s Fund in 2008, which assists children at risk, while also calling for “the development of a national strategy on children’s issues.”

The development of a national strategy is important for several reasons. A different UNICEF report (as cited in *The Moscow Times*, 2011) noted that, “the government also needs to step up control over money allotted for child welfare because most of the funding is used ineffectively and non-transparently, in part due to lack of any clear strategy on what the money should be spent for.” The structure of the system contributes to the problem. For many years after 1991, three separate federal ministries were involved in the child welfare system. The Ministry of Health oversaw children abandoned at birth or born in prison, the Ministry of Social Welfare took care of street kids and runaways, and the Ministry of Education oversaw children who had been abused or neglected ([Endicott, 2006](#)). These federal agencies have now been reduced to two: the Ministry for Health & Social Development, and the Ministry of Education. Although the merger of two ministries has resulted in greater coordination of services, there is still a long way to go ([Iarskaia-Smirnova, Romanov, & Lovtsova, 2004](#)).

One feature of the child welfare system is an emphasis on state intervention in removing a child from a home, with little attention given to helping and empowering at-risk families. Only since 2005 have social workers in children’s shelters begun to work with the biological families of children in the home ([Schmidt, 2009](#)). Still, the most common institutional response is to pursue termination of parental rights ([Balachova et al., 2009](#); [Endicott, 2006](#); [Schmidt, 2009](#); [Trygged, 2009](#)). Parents have limited legal recourse in disputing the decision of the regional

Guardianship Commission. Fortunately, some progress in changing policy has occurred. For example, the “restriction” of parental rights was introduced as a new legal intervention that the courts can use as an alternative to “termination.” This status is “intended to give parents some time to correct the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the home. However... there are no regulations or practices to provide court-ordered treatment for the families when parental rights are restricted, and there is no child protection system in place to monitor parents’ progress while in treatment” ([Balachova et al., 2009](#)).

Children in state-run residential institutions may remain there until age seventeen, at which time the state is obligated to provide them with permanent housing, usually a small apartment (condo). All children are eligible for education at either a vocational or technical school, or at a college or university, paid for by the state. While enrolled in any of these programs, they continue to receive state support, up to age twenty-three.

Family placement can take three forms. The most common is termed “guardianship” and 77.8% of guardians are relatives of the child ([Schmidt, 2009](#)). These families receive a small monthly allowance. The other two forms are similar to foster care. The families who engage in this form of care are viewed as professional parents, are trained by the state, and receive monetary compensation not only for the child but also payment for their labor (Schmidt, 2009). Fledgling innovations in forms of care are also taking place in various parts of Russia, mostly through the work of NGOs. The idea of small-scale homes for six to eight children with trained house parents is spreading after being initiated by SOS Children’s Villages. Other NGOs are facilitating foster placement and transition services for those leaving care, or are financing the training of social workers in preventive services, case management, and practice skills. However,

although some regional administrators are collaborating in some of these more experimental projects, they are still isolated from one another.

In conclusion, changes in family and child social policy in the Soviet Union and Russia have occurred slowly over time, and the implementation of change has been difficult. The number of NGOs working in this sphere was non-existent during the Soviet era, grew in the 1990s and began to shrink after 2004. Regardless of the number of NGOs in existence, the proportion of family and child services that they provide remains under 10% and their influence on policy is minimal.

Background of Nonstate/NGO Social Service Provision

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In the Russian context, nonstate social service provision is slowly emerging. The number of nonstate organizations involved in the delivery of social services has increased in the years since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian national, regional, and local governments have increasingly provided grants and in-kind assistance (e.g., subsidized office space) to nonstate social service organizations. Despite these trends, nonstate welfare provision is still nascent and composes only a small share of services available ([Benevolenski, 2014](#); [Cook, 2007b](#))

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, nonstate organizations played a negligible role in social service provision. Yet, nonstate organizations have been present throughout Russian history. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Russians began

forming charitable associations and promoting volunteer service as a means of addressing social problems ([Lindenmeyr, 1990](#); [Raeff, 1984](#)). After 1917, however, this type of free association among citizens was curtailed by the Soviet regime and replaced by alternative associations managed by the party apparatus ([Evans, 2006](#)). These organizations included veterans groups, youth and hobby clubs, and associations for people with disabilities. Such organizations were active in providing some services at the local level, although they did not play an active role in policymaking and for the most part were social organizations.

During the turbulent decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, international actors influenced the provision of social welfare. International economic development organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advocated for neoliberal policies in Russia's transition to a market economy. These policies view social welfare provision, and the state or nonstate actors involved in such provision, as less central to goals of maximizing economic productivity. Structural adjustment programs linked to loan agreements imposed policies that affected the financing and operation of social welfare states in countries such as Russia ([Baker & Hinds, 2012](#); [Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997](#)). Russia pursued a neoliberal path under President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, but bureaucratic stakeholders in the health, education, and pension systems blocked extreme cost-cutting measures and managed to preserve some state capacity for welfare provision ([Cook, 2007a](#)).

Recent years have brought some experiments with decentralization. For example, in 2005 the Russian government transferred responsibility for provision of child welfare and family support to regional and municipal levels of government, although federal grants help cover program costs ([Trygged, 2009](#)). Regional and local governments have worked hard to address the needs of their constituents, with varying levels of resources and success. On the one hand,

some layers of bureaucracy have been removed. On the other, the transition has varied across regions. Municipalities with larger budgets and stronger economies are better able to provide funding for such programs than smaller regions. At the same time, national commitments to other types of assistance were maintained, including healthcare, pensions, and payments to invalids. However, even these national systems reflect resource or wealth disparities between regions of the country, and the quality and accessibility of assistance varies ([Titterton, 2006](#)). For example, pensioners in Moscow receive substantial pension subsidies from the city government in addition to national pension amounts. Experiments with decentralization have thus resulted in varying levels of efficiency and provision of services across regions.

As the Russian state struggled to handle its social welfare responsibilities following the breakup of the Soviet Union, nonstate organizations attempted to fill the gaps in services ([Petukhov, 2008](#); [Salmenniemi, 2010](#)). The 1990s were characterized by an explosive proliferation of nonstate organizations, with 60,000 nonstate organizations registering with the Russian government from 1993 to 2005 ([U.S. Agency for International Development, 2006](#)). Many of these nonstate organizations provided services to disadvantaged populations, including the disabled, street children, orphans, single-parent families, veterans, the elderly, and others. Organizations also focused on preventive services and public awareness. Collaboration between local and regional governments and nonstate actors increased in the 1990s due to limited public funds and the need to find more cost effective ways to provide needed services ([Belokurova & Vorob'ev, 2011](#)). An influx of funding and consultants from foreign sources also aided the establishment of social welfare nonstate organizations across Russia. There is debate, however, about the impact of these efforts, whose interests were served by these international efforts to cultivate nonstate capacity, whether foreign influence stifled local initiative and collaboration,

and whether contextualization of foreign programs and methods was lacking ([Crotty, 2003](#); [Henderson, 2002](#); [Richter, 2009](#); [Sundstrom, 2005](#)).

The new millennium brought changes to how the Russian state viewed nonstate organizations, and these changes affected all types of such organizations. From 2003 to 2005, the “color”¹ revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan highlighted the potential for citizen protest organized through nonstate organizations. These organizations, particularly those receiving foreign support, were suddenly on the radar of the Kremlin ([Cavanaugh, 2010](#); [Cook & Vinogradova, 2006](#)). In 2005, Vladimir Putin created the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation (sometimes translated Public Chamber) to act as a channel of communication between citizen organizations and the Duma. In 2006, legislation designed to regulate nonstate organizations was passed. Often called “the NGO law,” the legislation increased government oversight of organizations through stricter registration and reporting requirements ([Cavanaugh, 2010](#); [Crotty, Hall, & Ljubownikow, 2014](#); [Kamhi, 2006](#)). Although designed to provide the central government with greater oversight and control, the requirements often had negative impacts, particularly on smaller nonstate social service organizations. Cumbersome and frequent reporting requirements on activities, members, and funding created hours of work for organizations with few, if any, paid staff ([Ljubownikow & Crotty, 2014](#)). In addition, organizations that received foreign funding were subject to more stringent oversight. The level of foreign funding dramatically declined, leaving fledgling organizations scrambling for survival ([Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2011](#); [J. E. Johnson & Saarinen, 2011](#); [Sperling, 2006](#)).

To preclude social unrest and cover some of the funding gap, the government began

¹ Peaceful demonstrations that took place in late 2003 to 2005 and that resulted in the overturn of governments in three countries: Georgia (Rose Revolution), Ukraine (Orange Revolution), and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution), ([Mitchell, 2012](#)).

allocating more funds to social welfare initiatives and encouraging regions to channel some of this money to nonstate organizations ([Henderson, 2011](#); [Salmenniemi, 2010](#)). Currently, nonstate social service organizations can potentially receive funding from multiple levels of government – local, regional, and national. In 2012, the Civic Chamber administered competitive grants totaling two billion rubles (\$64 million) to nonstate service organizations ([Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2012](#)). However, these grants do not reach many nonstate organizations; in 2010 only an estimated 0.2 percent of registered organizations had been awarded Civic Chamber grants ([Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2010](#)). The Russian government passed another set of laws in 2012 regulating nonstate organizations, while also pledging greater financial support for nonstate social service organizations. The most publicized aspect of this law is a requirement that nonstate organizations register themselves as a “foreign agent” if they receive any funding from a foreign source ([Russian State Duma, July 2012](#)).

In 2015, the scope of service, financial support, and roles of Russian nonstate social service organizations reflect the political and economic soil from which they grew. There are approximately 115,000 actively working Russian social welfare–oriented nonstate organizations ([Benevolenski, 2014](#)). The national, regional, and municipal branches of government are growing in their willingness to supply material support such as grants, office space with subsidized rent, or consultation and training ([Alekseeva, 2010](#); [Benevolenski, 2014](#)). Nonstate organizations today provide services in a myriad of areas, from child and family welfare to addiction recovery to elder care to disability services. Although the government often partners with these organizations, the proportion of services provided by nonstate organizations remains under 10 percent. Relationships between the majority of nonstate social service organizations and the state are moving in the direction of greater collaboration, but also greater dependency on

the Russian government. Despite the small number of nonstate social service organizations, government restrictions, and lack of resources to support programming, nonstate organizations participate in policy formation at the local level, where municipal and regional administrations sometimes call for their expertise in policy decisions ([Belokurova & Vorob'ev, 2011](#)). Recent studies of nonstate social service organizations find that when organizations are dependent on state funding and are focused on noncontroversial social issues, they can have a greater influence on policy decisions in the local context ([Beznosova & Sundstrom, 2009](#); [Fröhlich, 2012](#); [J. E. Johnson & Saarinen, 2011](#); [Ljubownikow, Crotty, & Rodgers, 2013](#)).

While inherited patterns of organization–state collaboration are helpful to some degree, certain aspects of the Soviet bureaucratic legacy may continue to hinder nonstate organization development. Scholars cite the continued reliance on personal contacts and patronage ([Henderson, 2011](#); [Salmenniemi, 2010](#)), vertical versus horizontal management styles ([J. E. Johnson & Saarinen, 2011](#); [Ledeneva, 2006](#)), and state restriction of the activity of organizations as key constraints on nonstate welfare provision. Others point specifically to the failure of foreign funders to take into account both local political environments and Russian norms and beliefs ([Crotty, 2009](#); [Sundstrom, 2006](#)). In addition, Russian citizens remain uneducated about the role of nonstate organizations in society ([Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2013, September 19](#)), wary of nonstate organizations ([Evans, 2011](#); [Henderson, 2011](#); [L. Jakobson, Mersianova, Benevolenski, & Pamfilova, 2011](#); [Salmenniemi, Borodina, Borodin, & Rautio, 2009](#)) and reluctant to join organizations ([Petukhov, 2008](#); [Rimskii, 2008](#)). Livshin and Weitz found that though domestic donations are increasing, the majority of funding goes to state-run institutions such as orphanages instead of nonstate organizations ([2006](#)). Partly as a result of foreign funding patterns and partly from the mistrust of the public, nonstate organizations also

are challenged to build long-term organizational capacity from funding that is limited to short-term projects. This capacity puzzle for nonstate organizations began with ties to international donors, yet it continues with the grant cycles of the government today ([L. E. V. Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010](#); [J. E. Johnson & Saarinen, 2011](#)).

In summary, while a myriad of challenges continue to arise in nonstate organizations' provision of social services and in nonstate organization-state collaboration in Russia, there are a number of positive signs indicating the health and growth of the sector. Jakobson and Sanovich ([2010](#)) argue that Russian nonstate organizations are diverse, and that they have learned to adapt to the surrounding political and economic environment. For example, many grassroots organizations have used the internet as their main vehicle for recruiting, organizing, and fundraising activities. Russian corporations and foundations are linking with nonpolitical nonstate organizations to address social needs in the immediate community ([Alekseeva, 2010](#)). Chebankova ([2009](#)) argues that although the public sphere and the ethical functions of civil society are stunted, the associational dimension is "showing some serious signs of successful independent functioning." Benevolenski ([2014](#)) reported that the share of Russian NGO funding from national and regional government sources in 2013 was 5 percent, a figure that represents significant growth in Russian state support of nonstate welfare provision.

Chapter 2: Glocalization as Conceptual Lens

Introduction

As is evident from the last chapter on the background of Russian social services, the interconnectedness of the world influence societies at all levels. Social workers have come to recognize that this interconnection affects clients, from individual, to family, to community. In response, an expansion in international foci in social work education has occurred over the past 20 years ([Caragata & Sanchez, 2002](#); [A. K. Johnson, 2004](#)) and several textbooks have been published to further international social work education in English-speaking countries ([Cox & Pawar, 2006](#); [Healy, 2008](#); [Healy & Link, 2011](#)). More and more, professionals are realizing that all social work concerns are globally interdependent ([Healy, 2008](#)). In conjunction with this, educators have emphasized teaching the importance of local context in preparing social workers to engage cross-culturally ([Dominelli, 2010](#); [Gray & Fook, 2004](#); [Healy, 2008](#); [Razack, 2009](#); [Staniforth, Fouché, & O'Brien, 2011](#)) and studies show that students are strongly interested in the link between local and global social issues ([Lalayants, Doel, & Kachkachishvili, 2015](#)). In addition, research has illustrated the tension between universal global social work principles and local practice, tensions that every social worker will face in some form ([Gray & Fook, 2004](#); [Jönsson, 2014](#); [Yip, 2005](#)).

The conceptual frameworks we operate under as social workers when thinking about the interconnectedness of local and global social issues and social work interventions matters. As Ferguson ([2005](#)) argues, it is time to move beyond indigenization models and consider how information and technology transfers in social work are multi-directional and non-hierarchical. I

take this one step further and argue for a conceptual framework that while not privileging one region or country's ideas, models, or interventions over another, does highlight that power differentials are always in play and must be taken into account. The ideas used to conceptualize the processes of interaction in the global world will circumscribe a social worker's ability to define problems, conceive of solutions, understand responses, and recognize potential sources of influence and power. Further, the conceptualizations we use as social workers should include room for reflection on our own positionality and power, or lack thereof. Finally, this conceptual framework should also offer a satisfactory explanatory lens through which to understand processes in the real world. In this chapter, I review globalization as a contested term and present several globalization paradigms. I argue that glocalization is a globalization paradigm that leaves room for underprivileged voices and advocate for an approach which I call critical glocalization. Critical glocalization takes into account power dynamics. Using the case study of Russia, I also show that critical glocalization offers a comprehensive explanatory lens through which to view change processes in addressing social problems.

Globalization

Globalization is a term that can refer to both a process and a result, with both negative and positive connotations. As a process, globalization is variously defined. The International Federation of Social Workers broadly and simply defines it as, "the process by which all peoples and communities come to experience an increasingly common economic, social and cultural environment. By definition, the process affects everybody throughout the world" ([2004](#)).

Another author describes globalization as the shift from traditional ways and means to universal similarities ([Villereal, 2007](#)). Authors point to the drivers of globalization as the growth of information and communication technology and the spread of neoliberal economic policies

([Findlay & McCormack, 2007](#); [West & Heath, 2011](#)). Neoliberalism as an economic ideology purports that the “most efficient allocation of resources is achieved by the competitive market” ([Ingham, 2006](#)). Thus, neoliberal policies push for reduction of government interference in the economy, privatization of business and industry, flexible labor markets, and balanced budgets. Although globalization is talked about as if it were a singular process, the literature suggests that it is actually an umbrella term for multiple processes. For example, globalization can be defined as “the worldwide diffusion of practices, expansion of relations across continents, organization of social life on a global scale, and growth of a shared global consciousness” ([G. Ritzer, 2004](#)). “It is important to restate the obvious fact that the term globalization is a linguistic form of shorthand which connotes an extremely complex and volatile set of international events” ([Midgley, 2007](#))

When authors have trouble settling on a definition, they often appeal to the apparent results of globalization:

“Although there is no agreement over the definition of globalization, a close reading of the literature suggests that there is consensus on its key features, namely:

- cultural diffusion and rapprochement contradicted by increasingly nationalist tendencies in many different countries;
- social relations that shape all aspects of life by giving primacy to market mechanisms and discipline;
- migration as a response to economic hardship, environmental degradation and violence;
- general integration and a widening of economic forces across borders compared with protectionism and exclusion;
- rapid technological change that has introduced new forms of social exclusion, e.g. the digital divide;
- disparities between urban and rural; and
- urbanization and centralization that stress environmental capacities to support ever rising population numbers” ([Dominelli, 2010](#)).

In sociology, globalization is also often described as both a process and a result, the result being “interdependence” in a number of areas. Meyer sums it up as increased interdependence in the spheres of politics and military, economies, people (due to migration), expressive culture (the

internet and mass media), and finally, instrumental culture ([2000](#)). By instrumental culture, he is referring to models of social order and social policy ([Meyer, 2000](#)).

The assumption underlying some definitions are that globalization is an unstoppable force of Western hegemony over developing countries. In other words, globalization is a form of Western imperialism that developing countries are unable to resist. For example, some globalization theorists adhere to modernization theory ([Parsons, 1966](#)), which asserts that countries will develop if they copy the forms and structures of Western capitalist democracy. If developing countries do so, they will emerge in forms and level of ‘development’ similar to that of wealthier, capitalist nations. This perspective has given rise to competing theorists, who argue that development is not a semi- evolutionary or predictable process. For example, world-systems theory contends that Western capitalism reproduces the economic dependency of the developing world on the developed; without this dependency, Western capitalism would not survive. In other words, developing countries are not free to follow the supposed developmental path because they are being dominated by more powerful countries ([Wallerstein, 1974](#)). Although modernization and world-systems theories are at odds with each other, they both assume a type of Western imperialism at their foundations, viewing less developed countries as mainly passive recipients of outside ideas and forces.

Many theorists talk about globalization in this way, describing a world “in which globalization basically runs as a pervasive and destabilizing spread of worldwide socioeconomic, politico-institutional and symbolic-cultural flows” ([Entrena-Durán, 2009](#)). Swyngedouw reframes the discussion by pointing to globalization as a discourse in which the idea of the overwhelming power of global economic and political forces is embedded, therefore providing additional authority to globalization’s outcomes ([2004](#)). He traces the emergence of this

“neoliberal discourse of market-led internationalism and globalisation” to the 1980’s, and states that it has become “a hegemonic, incontestable and virtually naturalised and self-evident set of arguments and beliefs” ([Swyngedouw, 2004](#)). He believes that the result of this discourse is to suppress both resistance and the conception of alternatives.

The attribution of globalization to neoliberal policy is widespread. Neoliberalism asserts that human well-being and the social good will be maximized when individuals are free to apply themselves in a market economy, without regulation ([Harvey, 2005](#)). Historically, neoliberal ideology considered that social institutions that form the core of social work are costly features to a society in which maximizing economic productivity was the main goal. Individuals who could not productively participate were considered deviant. Much of this thinking was spread by international economic development organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their structural adjustment programs were linked to loan agreements, and imposed policies that impacted the social welfare structures of developing and transitioning countries ([Baker & Hinds, 2012](#); [Cox & Pawar, 2006](#); [Deacon et al., 1997](#); [Healy, 2008](#); [Hugman, 2010](#)). As a result, neo-liberal economic policy is difficult for individual countries to resist when they face a choice of either changing their policy or not receiving critical loan aid.

Although the discourse painting neo-liberal globalization as inevitable and irresistible is widespread, some who theorize about globalization contest it ([Clarke, 2001](#); [Harris & Chou, 2001](#); [Midgley, 2007](#); [Pugh & Gould, 2000](#); [Webb, 2003](#)). Although they would agree that ideas and structures are increasingly interconnected, and that certain ideas are having a greater impact around the world than others, they would not characterize the process of globalization as omnipotent. “The highly deterministic and reductionist account of globalization provided in some macrostructural approaches ignores the role of forces which seek to resist globalization,

such as national and international people's movements, by assuming that globalization is both irreversible and all-consuming" ([Khan & Dominelli, 2000](#)). Robertson, a leading theorist of globalization, states that those who consider globalization as a "development that involves the triumph of culturally homogenizing forces over all others," are misled ([1995](#)). Pugh & Gould go so far as to plead with social workers "to reject the oversimplified, inconsistent, and inaccurate aspects of some accounts of globalization thus far offered. By embracing the omnipotence and inevitability thesis, some social theorists seem, paradoxically, to be accepting the catechisms of neo-liberal economists who reify market forces and posit a crude economic determinism. The defense of welfare is already a lost cause unless we believe that change is possible" ([Pugh & Gould, 2000](#)).

Glocalization

Other conceptualizations of globalization have been offered. Ritzer, in his book *The Globalization of Nothing*, asserts that globalization can be broken into two somewhat contradictory subprocesses: grobalization and glocalization ([2004](#)). Grobalization is a process in which "growth imperatives push organizations and nations to expand globally and to impose themselves on the local" ([G. Ritzer, 2004](#)). The grobalization process accounts for the imperialistic ambitions of actors, be they nations, corporations, or organizations. This more economically deterministic view of the globalization process owes its roots to Marxian and neo-Marxian theory, with corporate profitability as the driving force. In addition, Weber's emphasis on the continual spread of 'rationalized' structures around the world, and their growing control over people, is inherent in grobalization. Thus, grobalization arises out of modernism.

On the other hand, glocalization is "a process whereby the interaction of the global and the local produces something new – the glocal" ([G. Ritzer, 2004](#)). This greater emphasis on

diversity, individual narrative, and differentiation arises out of postmodernism. Ritzer explains that glocalization is a more specific term for how many globalization theorists already describe transnational processes, as “the interpenetration of the global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas” ([G. Ritzer, 2004](#)). Glocalization accounts for the power and possibility of the local as global ideas and structures impinge upon it.

Robertson, as one of the earliest glocalization social theorists, argued that globalization was not simply a homogenizing force, but also a vehicle through which economic, structural, and cultural heterogenization could take place. “It is not a question of either homogenization or heterogenization, but rather of the ways in which both of these two tendencies have become features of life across much of the late-twentieth-century world” ([Robertson, 1995](#)). He rejects the idea of a global-local dichotomy. Robertson would say that the integration of global and local produces an ever expanding variety of outcomes, as each context includes unique actors at all social levels that influence the interaction. “Not merely is variety continuously produced and reproduced in the contemporary world, that variety is largely an aspect of the very dynamics which a considerable number of commentators interpret as homogenization.”

Ritzer summarizes some of the key elements of glocalization in four points:

- “1. The world is growing more pluralistic – glocalization theory is sensitive to differences within and between areas of the world.
2. Individuals and local groups have great power to adapt, innovate, and maneuver within a glocalized world.
3. Social processes are relational and contingent, and globalization produces variety.
4. Commodities and the media, arenas and key forces are not seen as totally coercive” ([G. Ritzer, 2004, p. 77](#)).

Interestingly, the word ‘globalization’ has not caught on in the literature. Perhaps it is because globalization simply mirrors the popular conception of globalization, whereas glocalization is somewhat counter to the prevailing notion.

Similar to how Swyngedouw talked about globalization as a discourse, Szulecki describes glocalization as an ongoing conversation ([Szulecki, 2011](#)). This conversation leaves room for the power and efficacy of local actors, as opposed to the hegemony of global discourse and actors. Szulecki's scheme of glocalization is somewhat different from that of Ritzer, as it preserves a dichotomy of the global and the local. Szulecki describes the factors and processes of glocalization in this way, introducing the term localization in the description:

“‘Localization’ is defined as a discursive practice through which a seemingly universal discourse (related to a certain idea, norm, or value) is rephrased and reconstructed in such a way as to fit the landscape of the local setting and make these discourses meaningful and legitimate to the given culture...In the localization process, an internationally functioning discourse is “picked up” and consciously grafted on to existing domestic discourses (recontextualized), in such a way that it acquires meanings it previously did not have but that are related to some discursive structures and traditions present on the local level. As a modified concept or idea, the translated “universal” notion can then be presented to the “global.” Then another renegotiation of meaning occurs, through which the seemingly “universal” concept and its localized translation can again be merged into one” ([Szulecki, 2011](#)).

In this description of glocalization, Szulecki emphasizes the ongoing nature of global and local interaction, the possibility of influence from either direction, and the opportunity for completely new discourses to arise. Rankopo and Osei-Hwedie promote similar ideas, writing that their “central argument is that social work education and practice that take account of multiple perspectives and cultural explanations of social reality are more relevant than those that seek to transcend all cultures” ([Rankopo & Osei-Hwedie, 2011](#)).

A different way of thinking of glocalization is offered by Raz, who conceptualizes it not as a theory per se, but an analytic perspective ([1999](#)). With this perspective, we do not predict what forms will emerge from the intersection of the global and the local, but rather affirm that a type of continuum exists, ranging from domination to resistance, and that the interaction is constantly in flux in ways unique to each culture. Payne and Askeland agree with this

perspective, alleging that there is no such thing as a single, unified social work, but rather “social works,” based on local cultural assumptions and needs. However, they do think that Western models can be helpful in providing frameworks from which to innovate ([2008](#)).

In summary, the various definitions surrounding globalization in the literature point to a variety of ideological positions that can have an impact on international social work collaboration, social work education, social policy, and social welfare systems. The prevailing conceptualization of globalization (e.g. globalization) is often negative, presenting a discourse that pays little attention to processes of resistance and to actions of those with less power. The discourse around glocalization as an alternative is more positive. Glocalization recognizes that power is not unilateral, but that as global ideas and forces interact with local places, a mix of acceptance, resistance, adaptation, and reformulation occurs. Voices which are ignored in the predominant globalization narrative are heard in glocalization – voices such as local professional organizations, governments, policy-makers, educators, and social work practitioners. The activity of social movements and civil society organizations is acknowledged as contributing to the ongoing process of institutional change, the interaction of ideas, and the interventions that produce new forms that are neither local nor global.

Glocalization versus Indigenization

As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, I am promoting glocalization as a conceptual framework that improves upon the helpful but limited notion of indigenization. “‘Indigenization’... occurs when social work is rendered appropriate for local needs” ([Hugman, 2009](#)). Indigenization is further described by Walton and El Nasr as “a process whereby a Western model of social work is transplanted into another environment, making some modifications which enable the model to be applied in a different cultural context” ([1988, p.](#)

[148](#)). In Figure 4, I show a simple model of indigenization. A social work idea or model is introduced into a local setting. In that setting, the idea or model undergoes changes that adapt it to the setting. In this paradigm, the contact between global and local occurs within the local space, with the global invading the local. The local space changes a little, but mainly the change is happening to the specific intervention, which in turn gradually changes the local. However, the local has a semblance of ‘control’ over the process. There is not much in this model to suggest any influence from the local to the global. The idea of indigenization is helpful in social work because it emphasizes sensitivity and respect for local historical, political, and social context and norms.




Figure 1. Indigenization

However, there are some cautions toward operating with an indigenization mindset. Some advocates of indigenization argue for a process that eschews foreign models and promotes grassroots development. Rankopo warns that such a lopsided indigenization approach is detrimental to social work, arguing that indigenization should not blindly reject social work values and practice simply because they arise in the West. Another weakness is that theories of indigenization are vague in defining what is local: is it a city, region, or country? If social workers claim to have indigenized an intervention, do they keep in mind that their indigenized version may still be foreign to some subgroups in a geographic region? ([Dominelli & Hackett, 2011](#); [Rankopo & Osei-Hwedie, 2011](#)). Others support such caution, emphasizing that even when social work goals are articulated similarly across countries, social workers’ actual roles and

approaches may be vastly different ([Chou, Haj-Yahia, Wang, & Fu, 2006](#); [Hugman, Moosa-Mitha, & Moyo, 2010](#)).

In order to provide a more comprehensive idea of what happens in indigenization, Gray & Fook ([2004](#)) describe it as dialogical processes of global ideas with local contexts that are likely to produce models of social work more relevant than imported models. Glocalization expands this by asserting that the process is more than two-way dialogue, or a global idea or model injected into the local and modified, but rather an arena in which control over discursive content flow is dispersed over many areas (political, economic, policy, culture, etc.) aided by global media. The theory of glocalization is broader than and encompasses the process of indigenization. The glocal is not simply the global interacting with the local in the local, but an entirely new arena for discourse and change, with a process that is multilayered and multi-directional. Indigenization looks at a certain conceptualization (definition of social work, for example), model of service (foster care system for children in the care of the state, for example), or intervention (individual psychotherapy, for example) and describes how such a new idea/model/practice can be integrated into a recipient culture. Glocalization is broader while





Figure 2. Glocalization

and cultures are interacting, with no predictable outcome.

acknowledging that what indigenization describes does happen. However, indigenization's focus is on a specific process happening to a specific model or intervention and is somewhat unidirectional and proscriptive, whereas glocalization conceptualizes a space in which multiple models, discussions, politics,

On the other hand, glocalization is “a process whereby the interaction of the global and the local produces something new – the glocal” ([G. Ritzer, 2004](#)). Glocalization is modeled in Figure 5. In this model, the local and the global intersect, creating a unique space in which a continual process takes place. This is the space of glocalization. Both the global and the local exert influence on the intersection to varying degrees. The glocal space is a place of creativity and innovation, and new ideas emanate out, back into the global and the local.

In addition, the space of the glocal can vary, according to how much interaction is taking place, and how many new ideas the glocal is already producing. This allows for thinking about how interactions function differently in different places. For example, in the area of social work practice, there are regions in Russia that have been relatively untouched by international projects. Many of the social workers in service positions have little social work education, and the agencies in which they work resemble the bureaucracy of the Soviet social welfare state. The glocal space for such a place would be rather small. In contrast, cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Tomsk have had significant foreign projects and collaborations take place. In these places, the glocal space would be getting larger. In fact, in many places of the world the purely local forms barely exist anymore, as the global has already touched it, and the glocal is



crowding out the local. Figure 6 illustrates this scenario. The global remains fairly large, the glocal grows, and the purely local begins to disappear. In one sense, the glocal becomes the new local.

Figure 3. Glocalization with Greater Global Influence

Power & Change

According to glocalization theory, every glocalization space is unique, because every local context differs and every interaction with cultural forms from a foreign source is differentially received and interpreted ([Robertson, 1995](#)). As with indigenization, a strength of this approach is cultural sensitivity. Taken to its extreme, glocalization may lead social workers to a form of relativism. Social workers could become wary of or even shy away from designing “universal” interventions, thinking that trying to bring them to other cultures is cultural imperialism. I think that such consequences are more likely for those who conceptualize introduction of interventions using an indigenization model than for those who adhere to a glocalization model. However, the danger with using a glocalization model is that social workers may not take power dynamics into account. Looking at the Venn diagrams, it appears that local and global forces have equal influence, especially when looking at figure 5. As figure 3 shows, the size and relative influence of the local and global can change. Often it is the global that wields more power, as in the case of the IMF and other global discourse in Russian economic and social policy of the early 1990s. But it is possible for the local to have more power, or to have very little. Either way, anyone planning to enter a new context needs to be aware of the glocal space and power dynamics, and use their own power (be it funding, education, social, positional, etc.) with care. This approach is what I am advocating for in this paper: critical glocalization. After presenting Russian social work education and practice as a case, I will further develop this idea.

Glocalization as an Explanatory Lens: Russia

Russia provides an interesting example for looking at the emergence of the glocal space and developments in social work, because before the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, foreign influence was limited. This is not to say that Russia lacked interaction with the outside

world prior to 1991, nor that as a multi-cultural nation it was not influenced by globalization before then. Rather, the five years before and after 1991 saw an expansive opening to the outside world which created a glocal sphere to a degree not formerly seen.

Data and Methods

This chapter is based on 25 two-hour semi-structured in-depth interviews with Russian social work educators and practitioners in 3 Russian cities in 2011, 3 interviews of social work educators in 2014, an extensive literature review, and 11 years of experience living in Russia. In-person interviews were collected and digitally recorded. I analyzed them in Nvivo using an iterative process of coding and analytic memo-writing, working with a Russian native speaker to check the reliability of the coding and interpretation. I also analyzed Russian-language social work textbooks, comparing their tables of contents and authorship over time. Finally, I conducted an extensive literature review in order to understand and triangulate the information from the interviews and the textbooks. The findings allow me to trace the emergence of Russia social work education and social work practice over time using a conceptual framework of glocalization. After briefly introducing the context for social work education and practice in Russia, I move on to showing how glocalization provides a superior lens for understanding the development of education and practice in Russia.

Context

An overview of the macro economic and political situation will provide the basis for looking at glocalization processes in social work education and practice development. Admittedly, this is a brief and oversimplified picture, but it is enough to provide a context. From the late 1980s through the 1990s, the economic and political infrastructure of communism disintegrated, and years of tumultuous adjustment followed. The one-party political system that

controlled the entire economy collapsed, with nascent forms of democracy, free enterprise, and then “managed capitalism” taking root. In 1991, the Soviet Union split and the Russian territory became its own country. In the 1990s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were pushing for a neoliberal agenda in which government spending for social supports was minimized and a free market was emphasized. Pressure to follow these recommendations came through provision of loans to Russia to prevent a total collapse of its economy. While Russia implemented many IMF and other Western ‘expert’ recommendations, they did not cut provision of social services as drastically as other former East Bloc countries ([Cook, 2007b](#)), and in the 2000s Russia increased social spending. In the early 2000s the Russian economy stabilized due to the high price of oil, and the size of its middle class and overall standard of living begin to increase. In 2000, President Putin came to power, and anti-Western government discourse, until then a murmur, began to grow. Over the past 15 years, this murmur has become part of official government propaganda, made all the more pervasive through increased government control over the media. Political developments over Crimea and Ukraine since 2014 have only increased this bias. A myriad of factors have contributed to the bias, among them a resistance and backlash against foreign ideas, policies, and influence. Russian politicians, economists, and ordinary Russians blame Western policies imported to their country for the unemployment, dramatic increase in economic inequality, and economic instability of the 1990s and beyond.

In addition to the arrival of foreign economic, policy, and political advisors, Russia also experienced an influx of foreign ideas, people, funding, and programs in the sphere of social work education and social work practice. Indeed, the 1990s in particular saw grants from the European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO, the World Bank, and other international organizations focused on developing social work education in

Russia and on introducing new social service interventions ([Romanov & Kononenko, 2014](#)). By looking at social work education and service interventions in Russia over time, we see how a glocalization lens provides insight into power dynamics, multidirectional competing narratives, and innovative results not only for the specific projects themselves, but in the larger macro context.

Social Work Education

Social work as a profession did not exist in Russia prior to 1991. Benefits or social services were provided by government workers in various institutions/agencies. In fact, until 1991 the term “social work” described a low status, low-skill job, an understanding that persists to this day. As one interviewee said,

“When people hear ‘social work,’ what do they think? -- Regular people? Usually they imagine some marginal low professional or unprofessional work. For example, work at home, taking care of old people or invalids. This profession is regarded as something like a janitor or dish washer.”

Thus, the introduction of social work education in universities, with the help of international grants and collaborations, had an inauspicious beginning. One interviewee, a sociologist who also teaches in a social work program, recollected that,

“There was a time when we instructors said, ‘I’m not giving lectures to future nannies or manual laborers.’”

The first social work programs in Russian universities were opened in 1991. In the literature, there are various descriptions of how quickly university education in social work spread. One author claims that 52 universities had social work programs in 1995 and the number climbed to about 150 programs in 2005, ([Penn, 2007](#)), while another says that it went from four programs in 1991 to 130 in 2006 ([Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2006](#)). The initial federally-approved curriculum was created by an interdisciplinary committee over the course of one intensive

summer. Committee members included professors of psychology, history, political science, sociology, pedagogy, economics, and Marxist philosophy. Initially, most of the textbooks and concepts of social work were imported and translated from Europe and the United States. By 2011, several of the interviewed social work educators had participated in some type of exchange program in which they visited European or U.S. social work programs and numerous social work agencies. Iarskaia-Smirnova estimates that about 15% of educators have participated in foreign exchange opportunities ([2011](#)). In addition, some educators mentioned that they and their students had spent six weeks to a semester studying in European university-level social work programs.

Several forces were influential in shaping social work education in Russia from 1991 to the present. The first, concentrated heavily in the first fifteen years of this time period, was visits from European and U.S. social work professors, practitioners, and nonprofit organizations. Interview participants were candid about both the benefits and drawback of these visits. They appreciated the insight into definitions of social work as they were still trying to understand it for their own context. They also appreciated the examples of types of groups targeted and interventions used in social work practice, as most Russian educators in the first ten years had no practice experience themselves. They expressed great appreciation for being introduced to new ideas and interventions, as well as innovative teaching methods. However, numerous educators mentioned that the quality of foreign presentations varied widely, and that at times they, their students, and practitioners who came for training were extremely disappointed in the depth of content or the cultural appropriateness of the examples and interventions presented.

A second force shaping social work education was the work of the Educational-methodological Association of Russian Institutions of higher education in education in the field

of social work (Учебно-методическое объединение вузов России по образованию в области социальной работы – hereafter УМОБ), which advises the Ministry of Education on standards for social work education and curriculum for national accreditation. This association is headquartered at the Russian State Social University in Moscow, but includes Deans and/or representatives of Social Work departments from around the country. I interviewed several members of this committee, including two that were part of the initial group. The first set of social work education standards reflected the influence of European and U.S. social work models while also including a hodge-podge of traditional Russian general education topics ([Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2006](#)). However, in 2000 the second set of standards, developed by УМОБ, were accepted by the Ministry of Education, and these standards minimized any discussion of foreign influence or social work practice. The decrease in foreign influence in Russian social work curriculum coincides with decreased interest of NGOs in Russia, fewer opportunities for international exchange, and increased anti-Western opinion in the early 2000s ([Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2006](#)). However, the second set of standards allowed for 1/3 of the curriculum to be created by individual university social work programs themselves. As numerous interviewees mentioned, speaking of their own universities and other departments that they had contact with, a fair amount of material from foreign sources was still used in teaching, although Russian educators were beginning to write their own textbooks. An analysis of textbooks undertaken by social researcher Iarskaia-Smirnova confirmed their perceptions. She found that textbooks contained an assorted mix of approaches, “presenting a large incongruence between IASSW and Russian understanding of social work theories and practice” ([2006](#)). The influence of international projects also showed uneven results. For the universities that have actually participated in projects, the curriculum showed divergence from the National Standard, with new

courses and practical training being introduced (for example, as happened in Tomsk, Russia, as a result of the ARO project). These courses reflect a Western perspective on gender inequality, community resources, and participatory approaches. In addition, educators who participated in international projects integrate comparative analysis into their teaching. However, in places without involvement in foreign projects, the evidence of Western influence is minimal ([Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2006](#)).

In 2003, Russia committed to the Bologna accords, which is a European agreement aimed at standardizing higher education programs and quality across Europe ([Schmidt, 2009](#)). The Bologna accords call for four-year bachelor degree programs and two-year master degree programs in almost all disciplines. Because Russian university education generally comprised five years of training, the YMOB developed another revised set of standards, released in 2009, to adhere to a 4-year and 2-year requirement. This set of standards left very little freedom to individual programs, prescribing a strict set of subjects that had to be taught, and re-introducing traditional Russian, very theoretical subjects. Interviewees complained that it was quite difficult to fit any practical courses into the curriculum.

Since 2009, YMOB has continued to update the standards, allowing slightly more leeway to universities in designing original courses. However, universities are encouraged to use books written by Russians and approved by YMOB or other high-ranking Russian social work programs. Textbooks that were translated from German and English in the 1990s are gathering dust, and few current ones are being translated. Russian social work academics voiced pride that they have their own textbooks now, and felt foreign influence should be minimized so that distinctly “Russian” forms of social work could be developed. University educators are increasingly wary of inviting foreign lecturers, although they are open to reciprocal exchanges

with European or U.S. universities. In addition, a subject generally accepted as part of social work curriculums outside of Russia is not able to be taught in Russian social work programs. ‘Social policy’ as a topic is the domain of political science in Russian academia, and political scientists fight against letting social work departments teach it as a course, “even though they themselves rarely touch on social policy as a subject with their students,” as a Dean in a Russian social work program explained.

As we can see from this summary of social work education development, tremendous mixing and interaction of global, local, and transitional influences occurred in a short span of time. Macro glocalization produced a new form of economy – a uniquely Russian version of managed capitalism. Democratic structures weakened and strong state control returned to politics, with the approval of a majority of Russians. As evidenced by the evolution of social work education described above, anti-U.S. and anti-European national discourse extended to all spheres of policy, practice, and discourse. In 2014, an educator related how recently a Russian-born American social worker, who speaks fluent Russian with no accent, was invited to give a lecture to the students. The speaker was asked not to mention the fact that she was an American, but was supposed to present herself as a Russian who happened to have experience in social work practice in the U.S. This story was verified by the author with the actual lecturer. As most of the interviewees expressed, social work programs in Russia live in the tension of wanting to collaborate with those outside the country but also being extremely suspicious of any non-Russian knowledge or intervention. Along with this, they feel pressure not to become too “Westernized.”

Social Work Practice

Social work practice is another area that is better understood by glocalization than by the popular conception of hegemonic globalization or simple indigenization. In Russia, we see a blend of local and global ideas that have produced innovative interventions. In addition, we see that subgroups within society have wielded forms of power to resist global values or understandings and created their own interventions. Because many elements of the social work profession have been newly introduced in Russia, social work practice is highly influenced by the glocal – a space with a continuous multidirectional interaction of ideas.

As social workers and educators reflected on outside influences and changes in practice over the past 25 years, they almost unanimously voiced positive feelings for the training in foreign practice models and interventions that they had participated in or heard about. They also appreciated international training in evaluation and creating outcome measures. However they voiced reasons for why many international models did not work in Russia. Beginning with a macro focus, they talked about the lack of a legal/policy basis to support certain models and interventions, lack of government support, both national and local, and the weakness of civil society (nonprofit) organizations. In addition, oftentimes projects ended without a plan or funding for dissemination and implementation of an intervention. They talked about the use of the term “social work” and how it disempowers their efforts because of negative connotations in Russia. They also mention the poor quality of international trainers:

“Unfortunately, in the 90s we have so many trainers come overseas and their trainings were not always up to a high standard, so after this heat wave of trainings there was distrust. And we are doubting whether those trainings or any foreign-based trainings are good for us.”

In another study, when Penn ([2007](#)) asked practitioners “about the introduction of international models of social work practice, 20% said they did not believe they were suitable for

Russia, 45% were unsure, while 35% confirmed that they were appropriate. Most respondents added that the models should be adapted to suit Russia.”

Despite the shortcomings of global ideas/models/interventions in the Russian context, their introduction did create a wave of activity in the glocal. One vehicle in which the glocal is strongly evident is nonprofit organizations, a social structure that barely existed before 1991. An influx of foreign nonprofits and funding helped spark the creation of numerous nonprofits in Russia, both foreign-affiliated and Russian. Over time, foreign funding declined but many Russian social service nonprofits have adapted and begun to cooperate with local governments and to receive national and local government funding ([Wathen & Allard, 2014](#)). These Russian organizations have participated in numerous trainings such as board governance, leadership development, working with volunteers, grant writing, and capacity-building that were initially provided by international organizations. In the last decade a cadre of Russian trainers has provided training through seminars, webinars, podcasts, and written material.

However, local resistance to universal models has produced glocal forms. For example, in the realm of fundraising for social service NGOs, a model often presented follows fundraising models of Europe, Canada, and the U.S. Applying for grants from foundations and the government is emphasized, as well as outreach to individual donors. However, through my participant-observation at fundraising seminars and interviews, I found that NGO leaders in smaller cities reject many of the methods suggested as untenable in their contexts. They claim that working with individual donors is unrealistic for several reasons: the population’s unfamiliarity with and distrust of NGOs, the lack of historic philanthropic culture, and the low incomes of most of the population in their cities. On the other hand, they have taken some fundraising strategies and are leveraging them in creative ways to raise money from businesses

that wish to practice “corporate philanthropy.” The idea of corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility is a result of both Soviet history and foreign influence. During the Soviet era, an enterprise would often “sponsor” an orphanage or other government social service institution. This would usually involve donation of material or monetary goods and/or employees doing something on holidays. Since enterprises were owned by the government, such collaborations were fairly simple to organize. When enterprises were privatized and businesses worked in a competitive environment, these activities disappeared, only to re-emerge as foreign ideas of corporate social responsibility were introduced by multinational corporations and newly Western-trained MBAs. In time, the Russian government began encouraging Russian businesses to follow suit. NGO leaders seized upon this opportunity by creating collaborations with local government social service agencies and leveraging the government connection to legitimize their work. Seeing that the government had placed some stamp of approval on the NGO and relying on the government to monitor the NGO, businesses were more inclined to donate money and also send their employees as volunteers to these organizations.

In the Russian context, the government connection is critical. A free-standing non-connected NGO would have a very difficult time raising money from businesses. This form of fundraising arose in a glocal context, creating a form of operation that contributes to the glocal discourse and into the global, as other NGOs in former Soviet republics adopt similar strategies.

Examples in other areas abound. During the Soviet era, most people with physical or cognitive disabilities were placed in institutions with very few services. In the past 25 years, local citizen organizations and social workers have created nonprofits that offer support, education, and services to those individuals and their families to prevent institutionalization and promote quality of life. Although many would like to see services integrated into the educational

system (as in Europe and the U.S.), which is slowly happening, for now these groups in various cities have found their own way to create change and provide services. Within these new organizations, many educational, rehabilitative, and therapeutic interventions introduced by foreign trainers and organizations have been adopted in an institutional context that works for Russia ([Romanov & Kononenko, 2014](#)).

In the field of child welfare there is also glocal innovation. De-institutionalization of children has been declared an imperative by Putin, but various structural barriers, cultural assumptions, and corruption have stood in the way of rapid progress toward a foster care system. Innovative solutions have been created, such as the “patronat” system, whereby a child is placed in a family, but the building in which children were formerly housed becomes a resource center for those children and their families. The resource center provides after-school activities, counseling, training for parents, medical services, support groups, and such things. One of the first such “patronat” orphanages even received recognition from the United Nations for the positive outcomes achieved in child development through this new structure. This system began to spread throughout Russia, with local orphanage directors spearheading the movement. However, as power became more centralized in Russia, those in the old system who stood to lose power and money as a result of this change were able to pass legislation banning the patronat system. This illustration shows the complicated interconnection of politics, money, social policy, and structural forms and how varying levels of power, both macro and micro, can influence discourse and the fate of social interventions.

Another example of a glocal innovation is the adoption of foreign methods of community organizing, in which a paid neighborhood center employee facilitates residents in defining goals and creating programs for their community. Neighborhood centers were common in many cities

and towns during the Soviet era, although their main function at that time was to carry out government initiatives and oversee citizen participation. One Russian individual, trained in the United States and Europe in NGO creation and management, headed an organization to promote the development of NGOs and civil society. Her organization decided to introduce principles of community organizing to already existing community centers. She started this initiative in one Russian city and it has been spreading to others. The results have been encouraging: changing the methods by which these centers engage their communities has created new forms of community support (<http://rucal.ru/>) (interview with founder & one center leader). Instead of the neighborhood center staff deciding what programs to offer, they now focus on empowering community members to identify needs, create programs, and carry them out. The Russian version of the website emphasizes that the goal is “not to create new NGOs or government organizations or agencies, but rather to use principles of community organizing to involve the population in already existing organizations.” This goal is also consistent with recent government measures to reign in NGOs and harness and steer volunteer energy in an approved direction. The move by this NGO development organization to pour resources into this new initiative to develop government centers instead of independent NGOs is in fact a consequence of government pressure and negative propaganda against NGOs. Thus, in this situation we have global methods of community organizing being introduced into the glocal space resulting in new forms of work. The power dynamics of government involvement in the NGO and volunteer sphere will continue to produce new and adapting forms of civic involvement.

Glocalization does not occur only because of government pressure or anti-Western sentiment. Alongside glocal innovations are pockets of resistance to global influence due to cultural values. For example, although there are some nonprofit organizations offering services

to women affected by domestic violence, these face negative press from some Russian Orthodox priests and politicians who believe that such organizations spread “anti-family propaganda” ([Monaghan, 24 March 2015](#)). Since the cultural discourse on this issue is strongly tied to the Russian Orthodox Church, a powerful structure in Russian society, these organizations must find ways to communicate their mission in ways acceptable to the general population. Another value clash occurs over the definition of child abuse, as Russians in general support the use of corporal punishment. For example, one Russian researcher doing a study of corporal punishment used the word “abuse” in her work and was censored by other Russian academics (interview). However, the researcher is also following the government imperative for university faculty to increase their number of international journal publications so that the rankings of Russian higher education institutions improve. This case shows the complex interaction of discursive spheres in which glocalization occurs. The researcher lamented the fact that the foreign discourse around child abuse clashed with Russian discourse, and she was trying to create a new discourse acceptable to both sides. These and other dissonances in values create pockets of resistance to imported ideas in practice and in research, motivating innovation in the glocal sphere.

One assertion of glocalization theory is that the glocal space increases heterogeneity by producing innovations that go back into the global. This is true in Russia’s case. For example, other countries in the region take into account Putin’s “state capitalism” as they work to stabilize and develop their own economies and social systems. In many countries of Eurasia, national laws restricting and monitoring the work of NGOs have been modelled after Russian laws. In addition, since the prestige of Russian universities is higher than those of other countries’ in Eurasia, young people and researchers, including social workers and social policy makers, are being influenced by Russian education. So although much of this paper has focused on glocal

activity within Russia, there is strong evidence that the interaction and multi-directional influence described in glocalization theory is taking place.

Critical Glocalization

I view what has happened in Russia as the ebb and flow of various ideas within all spaces of the glocalization model, with the pockets of power within and between each space constantly in flux. Power to accept, change, or create new social policy and social interventions resides in actors, structures, values, and discourse. A simple expanded illustration is found below (see Figure 7). In the center area of the Venn diagram lies the glocal space, where innovation, interaction of ideas, and influence in all directions is created. The local and global areas surround the glocal. Various actors, structures, values and discourses originate from all areas, many of which also interact within the glocal space. For example, in Russia, some of the main actors in social welfare policy and provision exerting influence from the global space include international NGOs, funders, corporations, and trainers. At different periods of time these actors exerted varying levels of power in the system. In the 1990s and early 2000s, foreign funders influence the adoption of new structures (NGOs and other civil society structures) and social work interventions to a much greater degree than they do now. However, their activity in Russia influences the discourse around social problem definition and types of interventions to this day. On the other side, push-back against changes to the system arose from local government administrators, as well as the national government as it re-centralized control over policy and the legal structure of service provision. As NGO leaders, social workers, and social work educators swam in the glocal space of political, social, cultural, and academic discourses, they have generated new paths of service delivery, targeted interventions, and fund-raising strategies.

Actors, structures, and discourse can exert influence and move in various directions. For example, the national government promotes anti-Western sentiment in the media, leading to increased suspicion of foreign academics and restrictions on international collaborations. At the same time, the government recruits academics trained in U.S. or European universities with the goal of raising the prestige and ranking of Russian universities.




Figure 4. Glocalization: Actors, Structures, Discourse, Values

What is not reflected in the model is the differential power of actors, structure, and discourse. This is where social work educators, researchers, and practitioners need to practice what I am calling critical glocalization. Critical glocalization is an approach to research and practice that seeks to understand the main actors, structures, discourses, and values in a setting, with special focus on identifying low-power and disenfranchised voices and groups. This approach incorporates an examination of power and a recognition of the creativity and innovation of the glocal space. Any social work outsider entering a context should have the approach of critical glocalization. This would entail personal characteristics of humility, openness to a variety of discourses and value positions, self-reflexivity, integrity, and an

understanding and respect for one's own values. It would also entail empowering low-power actors to play roles in designing, implementing, and evaluating any intervention or policy.

Implications

The implications of different perspectives of global change for social policy and practice are immense. Each leads to different approaches to social policy, social work, and international collaboration. Looking at each approach in its most simplistic form, I will illustrate.

Globalization as commonly conceived is based on modernism, holding that universal knowledge exists and is applicable across cultures. This influences how modernist people and organizations enter a new space and attempt to create change; they would not have a problem advising on best practices or in changing existing structures with limited regard for local context. In Russia, there were times in which an international organization entered a region, set up a program, and left. The program survived and functioned to the extent that local people accepted or rejected the program in whole or in part, and adapted it to suit their own context. Other times, organizations such as the IMF prescribed interventions with little regard for local consequences. Such an approach lends credence to the hegemonic globalization narrative, and if the actors using such an approach have power, their approach muffles the voices of other stakeholders in the system.

Strict post-modernists would repudiate the claim of universal knowledge in the social sphere and assert that all knowledge is socially-constructed; therefore, if someone wants to enter a new culture, one must discard pre-existing ideas and begin by understanding the culture. In fact, at the extreme some might even say it would be unethical or maybe even impossible for an outsider to create change. Although glocalization arises from post-modernism, I think that it finds a compromise. In my conception of glocalization, neither the global nor the local is discredited. The local retains great value. Global universals may not exist, but global ideas,

discourse, and practice may contain elements that are applicable in multiple situations and cultures. The goal of critical glocalization is to participate respectfully in the glocal space, expecting that the interactions occurring therein can create something new. As an example, the organization SOS International Children's Villages exemplified this approach by entering the interaction space in order to establish something both similar and different from both their own standard model and the Russian residential model. Understanding the power complexities of a context and the change processes using a glocalization approach makes room for various stakeholders to act, recognizing that globalization is not an irresistible force.

The case of Russia illustrates why a conceptual framework of glocalization is appropriate. Looking back at the past twenty years, it is clear that globalization as a hegemonic force is not an appropriate framework through which to understand what has happened in the development of social work education and practice. Resistance by local individuals, institutions, and discourse interacted with global ideas and created new forms. This same process has been mirrored in multiple areas in Russia. The concept of indigenization, in which a global practice or idea is swallowed by the local context with minor revisions, does not do justice to the creation of new practices and forms created by the interaction of global and local, and does not account for the contribution these new forms make back to the global sphere.

Looking forward, glocalization needs to be the guiding conceptual framework for social workers. The framework through which social workers gaze as they enter a new culture and/or location will dictate to what degree they will look for and respect various sources of power. Using glocalization as their guiding paradigm will sensitize western social workers to power dynamics, develop their respect for local expertise, values, and ways of knowing, and remind them to reflect on their own values and biases. They will be encouraged to look for new solutions

and novel adaptations/creations of interventions that arise in the sphere of the glocal. Finally, they will seek to understand the broader political, economic, structural, policy, and discursive contexts in which they are working.

How does this apply to me and other social workers? When planning research, we need to understand global, glocal, and local discourses. All areas are important. The same is true in policy-making and practice. An awareness of the power dynamics in play in all areas is also important. For example, how does corruption affect service users? Educators? Policy-makers? The functioning of international organizations? Who is making decisions? In which direction(s) does their influence flow? In this way, social workers, be they natives of a context or outsiders coming in, will be able to make informed decisions in research, policy recommendations, and practice.

Glocalization as a lens allows for examination of multidirectional influence, acknowledgement of various sources and degrees of power, recognition of innovation that is neither global or local, and understanding of multiple contexts. The glocalization sphere births new forms and ideas that would not otherwise have arisen, and which in turn further influences glocal, local, and global discourse. Such a lens provides hope that people, groups, and nations are not powerless before the steamroller of globalization in the commonly understood sense.

Ritzer sums it up well:

“Yet, glocalization does represent some measure of hope. For one thing, it is the last outpost of most lingering, if already adulterated (by globalization), forms of the local. That is, important vestiges of the local remain in the glocal...If the local alone is no longer the source that it once was for uniqueness, at least some of the slack has been picked up by the glocal. It is even conceivable that the glocal is, or at least can be, a more significant source of uniqueness and innovation than the local. Another source of hope lies in two or more glocal forms interacting to produce that which is distinctive in content.” ([G. Ritzer, 2003](#)).

As social worker researchers and educators, we need to work “both within and with contexts” as Gray & Fook assert ([Gray & Fook, 2004](#)), with hope that change and innovation are possible. Glocalization theory facilitates this work and encourages this hope. Using critical glocalization, social workers will investigate power, and understand “whose voices are silenced and, more importantly, what gets discussed and what is erased,” ([Razack, 2009](#)) in order to create change.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundation, Methods, Reflection, & Data

A critical element of the glocal sphere is culture, and the remainder of this dissertation focuses on culture and its interaction with other actors, structures, and discourse in the Russian glocal space. While culture is a broad and amorphous term, I am focusing on only one sub-area of culture here. In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical foundation for chapters 4 and 5, articulating the concept of civic culture frameworks that will be used to analyze data from interviews and participant observation. In addition, I provide an overview of my methodology, reflections, and data.

Civil Society

In the United States, Canada, and large parts of Europe, the role of nonprofit organizations and volunteers in providing social services is widespread. A majority of nonprofit organizations utilize volunteers. In fact, in the United States, many nonprofit grant funders consider the strength of an organization's volunteer base as a criterion for funding. They recognize that the number of volunteers and the quantity of time contributed are barometers for the involvement of the community and the importance of the organization to the community. In addition, volunteers provide cost savings in service provision and are instrumental in creating social capital among both volunteers and recipients of service.

The structure of and benefits provided by nonprofits and volunteerism are part of what the academic and political worlds call civil society. Civil society refers in general to the relationship between citizens and the state. A simple definition is offered by Sundstrom and Henry, ([2006, p. 5](#)): “a space of citizen directed collective action, located between the family and

the state.” Edwards summarizes the main ideas in the civil society discourse into three main frameworks ([2004, p. 10](#)). The first emphasizes associations, networks, and informal voluntary organizations, both political and apolitical, which occupy the space between the individual and the state. The second conceives of civil society as seeking moral and ethical values and protecting human equality. The third focuses on the institutionalized norms that facilitate the existence and functioning of associations and networks, e.g. the public sphere. The three conceptualizations are complementary in function ([Edwards, 2004](#)). For example, voluntary associations provide spaces for ethical and moral actions, while the public sphere ensures that there are norms and structures (legislation, etc.) to undergird such associations.

The literature on civil society points to various expectations regarding the functioning of civil society. Many Western approaches expect that citizen associations will serve their function through confrontation with the state, acting as a link between citizens and the state ([Hale, 2002](#); [J. E. Johnson & Saarinen, 2011](#)). Alternative expectations of civil society recognize that the relationship between the citizen and the state can take other forms. The state can promote, protect, or restrict organizations. Another option is cooperation between organizations and the state to meet the needs of citizens ([J. E. Johnson & Saarinen, 2011](#); [Thomson, 2006](#)).

In the United States, civil society manifests itself in all of these ways. In the sphere of social welfare in particular, there is strong cooperation between private organizations and the state. In other parts of the world, such cooperation between the state and the private sector is a new phenomenon fraught with suspicion and difficulty.

Of the countries of the post-Soviet sphere, Russia remains the most influential. Social policy decisions in Russia have repercussions in other former Soviet countries, both due to political influence and to the high number of migrant workers from those countries. Conducting

this research in Russia provided several concrete advantages. Volunteerism is a new phenomenon in Russia, and because of pressing needs and scarce resources, volunteer organizations are developing and working in innovative ways in the field of social services ([L. E. V. Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010](#); [Petukhov, 2008](#)). In addition, the kind and scope of collaborations they have with one another and with government bodies are varied. Because the transition from a socialist past to a “managed capitalism” has been tumultuous and contradictory ([Field & Twigg, 2000](#)), and because volunteers and volunteer organizations do not have indigenous historical models to draw from, the Russian context provides an ideal setting in which to examine innovations.

In addition, the Russian context is one of great need for both preventive and ameliorative services. The rate of poverty is fairly high, with 32% of the population not having enough income to afford both food and clothing for their family in 2008. Another 51% could afford food and clothing, but not items such as refrigerators, washing machines, etc. In 2008, only 16% of the population was considered middle class, and 1% was considered upper class ([Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 2009](#)). Unfortunately but predictably, this correlates with a high rate of child abuse and neglect ([Balachova et al., 2009](#); [Berrien, Prelkov, Ivanova, Zhmurov, & Buzhicheeva, 1995](#); [Ovcharova & Popova, 2005](#)). Due to massive unemployment and the increase in substance abuse since 1991, the percentage of children in the care of the state has increased annually ([Carter, 2005](#)). At the same time, services and benefits formerly provided by the Soviet state have significantly diminished ([Guslyakova, 2006](#); [Kornai, Haggard, & Kaufman, 2001](#)).

The vast majority of civil society research in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia looks at human rights or democracy development organizations, foci undoubtedly critical to

understanding civil society's development and political impact. An understudied aspect of civil society in post-communist countries is volunteerism and NGO formation at the grassroots level in less-politicized spheres. This paper focuses on volunteerism and NGO formation in the social welfare sphere because citizens who engage in social welfare volunteerism are choosing a less overtly political arena while still demonstrating a belief in their responsibility to wider society. Their participation promotes citizen interaction in the definition of social problems and mobilization in solving them. Volunteerism and NGO formation in the social service sphere is a foundational aspect of civil society.

Civic Culture

The concept of civic culture is grounded in the overarching theory and literature of civil society already summarized above. Before clarifying exactly how this paper uses the term civic culture, the evolution of the concept is summarized.

The conceptual roots of civic culture can be traced to the work of Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century, who concluded that volunteerism and formation of civic associations were keys to a functioning democracy ([2000](#)). Tocqueville posited that cooperative behavior is driven by an understanding that self-interest is often best served by working with others towards long-term societal goals ([2000](#)). In 1963, Almond and Verba re-invigorated this term, defining it as an ideal type of society with “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, perceptions and the like...that support participation”, ([1963](#)). Almond further elaborated with:

“A civic culture is said to be constituted by psychological attitudes amongst citizens that support the development of an active role for them in governance and create substantial consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions and the direction and content of public policy, a widespread tolerance of a plurality of interests and belief in

their reconcilability, and a widely distributed sense of political competence and trust in the citizenry”, ([1980, p. 4](#)).

In *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti ([1993](#)) built on these ideas, creating the term “civic culture syndrome” to describe their findings that some regions of Italy evidenced a group of cultural behaviors that were correlated with more democratic governance, stronger economic growth, and higher levels of well-being. The behaviors included in this civic culture syndrome were described as: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, tolerance, and social trust; and social structures of cooperation. Numerous authors use this framework as the basis of their research ([Andrews, 2007](#); [Davidson-Schmich, 2006](#); [Rice & Feldman, 1997](#)). Others use this framework, but challenge its assertion that civic culture is fairly static over time ([Janmaat, 2006](#); [McLaren & Baird, 2006](#)).

A more recent conceptualization of civic culture narrows the geographical focus of civic culture to a more local level and does away with the idea of an ideal type. Reese and Rosenfeld ([2002, 2008, 2012](#)) looked at a local system as a whole comprised of three civic culture components: community value system, community power system, and public decision-making system. Although they uncover community values through individual interviews, their focus is on the system, not individual ideational factors leading to participation. Civic culture is the interaction of the three systems in a specific locality. Their approach is helpful for more macro theorizing and urban planning, as exemplified by authors such as Gainsborough ([2008](#)) and Bacot ([2008](#)).

The work of Dahlgren ([1999, 2000, 2003](#)) takes a more ideational approach to civic culture. Dahlgren initially posited five dimensions of civic culture ([1999, 2003](#)) and then added a sixth ([2009](#)). They are: knowledge and skills; values; trust; practices; identities; and spaces.

More importantly, he wants to know why and how people decide to participate, and argues that rationality and reason cannot completely account for participation, but that the affective component of “passion” is involved ([Dahlgren, 2009](#)). Such ideas mirror the work of those studying political culture. These theorists argue that attitudes, norms and beliefs influence the participation of citizens and the functioning and survival of democratic institutions ([Docherty, Goodlad, & Paddison, 2001](#); [Inglehart, 1990](#); [Miegel & Olsson, 2012](#)).

Edwards ([2009](#), [2010](#)) takes an ideational approach as well. She goes back to the work of Putnam et. al and posits that the heart of it is ideational. She argues that civic culture syndrome is supported by certain frameworks about the role of the individual and the state in the social world, although these frameworks are not explicated in detail. Civic culture assumes that both an individual’s and a society’s frameworks for understanding and interpreting themselves and their role in the social world is the driving force behind their subsequent action.

Civic Culture Framework

This paper takes the ideational approach and rests on the assumption that frameworks are related to civic involvement. The term civic culture framework will be used to mean any framework that explains the role of the individual and the state in solving social problems. Thus, civic culture frameworks are not an ideal type, but the attitudes, beliefs, and norms that influence the behavior of individuals in society. These attitudes, beliefs, and norms may manifest themselves in various combinations. The frameworks common to a culture will be strongly related to civic involvement of citizens in that culture, including volunteerism.

Several theoretical positions related to civic culture frameworks undergird the rationale for this paper. First, it assumes that civic culture is not static, but malleable, as argued by Levi ([1996](#)), Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer ([1997](#)), Lowndes and Wilson ([2001](#)), Janmaat ([2006](#)),

Davidson-Schmich ([2006](#)), McLaren and Baird ([2006](#)), Bennich-Byorkman ([2007](#)), and Andrews, Cowell, and Downe ([2011](#)). Second and somewhat related, the paper rests on the premise that historical context and culture play a role in shaping civic culture frameworks. Several authors have pointed to the Soviet legacy as having an influence on civic culture development in post-communist countries, and they name ideational factors as key elements ([Bennich-Bjrkman, 2007](#); [Davidson-Schmich, 2006](#); [Janmaat, 2006](#); [Korostelina, 2013](#); [Rose et al., 1997](#)). Finally, this paper follows the theorizing of Reese and Rosenfeld ([2012](#)) that there are regional civic cultures, not simply a universal ideal type, although their work focuses on more macro aspects.

These theoretical positions are important for several reasons. If there were simply an ideal type, then all that would be needed to understand volunteerism in Russia is data on whether the institutions and behaviors of the citizens matched the ideal type. If civic culture is static, then the efforts of NGOs in promoting greater citizen participation are doomed to fail. If historical context and culture don't matter, then universal solutions to change should work (assuming that change is possible). According to the research cited in the previous paragraphs, we know these things are not true.

The puzzle of this paper arises out of the ashes of Soviet historical context and culture in which volunteerism (not compelled or organized by the state) was non-existent and non-state-affiliated grass-roots organizations were banned until the late 1980s. The rate of volunteering among Russian citizens has been rising since 1991. Recent survey research shows an increase in the number of people participating in local self-organizing groups to provide services to those in need ([L. E. V. Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010](#); [Petukhov, 2008](#)). Another project finds that students are less politically active but becoming more involved in local social service organizations than

in the past ([Vishnevski, Trynov, & Shapkov, 2009](#)).

Why are people volunteering in greater numbers, despite a lack of history of volunteerism or volunteer organizations, and despite state pressure on NGOs and other forms of civic engagement? The Soviet legacy provides strong ideals of collective social responsibility; however, it also imbues society with the contradictory expectation that the state should take care of its citizens. During the Soviet era, collective social responsibility meant building and strengthening the state, which in turn took care of its citizens. The current Russian system does not function under this premise. Because of the abrupt change in the system after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Russian Federation, and a continuing high rate of policy change, civic culture frameworks are fractured and in flux.

These papers explore what civic culture frameworks are articulated by various stakeholder groups, how historical and current political context plays a role in shaping these frameworks, and how these frameworks and the power positions of stakeholders in the system interact to influence the delivery of social services.

Research Methodology

I based this study in a regional capital of Russia with more than a million residents and a per capita income of less than half of that in Moscow, providing a context somewhat removed from the power, resources, and greater international influence of Moscow.

I conducted nine months of ethnographic research. The main ethnographic methods I employed are participant observation and semi-structured in-depth interviewing. In addition to these methods, I collected newspaper articles, government legislative reports, and NGO public relations materials to use in verifying critical events and information mentioned in interviews and observations.

I engaged in participant observation for five hours a week in each of three Russian grassroots volunteer organizations providing family and child welfare services. This included attending training meetings and leadership team meetings, serving alongside volunteers and paid staff throughout the nine months, and conducting informal interviews with volunteers. Grassroots NGOs are defined as those in existence for at least five years and founded by and still managed by a Russian citizen. The three organizations have been in existence for at least five years. In addition, I spent at least 12 hours at each of nine other organizations in the city. Because there are so few NGOs which have historically and actively provided services in the city and are still in existence, and I spent time in all but one of them, I was able to gain insight into the overall social welfare NGO picture in this city. After each incidence of participant observation, I wrote field notes, paying specific attention not only to what was said, but also to what I observed. I focused on behavior, choices, contradictions between words and action, and relational and power dynamics. Throughout the nine months, I conferred with trusted cultural informants to check my understanding and interpretation of observations. One of the benefits of the extended time period of the study was that it allowed for patterns to arise out of the data. In addition, I was able to ask questions when I felt the time was appropriate, without a feeling of pressure. Insights from participant observation helped me in formulating follow-up questions for semi-structured interviews. Nine months of participant observation laid a solid and rich foundation of background knowledge in which to anchor interview data.

I adopted purposive sampling with specific criteria for my in-depth semi-structured interviews among adults aged 19-68, culminating in the following breakdown of participants/stakeholders: 17 NGO leaders, 10 social service professionals, 10 recipients of services at community organizations, 24 volunteers with social service organizations, 20 non-

volunteers, and 2 government officials. Volunteers are those who have volunteered on average four hours a month for at least six months. Nonvolunteers are those who have never participated in volunteer service organized by a school, NGO, informal group of citizens, or government organization. Through both direct and indirect prompts, the interviews elicited participants' understandings and attitudes towards community-based organizations, volunteerism, social services, and social policy.

I used a variety of methods for recruiting interview subjects. Other than NGO leaders, I did not interview people with whom I interacted regularly as a participant observer. In this way I got a broader scope of volunteer and service recipient input. The following table summarizes the recruitment method I used for each interview group.

Table 1. Summary of Stakeholder Interview Groups

<i>Interview Type</i>	<i>Number of interviews</i>	<i>Recruitment method</i>
NGO leaders	17	phone call, email, meeting
Volunteers	24	Phone calls of contacts received from NGO leaders, universities, other orgs
Non volunteers	20	Phone calls of people referred through acquaintances unrelated to research
Paid service providers	10	Called government agencies for permission or met agency director at meeting
Recipients of service	10	NGOs made announcements, recipients called me
Government administrators	2	Phone call, other meeting
TOTAL	83	
Almost 120 hours of interviews, resulting in 1,600+ pages of transcribed interviews.		

To reveal interview subjects' civic culture frameworks, I used a strategy described by Gamson in his 1992 book, *Talking Politics*. I presented scenarios of social problems and asked them to reflect on the problem and possible solutions. Other questions asked directly about their opinion of how much or little citizens should be involved in setting social policy, what they see as the role of volunteers and/or NGOs in solving social problems, and in what cases the

government should do more or less and why, and their view of government and voluntary organization cooperation, both currently and ideally. At least three, but usually four social problem scenarios were presented so that patterns became clear. In addition, if an interviewee's responses seemed to diverge across scenarios, I was able to ask them to clarify. This led to a deeper discussion of their views and a richer understanding of their frameworks. I also gathered demographic information and asked about how they became involved in volunteering and/or NGO work, if applicable. Through both these indirect and direct prompts, I elicited interview subject reflections that expose their underlying civic culture framework. The full interview protocols are included in the Appendix, but the following is an example of a scenario. Here is one that seemed to be a favorite:

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

I conducted the interviews in Russian and digitally recorded them. I paid a native Russian speaker in Russia to transcribe them. The interview transcripts remained in Russian to preserve their integrity.

Analysis

The analytic process used methods of grounded theory and a case study approach. Nvivo software was used to analyze the data in an iterative process of coding, writing memos, and analysis. I followed a process suggested by Dierckx de Casterlé, Gastmans, Byron, and Denier

(2012) which involves two stages of analyses. Stage 1 of the analysis process involves looking at each interview as a case in itself, and taking the time for multiple readings of the transcription, thoughtful reflection, and writing. The outcome of this stage was a preliminary list of common concepts, themes, and gaps. In this stage of the process, I consulted a Russian native-speaker to read some of the interviews and write separate narrative reports to compare with my own. Stage 2 focused on more in-depth coding of interviews as well as analysis of concepts and development of a conceptual framework. I used Nvivo qualitative data analysis software for coding of individual transcripts. Throughout the process, I used free-style note-taking and memoing to document analytical insights. This facilitated making systematic comparisons within and between cases and stakeholder groups and identification of patterns and variations ([Corbin & Strauss, 2007](#); [Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995](#)). The stage 2 process was also an iterative one.

Notes from participant observation were written in English on my computer and stored separately from interview data. No names were included in the notes. Rather a simple nickname for the organization and first initials and perhaps roles of people were recorded so as to mask their identities. I read over these notes on an ongoing basis to look for patterns as well as themes or issues to ask about in future interviews or interactions, writing analytic memos to record my findings.

In order to reduce bias, I triangulated the interview data with participant observation and documentary data such as NGO brochures and websites, along with newspaper articles and legislative reports. Observational data served multiple functions. They confirmed patterns and themes arising in the interview data. When observational data seemed to conflict with interview narratives, my long study timeframe afforded me the opportunity to ask further questions, leading to a more nuanced interpretation of the data. Observational data illustrate actual behavior

patterns of interaction and power between stakeholder groups. Finally, the data brought to light unexplored issues and themes for further exploration. NGO brochures and websites provided information on how the organization presented itself to the public, recruited volunteers, and provided services.

In preparation for sharing my results in English, I translated the quotations myself, and then had a native speaker of Russian back-translate them. This process was repeated until the best translation was agreed upon.

Reflection

In conducting this research I was quite aware of several of my identities and how these seemed to influence the various stakeholder groups with whom I interacted. Although identities intersect, for the purpose of this discussion I have separated them out.

As an American in a Russian city, I was wondering how much being a “foreigner” would influence my work. In major Russian cities, there are generally ambivalent reactions to Americans in Russia. On the one hand there is respect for Americans that seems to come with the country being a superpower and an economically prosperous place. On the other hand, there is sometimes disdain for Americans due to American foreign policy, the “ugly American,” and a generalized Russian feeling of inferiority after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In my nine months of research, there was one weekend in which I felt my ‘American’ identity gave me celebrity status. I was participating in a weekend training aimed at starting new volunteer centers in small towns in the region. The training took place at a conference center in a rural area. Some teenagers from small towns had never seen an American before, and were obviously watching me. After one session, four girls shyly came up and asked to have their picture taken with me. I ended up having dinner with them in the cafeteria over lively

conversation. The encounters this weekend reminded me just how great the divide is between those who have had contact with foreigners and those who have not.

One thing that I already knew from living in Russia for a decade prior to conducting this research is that proficiency in Russian language goes a long way in garnering respect and acceptance. The fact that I could speak Russian, that I was living and had formerly lived in Russia for many years, that I had raised children in Russia, and that I had been an instructor in a prestigious Moscow university all served to cement trust with people and overcome my identity as a “foreigner.” I found that in general in 2013 and 2014 the people with whom I interacted were extremely warm, welcoming, and open. The exception to this came in the form of extreme caution on the part of government administrators and some social workers/psychologists who were employed by the state. Government administrators who actually agreed to an interview did so in ways that insured I would not be seen with them. Others I met in locations in which a third party made the introduction so that they could vet me before agreeing to an interview. However, several administrators who then wanted to give an interview were unable to obtain permission from their superiors to do so. In the end, I collected two on-the-record interviews from government administrators.

Service providers working for the government displayed varying degrees of caution. For the most part, those whom I interviewed were welcoming and open, although a couple were more cautious in answering any question that seemed “political” (their word). My service provider interviews were with directors and managers at government agencies, as in Russia it is wise to contact the people at the top first. On the other hand, there were three government agency directors that refused to grant an interview, citing that they needed to get permission from higher authorities to speak with a foreigner and that they were not willing to do so.

My identity as a social worker was helpful. The NGO leaders, volunteers, and service recipients took it at face value that I had altruistic motives for doing this research. My identity as a participant and fellow volunteer served to increase the depth of relationships I had with these people over time. Being a social worker helped build trust with government service providers as well. They were able to talk with me as a fellow service provider. In addition, since social work is a low-status profession in Russia, I think that the fact that most of them were psychologists helped them to feel a higher sense of status that mitigated the fact that I was an American.

My identity as a researcher influenced my work in several ways. First, since most of the groups with whom I was conducting interviews either had or were getting a higher education degree, they seemed to both understand my goals and take the interviews seriously. Among those who may not have had higher education, such as some nonvolunteers and the majority of service recipients, I emphasized that I was hoping to learn from them about volunteering, NGOs, and social services. Other than government administrators and service providers already mentioned, only two people declined to be interviewed. One was a very shy volunteer in her late teens, and the other was a service recipient whose schedule of work and caring for a family member with disabilities precluded her participation.

In general, my identity as a female was helpful. Since most of the people in the stakeholder groups that I interviewed are women, my sample turned out to be primarily women. In addition, over time I have learned how to be a combination of strong, polite, and respectful that works well as a foreign woman in the Russian context. I am not a pushover but I'm not arrogant. The listening and question-asking skills that I use as a therapist were quite helpful in the interview process. My approach to interviews and participant observation was as a learner and fellow volunteer, and this approach seemed to garner acceptance and respect.

I found that service providers, NGO leaders, and many volunteers viewed and treated me as a colleague, while government administrator contacts viewed me more as a “foreign researcher.” Service recipients viewed me as a social worker, mainly because the NGOs giving me access to them presented me as “a social worker who wants to learn more about services in Russia.” Nonvolunteers were quite open and respectful, and since they were recruited through my acquaintances who were uninvolved in any of my research, simply accepted me on the basis that their friends trusted me.

While preparing for my research in Russia, I was somewhat nervous about how it would go due to the repression of NGOs, both through legal and other means, in the past decade or so. I was quite relieved to find a warm welcome and hearty support from NGO leaders and volunteers who frequently mentioned how happy they were that someone was doing work in this area. People were very open about the positives and negatives in NGO/volunteer government relations. In addition, since I was not working with or part of an international NGO, nor providing any kind of monetary support for the grassroots Russian NGOs, they did not perceive my interaction with them to be problematic. Because of their warm welcome, and because of the openness of so many stakeholder groups in the first six months of my research, I had begun to think that getting interviews with government administrators would come easily as well. However, the timing of my interactions with government officials coincided with the political events in Crimea in 2014 and subsequent breakdown in relations between our countries’ governments. This led to increased caution on top of already generally negative stances towards Westerners.

The most gratifying part of the interview process was the reaction of the interviewees. Most of them thanked ME for the interview, with some even trying to refuse the minimal

payment that was offered. “Oh, no. I don’t want the money. It was my pleasure!” I told them I was obligated to give it to them and had them sign a receipt so that they would see it was official and take it. Frequent comments included, “This was so interesting to think about!” “I’ve never thought about these things in the big picture before!” “I enjoyed being able to tell my story and reflect back on it.” “I’ve been able to generate new ideas.” “This was so stimulating I’m going to tell my friends about it. Do you want to interview them, too?” “I wish more of our researchers would study these things.”

During the interviews, subjects often remarked on questions. They enjoyed both questions that let them talk about their own experience and questions that asked them about their perceptions and opinions. They seemed to particularly enjoy the deeper questions, pausing and giving very thoughtful answers.

Linguistic Challenges

The one thing that I had to adjust for was the lack of knowledge of volunteering and NGOs on the part of nonvolunteers as well as some government service providers, recipients of service, and even some volunteers. Sometimes the only volunteering or organization that a nonvolunteer had heard about was university students volunteering to serve at the Sochi Olympics, or organizations focused on ecology/environmental issues or working with homeless dogs. A few of them mentioned that though they know these organizations exist in Russia, they didn’t know of any in their own city (though in fact there were some).

Many interview subjects mentioned that the common public perception of volunteering arises out of the Soviet past as either something that young people do in the form of “good deeds,” or something that someone is obligated to do for free. During the Soviet era, citizens were often compelled to participate in ‘voluntary’ activity. Some of the confusion over

volunteering arises out of semantics; the word “volunteer” was imported to Russia after 1990 and is widely used. However, the word “dobrovolchestvo” was used during Soviet times to mean unpaid work someone did for the sake of society. Many people use the words interchangeably, but some leaders say that the even older meaning of “dobrovolchestvo,” that of volunteering to serve in the army, casts this word with a somewhat negative connotation. At the same time, they felt that many people still had no concept of what a “volunteer” was.

The issue of semantics comes into play with regard to NGOs as well. There are three names used for NGOs in Russia, and for those without personal experience of an NGO or someone working in one, these words are confusing. Since people have no historical social structure on which to hang the concept, they have trouble grasping it. The first word, “non-governmental organization,” is often understood to mean anything not government owned, such as businesses or private sports centers. The second, “non-commercial organization,” similar to “nonprofit organization,” is often taken to include the government. The third, “civil/social organization,” is close, but brings to mind communist party-controlled organizations such as chess clubs, professional unions (union of writers, for example), and other such organizations. The fact that modern NGOs can take several forms, conduct various activities, and collaborate more or less with the government clouds the issue even further.

For example, when interviewing a government service provider, I had to use several ways to get at the idea of an NGO.

Me: Does your organization collaborate with non-governmental organizations or churches, or with other local government programs?

“Do you mean a private company?”

Me: Not a company, but a noncommercial organization.

“Noncommercial??”

M: For example, “XX” or “XX” orgs.

“Ooooh. Ok, I get it now. Some kind of societal organization?”

The lack of knowledge of volunteering or NGOs comes up in the discussion of civic culture frameworks and their connections to service delivery, service utilization, and NGO development in Chapters 4 and 5.

Determining Civic Culture Frameworks

The process of determining the civic culture frameworks of each of the interviewees was based in careful analysis of the data. Again, I am using the term civic culture framework to mean any framework that explains the role of the individual and the state in solving social problems. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to define where the boundary between the individual and the state should be. As civil society theory purports, individuals often form voluntary groups to tackle certain issues, such as neighborhood clean-up, more funding for schools, or government policy change, for example. Sometimes these groups are formalized as legal entities such as NGOs, depending on the frameworks in place in a particular country. NGOs themselves can be more or less aligned with the government depending on source of funding, mission, and other factors. A foundational question of this dissertation is how civic culture frameworks are related to volunteering and working with an NGO, and whether this connection is related to how NGOs and the government collaborate in solving social problems.

As one may imagine, the number of frameworks could be the same as the number of interviews. I was interested in seeing whether any clusters of frameworks appeared among my interviews depending on age, experience with volunteerism, or other factors. As I mentioned earlier, in my analysis I first went through each of the interviews again as a case, listening to the digital recordings and reading through the transcripts. This enabled me to get an overall picture of each interview subject in terms of their perceptions and conceptualizations of many areas, including their civic culture framework. My in-depth coding of interviews in Nvivo allowed me

to analyze the themes in greater depth, and to compare whether certain interviewee characteristics were corresponding to ways in which someone talked about a theme. For example, did people over the age of 35 generally agree on the benefits and drawbacks of NGO service provision?

Fortunately, the analyses of interviews-as-cases gave me preliminary conclusions that bore out again when looking at coding by themes and subgroups. As patterns emerged, I was able to understand subgroup civic culture frameworks, and I was able to begin to theorize about what was happening.

How did I look for civic culture frameworks and what elements did I look for? The main elements were roles, power, and trust. When interview subjects answered scenario questions, I looked at what kinds of suggestions they made for solving a social problem. What was their mix of emphases on what the government, individual citizens, volunteers, and NGOs should do? If they mentioned individuals, families, volunteers and/or NGOs at all, what roles did they see them fulfilling (being individually responsible, support of government services, fundraising, actual service provision, innovation in services, policy advocacy)? Did they mention collaboration or explicate ways of NGOs and/or volunteers working with the state? How consistently did they suggest a certain way that government should work and that citizens should play a role? When describing roles, what were they saying about power in the system? As I was conducting my research, I noticed that the element of trust frequently arose as an issue in relation to NGOs and/or the government, and this became an element I included in understanding civic culture frameworks. I looked for all of these ideas in the answers to questions such as what are current social problems, what are the benefits & limitations of volunteer and/or NGO social service provision, etc. As is expected in qualitative data analysis, there is no one-to-one ratio

between elements and frameworks. However, the answers do cluster, and the frequency with which individuals and subgroups suggest certain ideas reinforce these clusters. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I provide a more in-depth description of these clusters along with a discussion of how they relate to service provision, collaboration, and NGO development.

Data


Before moving on to the discussing results, I am providing demographic information about my interview sample (see Table 2). I interviewed 83 adults.

Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Interview Subjects

	Mean Age	Mean Years Volunteering	% Female	% Religious	% In or Completed Higher Ed	N
All interviewees	34.7	4.6	84%	48%	86%	83
Organization Leaders	38.8	10.9	77%	59%	88%	17
Volunteers	30.0	4.0	92%	50%	92%	24
Nonvolunteers	31.4	0.0	85%	20%	100%	20
Paid Service Providers	41.4	6.3	80%	50%	90%	10
Recipients of Service	36.1	2.4	90%	60%	70%	10
Government Administrators	50.0	5.0	50%	50%	100%	2

The mean age of all interview subjects was 34.7, with an age range of 19 to 68. Eighty-four percent was female, 48% was religious, and 86% was either currently studying in an institution of higher education or had completed study at one. The mean years volunteering for the sample EXCLUDING nonvolunteers is 6.0 (not shown in table). Notable differences in interview subgroups can be seen in the table and bar chart. The mean age of volunteers is younger than other groups, although fairly close to the mean of the nonvolunteer group. Government administrators are older, as are government paid service providers, whereas organization leaders and volunteers are somewhat younger. As would be expected, organization leaders had the highest mean years of volunteering. Paid service providers had the next highest

mean, with 6.3 years. However, the range of years volunteering in this group ranged from 0 (3 subjects) to 15 (1 subject).



As shown in Chart 1, recipients of service have a lower level of education than the rest of the sample. Nonvolunteers are decidedly less religious than any other subgroup. Other than government administrators, all groups are predominantly female.

Chapter 4: Civic Culture Frameworks: Impact on Social Services

In this chapter I begin my exploration of civic culture frameworks of various stakeholders in the social service system in Russia.

Research Questions

This chapter explores the following research questions:

- What civic culture frameworks emerged from the data?
- What is the relationship between civic culture frameworks and stakeholder perceptions of NGOs and voluntary action in social services?
- How do stakeholder positions in the system and their concomitant frameworks influence service delivery, service utilization, and collaboration with the state?

Civic Culture Frameworks Continuum

Civic culture frameworks from these data emerged on a continuum, with stakeholder groups sitting along this continuum in various ways. Before describing the frameworks of stakeholder groups, I will define the continuum. As mentioned earlier, roles, power, and trust were the main elements I looked for in determining civic culture frameworks.



Figure 5. Civic Culture Frameworks

At one end of the continuum are frameworks purporting that the state should control social policy, funding, and service provision. At this end of the continuum, aspects of the framework included support for a strong state with little room for citizen participation in any aspect of policy-making, service provision, or volunteering other than that organized by the government. Those on this end of the continuum held that a strong, powerful government was a priority in creating a society in which citizens were taken care of. They also were more distrustful of NGOs and grassroots volunteering. Moving towards the middle, frameworks exhibited more openness to citizen participation in solving social problems. Common themes here echo themes from the Soviet period, including that the role of a citizen is to support the state, and in turn the state will take care of its citizens. In addition, this is the framework area in which people often mentioned that citizens are part of a society working together towards a common state-directed goal. State or nation-building was articulated or alluded to. Coupled with this were comments about citizen obligation to help the state and each other “during these difficult times.” It is a contradictory blend of strong distance between a powerful government and citizens and some recognition that “society” is all of us. There was some distrust of government here. The other end of the continuum consists of frameworks that embrace principles of citizen empowerment and mutual participation with the government in policy-making and solving social problems. At this end of the continuum advocacy was valued. The role of the citizen in an ideal world was seen to be active and involved in raising awareness of issues, innovating solutions, and getting the government to respond through either collaboration or pressure. Volunteers and NGOs were seen as making unique and valuable contributions to society.

This continuum does not represent the full range of frameworks possible, particularly at the right end. I would assume that had my focus been on human rights or democracy development organizations, the conversations would have exhibited more ideas about representative government, nonprofit roles in challenging the government, and political protest, and thus the continuum of exposed frameworks would have been wider.

Civic Culture Frameworks of Stakeholder Groups

The frameworks of each stakeholder group will be represented visually with reference to the continuum. Stakeholder groups have narrower or wider visual representation, illustrating that the frameworks of some groups exhibited more or less ranges of opinion within the group.



The opinions and conceptions voiced by nonvolunteers clustered at the left side of the continuum. They believed that it was the government's responsibility to set policy and provide and control all provision of social services. Several common threads seemed to form the foundation for their frameworks. Most of the nonvolunteers had limited knowledge of volunteering and NGOs. They often mentioned that volunteering was something that children in schools or young people studying at university take part in. In terms of volunteering, they talked about hearing of people volunteering for the Olympics, or perhaps school children visiting an old people's home or picking up garbage at a local park. They had even less knowledge about what an NGO was.

"I've heard of them, but I don't really know what an NGO is."

The Russian form of the questionnaire that I used contained all variants of Russian terms used to refer to an NGO. Sometimes with nonvolunteers that really had no idea, I could prompt

them by saying, “Have you ever heard of an organization that takes care of stray dogs? Or collects money for children in the hospital? They are not part of the government but they are registered to do certain activities.” This would give them a point of reference. Another common thread was an expression of distrust towards NGOs. Although many nonvolunteers didn’t have a conceptualization of how an NGO actually functioned, most nonvolunteers had heard the term NGO in the media. Most of what they had heard was negative, as the Russian government-controlled media covered stories of NGO raids and NGOs being declared “foreign agents” (another word for “spy”). More than one nonvolunteer said, “An NGO is a foreign organization.” Some meant that it was connected with foreign people, while others meant that this form of organization was not native to their culture. “It’s not Russian.” A final thread was skepticism at the level of services NGOs and/or volunteers could provide.

“Volunteers are good people but the government should be in charge of things.”

“How do you know that these people are adequately trained?”

When asked whether they would go to an NGO if they were in a crisis (I gave a couple of examples of crises), about five of the twenty nonvolunteers said they might, but the majority said they would probably not. A few claimed,

“I wouldn’t go to some organization like that for help!”

In answering the scenario questions, nonvolunteers mostly emphasized the government’s role in creating policies and programs to help those in need. When asked whether volunteers or groups of citizens could do anything to help, they often described volunteering as a duty of all citizens to help the common good. Those closer to the middle of the spectrum (the far right of their cluster) were even able to name an example of how this would look. For example, they had heard of volunteers going to orphanages to socialize with the children, or volunteers raising

money to fund nannies for children in hospitals. However, they emphasized that the government should regulate and guide these activities, and that volunteers should follow the government's lead.

“Volunteers are good people but the government should be in charge of things.”



Government Administrators fell on the left side of the continuum as well, voicing strong opinions that the government should set policy and provide and/or control all provision of services. However, they felt that NGOs and their associated volunteers had value in that they provided mobilized labor and also noticed local problems sooner than government officials. Government administrators have had experience working with NGOs or volunteer centers, and therefore were more trusting of NGOs and willing to carve out a role for them. Thus, this cluster is a bit wider than that of nonvolunteers.

“A benefit of NGOs that use volunteers is that they are smaller and they are geared to modern problems, and they have a warm and sincere atmosphere. From the point of view of acceptance of people, they treat every person as an individual, and not like just another person out of 100. The atmosphere is friendly and people receive refreshment, that's what's important.”

With regard to mission, administrators had a very clear understanding of what the power hierarchy should be. The government, and administrators themselves as representatives of the government, were in charge. They could allow or curtail the activities of NGOs according to their best judgment. The role of NGOs was to support government policy, help to provide services in areas where the government saw a need, and to bring suggestions for change to the government in a submissive and respectful manner.

“If an organization wants to do any kind of work in the social sphere, they should be registered and then come to us for permission. We need to build a relationship with a leader to understand what their goals are and whether we can trust them.”

Administrators generally held NGO leaders in high regard, although they did delineate between “real” organizations and those that were registered but did not actually tackle a need.

“There are so many so-called organizations. Very few of them do anything legitimate. Just the other day a grandma came in to try to get money for her club. I’m trying to address social problems!”

Government administrators, while generally positive about volunteering and NGOs, did express some nostalgia for the more government-directed volunteering of the past.

“Regarding NGOs, well during Soviet times there was one NGO, so to speak, and it was the Communist Party. There was the party, and within it were the youth organizations. The system was well built. Now there are lots of options, which is positive, but a negative is that people who have participated as volunteers don’t exactly understand what the point is. Before, one person organized something and explained the reason [contribution to building the Soviet Union] for it to everyone. Now there are so many choices and no clear direction.”

Administrators perceived less trust in the government and the system by citizens than in the past. However, they felt that the values of strong government and state-building would help to solve this problem.

“Maybe it’s not that obvious, but now there’s a lack of trust ... for example, in Soviet times there was the certainty of the planned economy and with it a strong faith in the government. The Soviet system was first of all ... planned in certain spheres and the government cared about every person, even if the person didn’t need or want anyone to think about him or what is happening in his family. The government was not indifferent to what happened to specific people. At that time all help was on the government level; it was a value that the government should help and that everyone should chip in. People were raised with the knowledge that we are all together in this.”

When speaking of volunteering, government administrators spoke either of volunteers as part of a mission-focused NGO, or of the greater volunteer movement that they and the government are working to build.

“Most of our work with volunteers is with volunteer organizations or educational institutions. They organize holiday parties for children in orphanages or children with disabilities. Or they do something ecological, like gather garbage in parks.”

“How do we work with them? We, we can give them money for simple things, like bags to put garbage in, and giving them a bus to get to the forest they are going to clean. It’s not straight money, but some kind of material help. And we might give them something symbolic to remember their day, like a T-shirt. Sometimes we provide help with publicity, or if a group wants to visit a certain school, we give them an official letter from us so that the school will allow them in. We try to be in contact with the schools and universities that have volunteer groups, so that if the regional or national government wants to do something bigger with volunteers, we are the ones who contact them.”

They spoke of the importance of harnessing the energy of people and channeling it in a “positive way for society.” One way they described this happening is through the use of “Volunteer Books.”

Me: Please tell me more about the volunteer books.

“These are done by the Ministry of Sport and Ministry of Youth Policy. It was a few years ago, not many, that the government of the Russian Federation and these ministries thought of it. They think of it as similar to an Employment Book (an official personal document – small book -- that every working Russian needs to get a job and to record employment status – beginning in 2017 the employment book in its current form will no longer exist) and as a way to keep track of the activity of the volunteer, first of all, so that the government can understand how many volunteers there are. People use them as a way to prove what is on their resume to get into university or get a job. These books are distributed by the government to places throughout Russia, to government structures like ours so that we can distribute them to anyone who participates in volunteering. People get one and register it on an all-Russia site.”

Government administrators perceived these books and new government-sponsored volunteer centers to be a positive development in harnessing volunteer energy in their communities.

In summary, administrators were supportive of social service NGOs that were mission-driven and providing services that complemented government services. They respected their knowledge and experience and tapped into those things, while expecting NGOs to be submissive to government oversight and control. Spontaneous or grassroots volunteering was seen as positive but possibly problematic. Such citizen organizations were expected to go through local

administrations for permission and oversight (either school administrators or municipal structures).



Service providers employed in government agencies evidenced the widest range of frameworks depending on their experience with NGOs and volunteers. Three service providers had limited or no experience with NGOs or volunteers and these fell on the far left side of the continuum in the service provider cluster. The rest of the service providers had experience working with NGOs and volunteers, and the more experience they had, the further to the right in their cluster they landed. Trust increased with past history of personal contact and successful collaborations.

No Experience with NGOs.

Three service providers had very little knowledge of NGOs or of volunteering in social services but expressed a desire to learn.

Me: “Do you know any NGOs that provide services for children or families in crisis?”

R: “No, but I’d like to find out about them in any case.”

“NGO, yeah, I myself would love to know what it is and why they exist. As an agency director I want to know. I have never worked with an NGO.”

“I haven’t had any experience collaborating with NGOs. I don’t know. I don’t know – I can’t say, but I think it would be good if we learned to trust each other. They us, and we them. Because we are after all a government agency and we have certain rules.”

However, they also expressed caution in working with NGOs for several reasons. In the process, they exposed their belief that they, as government workers, do and should have greater power:

“Well, for example, we don’t see them or understand them, right? And we need to understand whether they are really necessary, yeah. Then, you know, pedophilia has probably always been everywhere, and we need to see, if a man wants to help with

children and families, why he wants to do it. We need to check. Because we in the government have a background check in any case, although that doesn't mean that we're psychologically normal, but in any case that's a regulation, and it's a good regulation. Because overall we help vulnerable people, those who may not be very educated, and someone could come to them with an evil purpose. Something like that could happen."

In addition to expressing concern about lack of safeguards with volunteers and NGOs, these service providers also worried about the stability and quality of services.

"If it's just some organization providing services, then they'll be here today and gone tomorrow. We specifically need a government organization and laws and policy that clearly structure things so that we know how to work, and not have everyone doing whatever they want."

"There is no way to control quality of services."

These government-employed service providers also voiced nervousness about getting into trouble with authorities higher in the system, and perceived possible difficulties in working with NGOs and volunteers:

"I can't say, but in any case, if we use volunteers, for example, the government office that supervises us can come and see them and have questions. An establishment like this needs to have order. If there's no order, then any of us can do what he wants, right? It is our job to work according to the rules. This doesn't mean that we don't have hearts. The rules were developed to protect the rights and the interests of the children and we must abide by them."

"It's not easy to collaborate with NGOs in our, at least, region because the Ministry of Education is very cautious about this and it's only with their permission that any contact can be carried out. That is, we're not against it, and I don't understand this fear, because people are willing to help and do something with their lives, and they have the time and resources to do it. Unfortunately we have this limitation."

When answering the scenario questions, these service providers leaned heavily toward giving the government the role of policy maker and the power to control the system, while sometimes opening the door a crack for NGOs. The scenarios were the final portion of the interview, so by then the service providers had already been primed to the idea that perhaps

NGOs and volunteers could play a role in the system. While they seemed open to the idea, they had a hard time conceptualizing it.

“The government is obligated to help those that need help, especially children, because the government is raising the citizens of Russia. No one else should do this. Unequivocally.”

“There should be a government system that monitors families and that invites NGOs to help. There should definitely be a system. I don’t know how this would work, though.”

“I can’t say how an NGO could help ... maybe they could organize some ... again, what could they do? Maybe take kids to the theater, or to an art class. It all depends on money, so I can’t say. These are governmental questions. Let them solve problems at that level.”

Experience with NGOs.

On the other hand, the more experience a service provider had with volunteers or NGOs, the more open and supportive they were to cooperating with them. Some were still cautious:

“You know, we have a lot of legal requirements now and they are good and bad. I even got a document that said, “Describe your work to us. Do you collaborate with businesses or NGOs?” It’s a required question and collaboration might raise suspicions. On the other hand, there are a lot of government grants now that NGOs can get to provide services that the government wants to fund.”

Contrary to what providers with no NGO cooperation experience said, those who have worked with NGOs were very optimistic and positive about the government’s involvement in their collaborations.

Me: How did your collaboration with NGOs start?

“In general I’d like to say that we are under the Ministry of Social Policy of the XX Region and it’s fairly progressive, so they write policy programs for the region that are inclusive of several spheres and organizations. Organizations go to the head of the Ministry and the ministry agrees to cooperate. We have a program that we currently run and several NGOs also participate in implementing it.”

“We just have a rich group of NGOs around us, not rich in money, but organizations that do a lot. I think our merger of government agencies and NGOs functions well. Where the government isn’t able to provide services, we use NGOs according to some regulations. They are smaller and more mobile and yes, there’s less bureaucratic hassle, so it’s a very good help for us.”

One fascinating pattern was that almost all (6 of 7) service providers who had some experience working with NGOs and/or volunteers mentioned some foreign influence, while the three without experience had had no foreign professional contact. At least five of the government agencies in which NGO-experienced-providers worked have accepted foreign volunteers to work with them for a time. Others mentioned visiting other countries on professional exchanges. For example:

“We were in the state of Mississippi and saw a government anti-bullying program that is done through the schools. We had our program and we observed theirs, and then we created a third program together that we have been using here. We train volunteers to help carry out this program.”

Finally, because of outside influence, they had expanded views of funding.

“I think it is very important that businesses fund social programs. It’s only developing. It’s something modern – young managers or those who studied in the West do it. For me as an agency director I sometimes have to raise funds because the government, well, they don’t finance us that well.”

Foreign influence and exposure to NGOs, volunteers, and alternative funding forms seem to help broaden the scope of their civic culture frameworks. However, when describing their perceptions of volunteering, service providers linked it back to the Soviet past and to the current process of government consolidation of volunteering. The Soviet legacy persists in subtle ways to support the idea of state-building.

“In the soviet system we had a slogan: ‘Think first about your country, and then about yourself.’ It’s not a bad slogan. Volunteers do that. So the Soviet system was supportive of volunteerism. But then it was all “walking onward” with flags, without a lot of deep interest. Now volunteering is different, better, but it’s good that this slogan stayed with us.”

“In my experience, modern volunteering is not similar to volunteering that took place during the Soviet Union. Those volunteers walked toward a societal idea, but now they work driven by their own values. At the same time, it does influence a little, because the experience of organizing people has remained. And some of the functions, those that come from the authorities, from all the Ministries, remain. Sooner or later the Ministry

will oversee this area again. It's already formalizing volunteering. If it is formalized it will be strong."

When answering the scenario questions, ALL service providers were quick to name individual responsibility before suggesting government, volunteer, or NGO intervention.

"Well, first of all the parents should be responsible. If they're not, it's imperative to establish some kind of authority to control things."

"I consider that adults should be capable .. responsible people. They gave birth to the child. We should raise this generation so that they would answer for their lives and for the life of their child."

"The parents should be conscious of what they do. Without this, what can the government do?"

"Parents depend too much on the government."

Why would service providers emphasize personal responsibility? Perhaps they do so because they see the full spectrum of humanity up close, and in a situation of limited resources, must make decisions regarding distribution of those resources. A common schema used to allocate social welfare resources worldwide is that of 'deserving-undeserving.' While service providers say that a single mother with a disability or illness deserves help, they are less willing to provide help to a single mother who abuses alcohol, for example.

Service providers with experience with NGOs or volunteers suggested that the government be primarily responsible for the welfare of children and families but also suggested that volunteers and NGOs be part of the solutions. As we move to the right in the cluster of service provider frameworks, the suggestions change to being more and more trusting of NGOs and willing to give them a role:

"The local administration ... you know what I would suggest? The administration of the whole island and NGOs together. Although I don't know what NGOs would do. Maybe be volunteers? The administration would be the head of everything and set the strategic direction, and NGOs and people would participate in solving the problem."

“I would like if the government would organize things better. But hope in the government has died in many people, and we depend on ourselves most of all. So volunteers would have to help.”

“NGOs are more innovative and flexible. We should take advantage of this and work with them. But the government should control them more.”

“I think that the government and NGOs and volunteers should work together so that it is easier for people who need help to get what they need.”

“I think it’s a great opportunity for partnership between the government and NGOs. NGOs could help with resources and self-help groups. The government should make sure the families have money for food and other things, right?”

“There should be a partnership between NGOs and the government. I work for the government and can do this. And if there are businesses with social programs, they can help fund it. And I wouldn’t interfere with volunteers helping.”


One service provider even hinted at an advocacy function for NGOs, pushing them along the continuum toward the “state and citizen mutual participation” framework.

“An NGO is a noncommercial organ. It’s excellent that they don’t depend on anyone, right? But if they are subsidized by the government, well, understandably they’re not going to go against the institutions that are funding them. Ideally there’s kind of a three-legged process going on. An NGO steps up and takes the initiative to suggest a new program to the government. They’re not afraid to do this. And it’s great if a foundation is willing to pay for it. It would be great if things really worked this way. And it would be great if the government financed help for those who really cannot pay for things.”

This service provider continued with:

“I think it is a benefit that government agencies have competition. Competition always leads to development and a move forward. When someone does something better than you do, then you should either not exist as an organization (knock on wood) ... or you should develop with the times and improve the level of your services. In general, if there is good healthy competition in providing services, I think that is good. After all, NGOs didn’t simply appear. They were created because there was a specific problem that needed to be solved immediately. The government didn’t have the resources or the level of resources to provide the services to help. Therefore I always think that we should collaborate with them and together carry out the activities. It is in no way a competition, like in business where they say, ‘you’re better but I will crush you.’ No, we should collaborate with them and do things together. And if the problem resolves itself, the NGO can either dissolve or reorient itself to solving other problems.”

In summary, service providers evidenced a wide array of civic culture frameworks. Those with little personal experience with NGOs or volunteers supported strong government roles and power with little trust of NGOs. Those with experience working with NGOs and volunteers also voiced beliefs that there should be a strong government, but also had some trust in NGOs and were open to the involvement of NGOs and volunteers in providing services.



Recipients of service have civic culture frameworks sitting in the middle of the continuum. They voice an expectation that the government should provide the services that citizens need while also acknowledging that in reality this doesn't happen. Their framework seems to have been forged by a blend of the ideal and reality. The ideal would be that the government guide the country in a way that provides opportunity for people to live without hardship and that individual citizens exhibit responsibility for themselves and for others. Because of their experience with reality and receiving help from NGOs and volunteers, their framework includes room for these social structures as well.

Recipients hold the government responsible for establishing economic conditions that prevent difficulties for families; these comments reveal the amount of power they think the government holds.

"The government should care about people first of all."

"The government should understand that it's hard for a single parent and provide some benefits and some things through the school."

"The government should not place families in such impossible conditions."

"After school activities, day care, benefits, the government should provide these. It should be centrally organized and financed. An NGO, what can they really do? Maybe something locally."

Others acknowledged the role that NGOs could play:

“The government should take care of the protection and material needs of children, but NGOs can provide the spiritual education and social interaction, and some material help as well.”

“The local administration should take care of financing, and volunteers and NGOs should make sure that the government knows what the needs are.”

“The government should coordinate efforts of NGOs and volunteers and government programs.”

They also voiced strong opinions in the responsibility of individuals for their own welfare. In responding to the scenarios, they said things such as:

“With regard to low income families I have the firm opinion that if you have a child then they are your responsibility. I’m not saying that the government should throw up their hands and refuse to help. It should create the conditions for the woman to get work and the child to be in child care. But we shouldn’t feel sorry for single mothers. We have to put the responsibility for their lives on them.”

“Aaaa, I don’t agree [to the suggestion in a scenario that a low-income single parent might need some sort of help]. It’s very rare for a single mother to have such a low income that she can’t take care of herself. Those are people who just don’t want to take care of themselves. They wait for help. Instead of waiting for help, they should get moving. I think it depends on people. I had to work at five jobs and I was fine.”

Most recipients of service know about NGOs through their experience in seeking services. They also know people who volunteer because of their encounters with NGOs. However, many only know of the one NGO from which they receive services, and could not name others in the city or else could only name one or two.

“I know of some that are registered on paper but don’t actually do anything. The only one that I know of and that actually does work is XX. It seems to me that it’s the only one in the city, because I looked for help all over, and until XX helped me no organization actually offered services.”

Issues of trust and power came to the fore when service recipients were asked: “If you could choose either a government-run program or this program run by the NGO/volunteer organization (if both existed), which would you choose?” and “What are the benefits and

drawbacks of service provision by NGOs or volunteers?” While recipients voiced an expectation that the government should help, they also voiced some fear in how a government agency would respond to their request for aid:

“A benefit is that help [from an NGO] is more targeted, and more ... how to say it ... from the soul, the heart, because the people that work there are dedicated to helping people. There isn’t that automatic response from people [in a government agency] who are just fulfilling the letter of the law without thinking about what their actions imply. Like, ‘You are in a bad situation, and we can’t help you. So we’re going to take your kids.’ In NGOs there is more understanding, a focus on helping and then seeing how it goes.”

“It was surprising that NGO volunteers aren’t representatives of the government, and that they weren’t going to punish us or control us. A volunteer organization/NGO can be more flexible with money and provide the kind of help each family needs. Unfortunately, they are not in a position to help everyone.”

“Government workers manipulate the law and don’t care about the rights of ordinary citizens.”

“NGOs can’t help everyone that needs help, but neither does the government. I repeat, the government gives with one hand and takes away with the other. It’s difficult to prove that you need something. They say they have benefits, but then they don’t want to give them. We went for help with housing because we have 13 people in a 2 room apartment, and they said, ‘we don’t see a reason to help you.’ Also, they have a bad attitude towards single parent families, a negative, boorish attitude.”

The other theme coming out of the interviews, and already alluded to above, is that recipients felt that NGOs and volunteers provided services in a more humane, flexible, and targeted way.

“I’d get help from an NGO, because as in any government there is bureaucracy. And often the help that the government gives doesn’t make it to the person needing it. Our government employees, well, they do their work, but not out of their hearts. When people work from their hearts and throw themselves into their work, then the help is greater.”

“Well, these organizations are really free from bureaucracy, and therefore they can definitely be flexible in responding.”

“I have a two-sided view: on the one hand, government agencies have well-defined criteria for services that we know and they can’t refuse. Somehow that is more reliable. On the other hand, NGOs are more flexible, not as bound by strict rules, but still

accountable and can respond flexibly to the needs of the population. I would go to a volunteer organization, which is what I did.”

Me: If it were possible to receive the same services from the government, would you still choose an NGO?

“Well, in a government agency, as I see it, there is a more formal approach to clients, and they’re more focused on, well, not on solving the client’s problem, but just on statistics for government accountability. If a client has a specific need, they can’t provide it if it’s not on their list of services. NGOs can be flexible.”

Service recipients had overwhelmingly positive impressions of NGO services based on their own experience, but as they pondered a bit longer the question of where they would go for help, they based their conclusions on pragmatic considerations. This is likely a reflection of their desperate circumstances.

“I’d go for services from one or the other, as opportunity arose, why not? Or, for example, wherever the services were better, that’s how I’d choose.”

“I would go to both government and NGO for help. We’ll take from everywhere. They offer – we’ll go.”

“Which would I choose? You know, I wouldn’t refuse government help or NGO help – I wouldn’t refuse. It seems to me that the opportunity to receive any help is good, wherever it comes from.”

“But in addition to help from NGO XX, I try to get benefits from the government. But it’s hard to get anything and it isn’t much. The NGO offers lots of services on top of material help, and the government doesn’t offer such a range of services.”

“NGOs can provide targeted help and information. For example, a lot of people don’t know what government benefits are available and NGOs can help them apply and provide legal assistance in getting benefits.”

In cases where a government agency worked closely with an NGO, service recipients had a hard time delineating what services were from which source. These interviewees were likely to be very supportive of government/NGO cooperation in service provision.

“I like the way organization XX works and is in contact with the administration of our region, so that those at risk can receive some services from them. It’s better this way – families having problems can be helped before they have a crisis. The organization approaches the family differently, humanely, and helps them solve their problems. This is good, and it’s nice to have government administrators who think progressively this way.”

“Well, before [during Soviet times] it was easier to live, because the government gave us the opportunity to have an apartment, to work, and everyone was supposed to work. Now there’s a problem, a problem for a lot of people in terms of income. Therefore, volunteer movements and NGOs are essential. Because our system changed from USSR to Russia and everything changed. NGOs are essential – the more the better – because people have trouble coping with difficulties in life.”

“Probably an NGO has some valuable experience and it would be good if it collaborated with the authorities to formulate new programs and initiatives.”

Service recipients often viewed NGOs and volunteers as stepping up to fill gaps in government services as a way of helping to build the state. They have a hard time understanding why the government’s approach to NGOs in general has been negative, and don’t always know about the increase in government fiscal support for social service NGOs. This reflects the impact of the media and negative propaganda on the population. At the same time, recipients depend on NGOs and volunteers and therefore have spent time thinking about their roles in the system.

“I have a problem with the government suppressing these organizations. NGOs don’t make a profit. So besides working with us they [NGOs] also have to fight a war with officials. It’s too bad we don’t have a good relationship between the state and these organizations. That’s too bad. How can we do this – I don’t know. Local officials, they don’t realize that all this is done for the people, for the state itself. We are members of society. The state – this is us. Until we get to the point of getting out of the crisis – there are really lots of people who are homeless, poor, and children in need of help and protection – until the government understands this, we have to do things together in society.”

In other words, it is a good thing that citizens themselves will step up to help the state take care of its citizens until the state is able or willing to do so.



The civic culture frameworks of volunteers were clustered in the middle-to-right side of the continuum. Where they fell in their cluster was related to their depth of involvement as volunteers in the organization. All interviewed volunteers were those who volunteered regularly

over a long period of time. However, volunteers who landed closer to the middle of the continuum were those that simply volunteered but did NOT take part in volunteer leadership roles such as leading a team or helping the official NGO leaders to make new connections or create new programs. Volunteers who did take on leadership roles tended to have frameworks a bit closer to the right side of the continuum. However, the frameworks of volunteers were highly consistent.

Many volunteers alluded to the idea of state-building reminiscent of the Soviet era, with a strong state setting policy and directing citizen action to solve problems. In other words, the government should set policy and provide services, but “they can’t do everything, so we have to help.” The roles they assigned to the government versus citizens reflected this strong-state-with-citizen-help mentality.

“We have gone through a rough transition, and the government is still rebuilding our society. We see needs and want to help people until our system can take care of people.”

“Of course the government should be responsible, because these are its citizens, and even if they have low income, they still pay taxes and are part of society and should be supported. During Soviet times these families were looked after by a government agency or neighbors. Those were the values. Now they’re gone but I think we’re slowly getting back to them.”

One volunteer described her ideal system when responding to the island scenario, and it summed up well the civic culture framework of many volunteers:

“I wouldn’t rule anyone out. The island needs a government and NGOs.

Me: Why NGOs?

“They see things; they’re closer to the people and to the problems. Although, if we’re going to have an ideal island, then the administration will do things well, and we’ll only need the NGOs to channel the energy of the people somewhere, in a positive direction and not against the government. They can organize fun activities. The government can do everything else.”

Another volunteer commented: “I think that we are in a time in our country that people who gave a lot for the country got tired and after 1991 had to work to survive economically and stay emotionally healthy, but maybe now that things are a little more

stable, people will understand that we all have to build the country and those values will be reborn.”

Volunteers vested the government with the power to change and create conditions to better the lives of citizens:

“The government should not look at low income families and just give them money, but should create conditions for them to have a better life.”

Another volunteer answered a scenario about unsupervised children with:

“I think this is a government problem, because these children are our future workers and members of society and the government should apply strategies to make sure these future members of society grow into worthy people. To do this, the children need to have their childhood organized with activities.”

However, even as volunteers described this ideal society in which citizens help the government build a strong system, they voiced serious levels of distrust in the government.

When answering a scenario about helping low-income single-parent families, a volunteer responded with:

“That’s a difficult question. Such a question! Of course, I understand that the government should help such families. But it’s not a good idea to count on our government, so all that’s left is to hope in yourself and other people around you that you can trust.”

Others stated:

“If the state were to actively help single parent families, I would be nervous. If the same thing was offered by an NGO, I would have nothing against it, because they don’t have the power to somehow punish me. But the government might decide that I’m not good enough.”

“It seems to me that currently it’s difficult to NOT be afraid of going to the government for help, although on the other hand, I know it’s not that difficult to gather the documents needed. But it’s hard to prove to the administration that your income is low. I wouldn’t play these games with the government; I mean, I wouldn’t tell them about my problems.”

Lack of trust helps explain some of their enthusiasm for alternative organizations and citizen involvement in social service programs. Volunteers also voiced high levels of satisfaction in their roles in the system, for both personal and other reasons.

Personal benefits:

“I think that a benefit of volunteering is that you can spend your free time in a positive activity and the result is that your activity brings another person happiness.”

“Through volunteering I have met a wide variety of people and improved my social skills.”

“Volunteering helps me to learn about what I like and don’t like.”

Societal benefits:

“I was with my child in the hospital and saw the orphans there all alone and had to do something. In a good society the strong help the weak. That’s how I got started.”

“The role of organizations is important first of all because the help is from volunteers and comes from their heart. And volunteering doesn’t have the problem of bureaucracy for people to get services.”

Volunteers overall, but particularly those who were “group leaders” or who had closer relationships with official leaders of the organization were creative in describing the types of roles they could see NGOs and volunteers play in the system. When reflecting on the questions in the scenarios, they were quick to include NGOs and volunteers as participants in the system, coming up with ideas of how these things could look.

“Even though people are used to the government providing after school activities, I think it should be an NGO that runs the after school programs in the school building. I think that those with low incomes could go there for free. I don’t actually know how the grant system works, but somehow maybe that could help subsidize it.”

“We could start an organization so that pensioners could volunteer to help take care of children from low income families after school.”

“It’s possible that some group of people with initiative would form and organize the parents and help them with their problems. That would be great! People should be socially responsible.”

Regarding prevention of bullying:

“NGOs should work with the kids, but the government should do something at the level of censoring television and the press from showing so much violence.”

Regarding abuse or neglected children on the island:

“It’s possible that it’s not the administration of the island that will sit and think about how to solve the problem. Without the people nothing will get done. Let people help solve the problem, otherwise they are not full-fledged citizens.”

Volunteers were adamant that NGOs should play a role in the system.

“Again, I suggest NGOs be involved.”

“NGOs and volunteers should help solve this problem. They can find donors and sponsors to help. I mean, the government should somehow solve this problem as much as it can, but then organizations can help.”

“I want to emphasize that both NGOs and the government should be involved.”

Although volunteers were so strongly in favor of NGO and government cooperation, they recognized that the trust issues go both directions, but that without trust they could not move forward. First, as mentioned above, from them towards the government:

“Even though we like to blame the government for things, we won’t solve anything without them. No matter what we’ll have to work with the authorities to solve any problems.”

They also recognized the lack of trust of government officials towards NGOs:

“We also need a turnover in government officials who can understand NGOs and volunteers. There are a lot of old officials, unfortunately. Young officials are more flexible in their thinking, have studied in the West, and they understand how NGOs work and that we’re not the enemy and we’re not crooks.”

At the same time, echoes of their framework that government should bear the ultimate responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens come out:

“A drawback is that with a high level of development of the volunteer movement and NGOs the government might just withdraw. Why should they invest money if services are being provided for free? Let the volunteers do it all. This could start at the level of local officials and go to the top. They could throw everything on volunteer organizations.”

“And NGOs... a lot of officials consider volunteer NGOs like free labor, so to speak. ‘Let’s get more volunteers to do it!’ And maybe not even NGOs, because NGOs are more independent, but schools and government volunteer centers.”

Participant observation data affirm these conclusions, particularly in how volunteers with leadership experience are positioned further towards a “mutual participation” framework. For example, when a volunteer team leader saw a problem at an orphanage and wanted to work out a solution with the children’s caretakers, they became frustrated when the caretakers had to ask permission of the orphanage director. When the orphanage director aimed a tirade at the volunteers for “interfering,” the volunteers were indignant and discussed the unreasonable power structures amongst themselves. They expressed frustration about structures at the orphanage itself but also in the system as a whole. However, at the same time that team leaders of volunteer groups verbally supported a more participatory approach to solving problems at the agency or institution level, their actions also belied their understanding of the power structure. If one person suggested going to someone “higher up,” the other explained that doing so would probably get them kicked out of the agency (by the agency director, who would find a reason). In addition, they often carefully weighed their decisions about what issues to pursue and which to let go. For example, if they saw an individual child being treated unfairly by orphanage staff, they would sometimes let that go, explaining that “it’s better to work on getting permission to run this job-interview training with all the older kids (for example) than to cause trouble for the caretakers over one kid.”

In summary, volunteers occupy the center and slightly right side of the continuum. Their frameworks consistently expect that the state control policy and service provision, with varying levels of citizen involvement in helping the state reach its goals. Volunteers voiced some distrust in the government, which seems to contribute to their framework that citizens need to be involved in social welfare. Those volunteers who have informal leadership positions tend to exhibit a weaker state-building framework and move closer towards mutual participation.

However, even these volunteers did not suggest that NGOs or volunteers should confront the state or challenge its authority. Cooperation with and respect for the government was valued.



NGO leaders fell on the right side of the continuum. A subgroup of NGO leaders, those whose organizations had moved away from providing direct social services, fell closer to the middle of the continuum, while NGO social service providers fell further to the right side. The issues of trust, power, and roles are intertwined in the frameworks of leaders.

Statements about trust in different levels of government shows some ambivalence. On the one hand, leaders are wary and cautious in their dealings with local authorities and of legislation and actions by the federal government against nonprofit organizations. The federal government issues mandates to local enforcement agencies, and they in turn perform checks on organizations.

“You probably heard about all of the “checking” on organizations all over the country. Just last month they raided the offices of XX organization in our city. Took all their computers and papers. I don’t think they found anything, but they do it to keep us in line. So that we are always a little afraid.”

NGO leaders are also tired of negative propaganda against NGOs, even though they don’t think their organizations are necessarily the targets.

“In the media, all NGOs are lumped together. Ordinary people don’t know the difference between voluntary or social service organizations and those political or foreign organizations. So the people think we are all the same.”

Working with local officials was initially problematic as well:

“I’ll put it this way – they didn’t prevent us from working, but there was the feeling that we were practically in a competitive relationship.”

On the other hand, NGO leaders cited the increasing level of monetary support from the federal government as well as the regional and municipal authorities.

“Slowly now, when there is a change in attitude, the powers at the top are starting to recognize that they should involve NGOs in providing social services and that they should support this process, and municipalities should start to collaborate with NGOs. This will all change, I think, and this will be a fundamental change towards NGO work, and the government will finance the work, but not the work of one-time events anymore.”

“At the federal level everything looks good. From federal grants we can pay salaries. But at the local level it is still difficult. But little by little it is shifting, because the federal government sets the tone and how the federal government does things is often a model for the local authorities, so it will change, I think. However, societal thinking, of course, is hard to change.”

Levels of trust with local officials can be either problematic or fairly high. Either way, the comments of the NGO leaders show that in their framework they expect to be treated with respect.

“Working with the administration is another question. It’s like a vicious circle, because philanthropy is in the process of developing in Russia. It’s as old as I am [less than 30 years old]. The pay is low or non-existent. Because of this, this field does not attract successful and intelligent people, because, well, you need to eat something. Therefore there are a lot of people who want something, it’s not even clear what, who go to the administration and ask for help and say they are a nonprofit organization. We have plenty of these organizations and they don’t have any idea how to be accountable; they don’t even know how to turn on a computer. Because of them, the administration thinks we are all like that.”

Some NGOs are able to have very successful cooperation with local officials:

“While we were doing our pilot project we noticed that many families with children aged 2 to 3, and sometimes people from orphanages would call to ask for help. We went to the Department of Education and asked for permission to start a consulting and diagnostic center located at a public kindergarten. They gave permission and were supportive. Here we work with preschool children individually and in groups. We also do training for specialists. And we have started to work other government institutions in the city.”

The civic culture frameworks of NGO leaders varied somewhat in how they expected roles to be carried out. They all thought government funding should be increased for volunteer and service NGOs, and felt that citizen involvement was an important part of society.

“If we want a really healthy society, then everyone must contribute. We cannot expect the state to create this by itself.”

However, they differed in how they expected the government to lead and share power. The NGOs of leaders in this study can be divided into two groups: volunteer centers and social service NGOs. Leaders of volunteer centers were moving their organizations away from providing social services and generally collaborated with government authorities and other NGOs to facilitate short-term volunteer opportunities, and to promote volunteering in schools and other government-connected organizations. These leaders felt it was the role of the government to set a clear agenda for citizens and organizations to follow. The role of the state was to set policy and provide social services, while the role of NGOs was to channel volunteer energy in ways that supported the state. They expected NGOs to be agents of change mainly in ways that the government was planning to make change. In contrast, NGO leaders of organizations that provided social services expected more power-sharing with the government. They cited the obvious benefits of NGOs and citizen involvement as proof that the government should include them in setting policy and social program agendas.

Leaders of social service NGOs stressed their grassroots experience, flexibility, and innovation in being of value to society.

“We try new things and create new services quickly.”

“We can provide someone with emergency help today. If they go to a government office, they’ll wait for weeks.”

“We have experience in service areas that the government has never worked in before. We know what people need.”

“We are here on the ground, not in an office somewhere. We should be involved in making new laws and creating policy.”

“They should listen to us.”

“It takes the government years to make a change.”

In fact, government officials at various levels have been incorporating leaders of NGOs into round tables or advisory boards as they tackle social problems. NGO leaders see this as a positive development, but one that is hit or miss depending on which government officials are in attendance and whether they actually respect the work of NGOs.

“I know that a leader in NGO XX belongs to a regional advisory board and I think is able to bring our ideas to them.”

Their frustration at the level at which this currently happens is evidence for their power-sharing framework:

“Yeah, we have round tables, but they don’t always lead to any kind of change.”

“We have to be careful about how we suggest change. We know what our clients need and we want to change policy for them, but it’s tricky.”

As these comments show, the frameworks of social service NGO leaders showed expectation of not only simple involvement in providing services, but also involvement in the policy-making process. They expect greater power sharing. However, they recognize that in reality the power of the government was much greater than theirs, and this power served to limit their ability to exist and function.

“Well, at least they give us permission to do our work.”

“We need more freedom to provide services when we see a need.”

To summarize, NGO leaders shared a trust/distrust relationship with government authorities at various levels. Their frameworks showed a firm belief in the importance of citizen and organization involvement in building society and improving the lives of people. However, leaders of volunteer centers displayed a stronger framework of state-building and support of government with little expectation for power sharing in policy setting or system change, whereas leaders of social service organizations felt that their role and the role of their organizations was

not simply to provide services, but also to be involved in the process of changing the system and advocating for the needs of their clients.

Figure 6 places all of the stakeholder civic culture frameworks on the continuum.



Figure 6. Civic Culture Frameworks of Stakeholder Groups

Stakeholder Groups, Frameworks, and Power

I propose developing this graphic further in order to better understand how these varying frameworks actually influence government/NGO collaboration in service provision and service take-up. One important element that has already been discussed in some ways is power. In this study, power refers to the ability to affect change on social policy, programs, and service provision. For example, government services for people with disabilities were extremely limited. One organization formed by volunteers began to offer services for children with disabilities. As they became better trained they offered to work with a school. The director of the school refused, because he has power over the school and what services are provided, in part dictated by higher authorities as well. However, this organization was able to form a relationship with a government

administrator who oversees multiple schools. This administrator was open to working with them and gave them permission to provide services in one school on a trial basis. Things went well and now their work has expanded to two more schools. Another example involved an organization wanting to work with some government agencies providing services not previously available. This organization similarly built a relationship with an administrator who signed a contract with them and they were able to function. However, the next year this administrator was promoted to a different area of government, and his successor wanted nothing to do with NGOs and annulled the contract.

Power differentials were evident at events as well. A few times a year, different levels of government would host round tables to discuss social policy and service provision issues. At other times, an individual government agency or occasionally even an NGO would organize a round table or seminar. These events would include representatives of the government, agency directors and some employees, and a few NGO leaders. Respect for hierarchy and the power of the government were evident in various ways. Government administrators were always seated in positions of honor, even when they were only “spectators” at an event. They also were introduced before others at the beginning of the event and often made a short speech. During a discussion, others in the room often turned toward the government official when speaking or referenced them as they spoke. Government officials were allowed to interrupt a discussion, whereas no one interrupted a government official, not even the moderator of the discussion. If someone was describing a new initiative or other program, they would make sure to thank the government administrator for whatever part they played in allowing and helping the program get off the ground.

On the other hand, NGO leaders tread a cautious path at these meetings. I observed how they carefully tested the waters in introducing new ideas, checking to see what the response of government officials and/or service providers was to a new idea or evaluation of an existing policy or program. Oftentimes, it was obvious that NGO leaders had built support even before these meetings. Their statements revealed that they had broached a topic in private with an administrator and were confident of their support, or they had a group of government service practitioners who echoed their propositions. Those in higher power positions did not need to use these tactics.

Finally, depending on the context, it was clear that power belonged in a limited number of hands that could either approve or refuse permission for something to happen. Volunteers had to submit to the decisions of NGO leaders, who had to submit to both government service providers and administrators. At times, NGO leaders circumvented directors of local agencies by going to their superiors in the government for permission to provide a service. Once a higher government official decided that a particular intervention would be advantageous, they simply ordered those under them to cooperate with the NGO.

As these examples illustrate, different stakeholder groups wield different levels of power in the sphere of social policy and provision, and the frameworks connected to these groups tend to influence what happens. In other words, for one, government administrators hold the most power in the system, and their frameworks favor government control with no to some allowance for volunteer and/or organization participation in the system. Because they hold power, their frameworks are more influential in the ideational realm of society. The influence is magnified by the state-controlled media, and which wields its own power and shapes the population's frameworks around NGOs' and volunteers' places in their society. So if we change the

illustration of the frameworks to loosely account for power, we could change the size of the circles (see Figure 3). In reality, the power of the state over citizens in Russia is much greater than shown here. The middle oval would become much smaller, and the one on the right would be miniscule.




Figure 7. Framework Power Differences

State Control/State Provision

As these civic culture frameworks clash and power differentials are taken into account, a variety of outcomes in the system are more easily understood. For example, the “State control/state provision” framework is the most powerful, both for historical reasons and because actors in the current system who adhere to this framework are in positions of high power. This combination leads to outcomes in funding, regulation, cooperation, and the populations’ willingness to use NGO services.

Funding

For some years, NGOs had access to funding streams from various parts of the world, though many grassroots organizations were very small. A \$10,000 grant from a foreign foundation could go a long way. Between the years 1991 and 2012, the government tightened laws regarding NGO registration and receipt of foreign funding, and numerous NGOs folded. However, in recent years the governments at the national, regional, and local levels have increased their funding of social service nonprofits. NGO leaders see this as an extremely positive development, although there are some caveats.

Org. Leader: “We receive the majority of our funding from the federal government and the region, and every year we get a bit more, and our work is developing.”

Org. leader: “We don’t apply for grants with certain government levels anymore, because we might write a grant for a certain amount of money, and when they award us the grant, they alter the terms and expect us to do much more or something different than what we actually proposed. Because they want us to do costly but quality work for little money and also change some of it, and expect all the work to be done by volunteers for free instead of by qualified specialists, we just don’t apply.”

More than one organization leader, service provider, volunteer, and service recipient mentioned corruption in the government as problematic. Here is one way it is played out.

Org Leader: “In the entire federal system it’s the same, money is given not to those who have the best proposals, but to those organizations that either know someone or have a special connection.”

The latter two quotations reflect the power differential between those that hold the mutual participation framework and those that adhere to state control/state provision. Organization leaders would prefer to have more power sharing, but they are not in a position to insist on it or change how the system works.

Regulation

The passing of stricter government regulations also flows from the framework of “state control/state provision.” These regulations have both positive and negative consequences. On the

one hand, these regulations are meant to improve the accountability and quality of NGO social service provision.

“It’s good that the government is overseeing the work of these organizations more.”

On the other, they impose a burden on the organization. One service provider noted that:

“Our habit is to think that volunteering and organizations should be part of the government system, right? [because everything was part of the government system during Soviet times] Probably this idea slows the development of NGOs as a structural form. And this leads to some negatives in the laws for how NGOs can be registered and work in Russia. There is a lot of oversight and regulations and paperwork for NGOs with minimal benefits. For example, we as a government agency get our building and our utilities paid for from the government budget, along with our salaries. We have funding for all kinds of expenses. But how does an NGO manage to exist? They have to eternally be looking for money.”

Another service provider said that:

“Bureaucracy hinders NGOs. Sometimes, I’m not saying all the time, the money doesn’t actually do anything for the clients. Sometimes an NGO wins a grant, and all is good, but they spend so much time on the paperwork, or the people working at the NGO turn over, or something else, and formally a program exists on paper, but it is never implemented in real life.”

Cooperation

Two stakeholder groups sitting on the left side of the continuum, government administrators and government-employed service providers, are both groups with higher levels of power than volunteers, NGO leaders, or recipients of service. Thus, they have the opportunity to either limit or support the work of volunteers or NGOs. They can refuse permission for groups to function, refuse to cooperate, or dictate the terms of collaboration. For example, a volunteer describes how the dynamic works:

“You know, in our hospitals, orphanages, schools, or other government institutions, there are already formed opinions, and you know, the boss is the boss. He’s not used to anyone else coming in with new ideas and doing stuff. You know, volunteering is a tradition in the West, but here it’s just beginning and therefore we have remnants of Soviet, communist thinking.”

Me: Does this influence the actions of the director?

“Of course, of course. There are strong stereotypes. A person who lived many years in that system, what he received from it ... they are afraid of the responsibility of changing the system. They’re not against us, as people, as volunteers.”

That quote hints at varying levels of power even within the government, with a director of an agency being afraid to make changes without approval from higher up. One NGO leader explained:

“The government is very open to volunteer projects at the level of the authorities, but the directors of government places like hospitals and schools don’t all accept us. There are as many opinions of us as there are places. There are people who are directly negative and ask, “For what?” But they’re the minority, but you have to be able to handle rejection and hope those people will change their minds.”

Willingness to use NGO services

The combination of negative propaganda authorized by those in power and lack of knowledge of NGOs in the general population leads to a hesitance by the population to use services provided by NGOs. The historic framework of direct social services falls in the state control/state provision. This remains the dominant framework because it was the only framework for so many years, and because alternative frameworks are not presented in the media. In fact, negative media coverage of NGOs serves to prevent widespread acceptance of them.

Service provider: “Yeah, yeah. If you say the word “volunteer” people say “what’s that?” If you explain that they are dobrovoltsi, or that they are people who just help other people, then it rings a bell. And NGO, what’s that? Everyone is used to working in the system, right? It’s hard for NGOs.”

Volunteer: “A drawback [of NGOs services] most often is distrust because if something is free, well, “free cheese is only in mousetraps,” we have such a proverb. We also think that it must be low quality. So people won’t come to the NGO for help.”

Nonvolunteer: “I don’t know what NGOs are or whether I can be sure they offer quality services. I wouldn’t go to them.”

State Control with Citizen Assistance

The middle framework, state control with citizen assistance, is held by people who have less power than government officials. Some results of the interaction of this framework with

other frameworks are citizen avoidance of advocacy, participation and awareness of problems, initiative, and openness to new structural forms.

Citizen Avoidance of advocacy

Many stakeholder groups have some members that fall into this framework, and it is a framework being used by the authorities to steer people into the type of citizen participation safest for the state.

One service recipient, because of her very positive interaction with an NGO and volunteers, was incensed that the media was pushing the volunteer movement in a less service-oriented and more state-building direction.

“I think that ideological propaganda is unconscionable! We dealt with this, we went through this in the 60s, 70s, and 80s. We already went through this and I have an allergy to this, an immunity, but young people who grow up now ... what’s happening now with history, with the feeling of patriotism ... it’s manipulation, it’s stultification aimed at a very low intellect and is an aggression against the masses. It is dangerous, very dangerous. It can be used to form and steer the masses. It’s scary, very scary.”

Many people in this framework didn’t talk about advocacy or having the power to change things when they thought about citizen participation. However, some explicitly mentioned that the role of volunteers and NGOs is to support the state, while others mentioned that even if they wanted to work for change in the system, they would do it in a way that did not challenge the system. Is this because they really believed citizens should always support the state, or because those with state control/state provision frameworks simply held more power and could use it against any challenger?

Participation & Awareness of Problems

For volunteers in particular, having the framework that they should contribute to their society resulted in them taking up opportunities to volunteer as they arose. Volunteers mentioned several ways that they became involved in volunteering. The first was through the invitation of

friends. The second was through a presentation by a volunteer center at their school. The third was somewhat surprising: one third of the volunteers went looking for opportunities online, and this search resulted in their first volunteer experience. Not only did their framework dispose them towards volunteering, but volunteers often described having their understanding of societal structure and social problems expanded.

Volunteer: “When I began volunteering I didn’t understand a lot of social problems at all. So I got involved in a lot of stuff just to learn. Now I’m focused on one thing, and we work to find a common language with the authorities.”

Initiative

Once volunteers began to participate, they also began to take more initiative in the form of recruiting friends and creating programs. For example, I was able to participate in a training weekend run by a volunteer center. The volunteer center was focused on starting other centers in smaller cities and towns in the region, and had invited groups from six cities to a retreat center for training. Each group consisted of either a teacher or a leader of a community center and about eight to ten young people between the ages of 15 and 22 or so. The training consisted of team building activities and brainstorming and planning of projects the teams in each city could do. Students were equipped with skills in communication, basic project proposals, and organization management. Because there was a government employee (teacher or community leader) with each team, the projects being designed were within the parameters of a government agenda. Nonetheless, the young people left this weekend with new skills and were encouraged to organize themselves to “do something positive and good for your city.” It was quite an impressive weekend.

Openness to New Structural Forms

Finally, all the interview subjects who had this civic culture framework discussed how their participation in volunteering, cooperating with NGOs (service providers), and receiving services has exposed them to new ideas about how social policy could be changed and how newer forms such as voluntary organizations and NGOs could play a part in service provision. This openness was most evident as they answered the scenario questions. The further they were to the right on the continuum, the greater their ability to brainstorm solutions to social problems that utilized a variety of structural elements, including volunteering, NGOs, and state forms of service provision.

This openness to new structural forms is communicated in the answers that service recipients gave to the question: “What advice would you give to this NGO?” [the one from which they receive services]. Almost all of them talked about publicity and getting the word out.

“Well, I think that they should spread more information, because a lot of people don’t know about stuff. They have services for people in need, but people can’t get them or contribute to it because they don’t know about it.”

“I think they need to publicize their events and services better.”

“I don’t know, maybe publicize more, well, let the population know about their work and services, so that people heard and knew about them more. I myself didn’t know about them, but my friend had some contact with them, and I found out about them through her.”

State & Citizen Mutual Participation

This kind of framework is held by some NGO leaders and some volunteers. Although some NGO leaders specifically consider that a strong society is built by the state sharing power with the citizens, they are in fact in a low power position and therefore have to be creative in their work. This framework is conducive to the work that many NGO leaders and their organizations engage in – creative advocacy, innovation in services, initiative, and networking and referrals.

Advocacy

At this end of the continuum advocacy was valued, though for the most part it was non-confrontational advocacy. Because of the great power difference between the state and NGOs, leaders creatively found ways to advocate for changes in the system. In terms of service provision, they diligently sought to build relationships with government officials and government agency employees in order to get permission to function and even to promote cooperation. They spent time describing social problems from a grass-roots point of view and trying to convince these people to support new services. Although they expressed frustration at their limited inclusion and/or acceptance in policy discussions, they took every opportunity to participate in government sponsored round tables or advisory boards. In addition, NGO leaders occasionally collaborated with each other to bring in a subject expert from Moscow for a day of discussions, and intentionally invited relevant government officials to participate as well.

Innovative Initiative

This framework was also connected to initiative, but even more to innovation in services. Some volunteers and many NGO leaders felt strongly that as citizens outside of a cumbersome bureaucracy, they could more easily meet the needs in front of them. In fact, they felt that it was their duty as citizens to do so and took initiative in creating something from nothing. It was described as a “calling” by many. Many of the services they provided had never been provided in Russia before, or only to a small degree. Services they created were aimed to improve the lives of children and families. There are many examples. One organization provides services to families of children with intellectual disabilities so that these children can avoid being institutionalized but remain in their homes. This organization is also pioneering inclusive education in a few schools in the city. Another organization provides services to families in crisis

so as to prevent children from being removed from the home. Another organization morphed from providing volunteer caregivers for orphans in the hospital to raising money from foundations to pay professional caregivers to provide the service. Yet another organization provides aid to women who have experienced domestic violence. The list of services provided is varied, and another paper could describe how quickly and creatively NGO leaders saw needs, experimented with services, and adapted further. NGO leaders were quick to see root systemic causes to social problems and shift their focus. Because of this, they see the benefits of their type of social structure and feel that they should have more power in the system. It is a mutually reinforcing cycle of innovation and framework strengthening.

Relationships & Referrals

Because of the emphasis on power sharing in this framework, NGO leaders and their organizations were open to collaborations and engaged in them frequently. As an NGO leader said, “We cooperate quite a bit with other NGOs and the government, but with NGOs more than with the government.” In the social service realm, this resulted in people who needed services receiving more targeted and simply more services. For example, a government agency might provide help with finding housing, but they do not offer services for families whose housing is deemed unfit for children. In the case of such a family, the usual approach is to remove the children from the home. However, because there is now an NGO in the city serving families in crisis, the government agency will refer the family to the NGO, which in turn will organize volunteers to renovate and fix the home so that it is certified by child welfare personnel. Through my participant observation, I know of three families who were able to avoid being torn apart in just such situations. This level of power-sharing by the government in this situation might be minimal, but it could not have happened had NGO leaders not held this framework and been

consistently working toward that end. As a result of their efforts, those needing services benefitted.

Conclusion

Civic culture frameworks in the data can be thought of as a continuum. At one end is the framework of state control and state provision of social welfare policy and provision without citizen participation. At the other end is a framework that values state and citizen mutual participation, involving the sharing of power in setting policy and providing services. Between these two is a framework reminiscent of the Soviet past in which a strong state sets not just social policy but overall direction for the country. Citizens collectively help society reach that goal. The role of the citizen is to support the state, not challenge it.

The six stakeholder groups in this study were strongly connected to certain sections of the civic culture framework continuum. Their frameworks were illustrated by what they believed the roles of the government, citizens, and NGOS should be, the amount of power they attributed to each structural element in an ideal setting, and the level of trust they expressed about these different elements. Nonvolunteers held strongly to ideals passed down from the Soviet system – government should control social policy and provide all services. They expressed suspicion and distrust of NGOs. Government administrators also believed in a strong state, but were open to cooperating with NGOs. However, they described the ideal society as one in which the government oversaw and strongly regulated NGOs, giving discretion to local officials to allow or restrict NGOs as they saw fit. With regard for general volunteering, government administrators preferred a state-directed form of volunteerism and were actively working to help create places to channel the volunteer energy of the population. Government service providers exhibited frameworks from the left to the middle of the continuum, with those lacking experience with

volunteers and NGOs being distrustful of them and adhering to a strong state control framework. Those with experience of NGOs, volunteers, and foreign professional contacts were positive about volunteer and NGO involvement in service provision, so long as the state set the agenda and exercised better quality control and oversight over NGO service providers. Volunteers' framework cluster aligned at the middle and right side of the continuum. Many volunteers expressed strong ideals of nation-building and citizen involvement in helping the state reach its goals. The more that volunteers were involved in leadership in their service organizations, the more they drifted further right and argued that mutual participation in policy-making and service provision was ideal. Finally, some NGO leaders held civic culture frameworks that valued state control with citizen assistance, with many leaders further toward state and citizen mutual participation. Their frameworks contained a greater emphasis on power sharing in policy making and service provision, and a priority in advocating for changes in the system in nonconfrontational ways.

The frameworks held by different stakeholder groups influence the actions of group members. In addition, the stakeholder positions in the system are connected with varying levels of power in the system, and because of this, the actions of the stakeholders are more or less restricted. This played itself out in areas of funding, cooperation, service utilization, avoidance or participation in advocacy, openness to new structural forms, initiative, and innovation in services.

Implications

Implications of these findings are both theoretical and practical. As the findings illustrate, frameworks matter in motivating action. Frameworks arise in historical contexts and are shaped by systems, but frameworks can also change through influence at both societal and individual

levels. The media and public discourse influences the acceptance of frameworks, as does individual exposure to and experience in alternative social-structural forms. Power interacts with frameworks in a way that those in power are able to keep their frameworks dominant.

Social workers can find practical implications to these findings. For example, when establishing social enterprises and social service nonprofits, social entrepreneurs must understand the political and social history of the community and how people perceive service organizations. What are their civic culture frameworks? Do community members trust organizations? What subgroup differences in perceptions exist? An analogous example in the U.S. is that of different frameworks of police and citizen roles in communities. Communities will differ from each other in how their stakeholder groups understand citizen versus government power and roles in law enforcement.

In addition, social workers must recognize that when there are conflicting frameworks, the power positions of stakeholder groups in those frameworks matter. We must identify not only the obvious subgroups in a community, but also less visible subgroups with great or little power. Social service organization leaders must be savvy navigators of various frameworks and power positions in order to exist, persist, advocate for and provide services to those less powerful.

The finding that exposure and involvement can change frameworks is also helpful for social workers. Often we struggle to understand why an intervention fails, why community involvement is sparse, or why take-up of services is low. If we take the time to understand the civic culture frameworks, along with the historical systems that shaped them, we will be able to create more acceptable ways to engage subgroups through exposure to new experiences, ideas, and structures.

Chapter 5: Civic Culture Frameworks & Social Service NGO Development

Introduction

This chapter is based on the 17 interviews of NGO leaders and nine months of participant observation in one Russian city, exploring civic culture frameworks and their relation to NGO development more deeply. Criteria for an NGO's inclusion in the study were (1) having existed for at least five years, (2) having been founded and still being managed by Russian citizens, and (3) having provided direct services to families and/or children. To be included in the study, the organization had to be currently legally registered, though it did not have to have been formally registered for all of the five years of its existence.

As described in Chapter 3, the elements I looked for to understand civic culture frameworks were roles, power, and trust. How did an interview subject understand the role of the government and the role of volunteers and NGOs in tackling social problems and forming social policy? Who did they perceive as having power in the system, and how did they imagine power to function in an ideal system? How did trust of governmental and nongovernmental institutions influence civic culture frameworks? As NGO leaders told their stories, it became clear that they began with very similar frameworks, and that over time these frameworks have diverged.

The findings I am presenting in this chapter crept up on me. In analyzing the interviews of NGO leaders, I began to notice narratives that reflected the emergence of two somewhat different civic culture frameworks from a similar beginning. As I sought to make sense of these diverging narratives, I realized that they coincided with another characteristic of the NGO leaders: the type of organization in which they worked and the direction in which it was heading.

These leaders paint a fascinating picture of civic culture framework change over time, and how those framework changes coincide with changes in their organizations. Leaders illustrate how historical and political context and foreign influence have shaped their frameworks, as well as how their personal experience and political pressure continue to shape them, leading to diverging goals in the missions of their organizations.

NGO leaders in this study guided a variety of organizations providing services such as crisis counseling, mentoring of youth in the care of the state, services for families in crisis, domestic violence prevention and therapeutic consultation, services for people with range of disabilities and their families, support groups, training of community leaders, and mobilization and training of volunteers. Some of the NGOs that formerly provided regular and targeted social services are now moving towards providing only mobilization of volunteers for one-time or non-service events.

Every NGO leader I interviewed began as an informal volunteer in some type of social service activity before many NGOs in Russia were in existence. As is often the case worldwide, social service volunteering leads to establishment of social service NGOs ([Musick & Wilson, 2007](#)). In fact, twelve of the seventeen leaders I interviewed are founding members of their organizations. However, in this Russian city two different types of NGOs emerge from the common soil of social service volunteering. The first type, which I will call social service NGOs, focuses on providing direct service and/or training to people who provide direct service. This type of NGO is more active in advocacy for disadvantaged populations or policy change, and their motivation is articulated in their mission to serve a specific population. The second type, volunteer centers, are organizations which focus on providing volunteer opportunities primarily for young people. The opportunities often include short-term projects as well as calls to help

social service NGOs pull off one-day or short term events or fundraising. The stated primary motivation of volunteer centers is to promote civic involvement in ways that support the government and to provide opportunities for individual “self-development.”

The characteristics of social service and volunteer center leaders are similar in many respects (see Table 3). The majority is female and has completed higher education. Social Service NGO leaders tend to be slightly older on average and more religious than volunteer center leaders, with slightly greater years of volunteer experience.

Table 3. NGO Leader Characteristics

	Mean Age	Mean Years Volunteering	% Female	% Religious	% In or Completed Higher Ed	N
Volunteer Center Leader	32.6	9	80	20	100	5
Social Service NGO Leader	41.3	11.75	75	75	83.3	12

Social Service Volunteering as Foundation for Establishing Organizations

Volunteering served as the impetus for the establishment of NGOs in this city. Of the 16 NGO leaders that I interviewed, each one had become involved in NGO work through volunteering before the NGO was founded. Many of the organizations began as loose groups who decided to serve people faced with a particular social issue.

“I had always heard about orphanages and finally I just went and visited one. What I saw shocked me. I asked what I could do to help, and at first I just brought them supplies, like diapers and toys. I got some friends together and that’s what we were doing, and then online I found some other people who were working in orphanages and we joined forces and started to do more to interact with the children.”

“Our organization began with a group of us who were already professionals – psychologists and educators. ... I guess you could say we were volunteers, since this was not part of our jobs. ... later we found sponsors that could pay us for our work.”

“The idea came up when hanging out with other friends who are in wheel chairs. We decided to start a group to create social opportunities for people with disabilities. Over time this goal changed and transformed because we gained experience and new opportunities arose. So we just widened our scope of work.”

“I saw an ad online (for helping orphans in the hospital) and went once and enjoyed it. My interest rose in the process of volunteering.”

“We didn’t start out thinking to found an organization. As I said, we were volunteer carers going to the hospital to take care of babies who were sick and whose mothers had abandoned them.”

Even in the organizations that later became volunteer centers, initial foci of volunteering were primarily social service in nature, such as programs to help children coming out of institutional care adapt to independent life, programs to visit the elderly in institutional settings, and programs to promote inclusion of children with disabilities into activities with other school children.

“Back in 1997, L and I began our own volunteer project working with teenagers in the welfare system.”

“We took some school children to volunteer at an old people’s home and they loved it, so we continued setting up opportunities. Eventually it became an official part of the school and then a recognized volunteer center.”

Over time, these loosely organized volunteer groups formalized into legally registered NGOs in the Russian context, and the interviewed leaders became formal leaders in the organizations, although they were and still are not necessarily paid. What were their civic culture frameworks during their initial years of volunteering? They described a framework in which they expected the government to set policy and provide services, but an understanding that the government was unable to do its job in the transition. Leaders felt that they could not stand by and do nothing when people were suffering, although they expected the government to eventually recover and take over its role. In the early years, they did not understand the greater social structure, but simply wanted to meet needs in their immediate vicinity. They had no vision of changing social policy or structure.

“We were young and active, and excited that we could do something on our own initiative. We wanted to be part of helping the country through the hard time.”

“Those were hard times and we couldn’t expect the government to rebuild everything all at once. So we decided to do our part until the country was stronger again.”

“It was only after going to the orphanages for a while and seeing what was really happening that I began to see the deeper issues. It took a couple of years before we understood how the system worked and that the government was not necessarily going to change anything. We realized that to do something for the kids we had to try to change something in the system, even if it is just something small.”

The civic culture framework that leaders started their careers with is in the middle of the continuum from Chapter 2 -- state control with citizen assistance. All of the NGO leaders had civic culture frameworks in this area as they began their work.

The Soviet Past, Foreign Influence, and Current Political Climate

Although the civic culture frameworks of social service and volunteer center NGO leaders diverge in specific ways that influence the path of their organizations, their narratives exhibit a high degree of consistency when looking at the connections between NGO development and three influences: the soviet past, foreign interactions, and current laws, policies, & climate. All NGO leaders, regardless of the type of organization they were in, talked about how these elements impacted the acceptance of volunteering and NGOs by the government and the public, and the ability of the organization to obtain funding. These narratives describe the contexts that influence their own, “the government’s”, and the public’s frameworks.

During the Soviet era, volunteer activity was marginally voluntary and often mandated by party controlled work, neighborhood, or social organizations.

“There was volunteer work in Soviet times, but it was different. It was mostly young people from the Pioneers (communist youth organization for ages 10-15) or Komsomol (communist youth organization for ages 15-28), and they were organized by the government or some authorities of the government.”

In 1940 a youth volunteer movement called Timurites began among Little Octobrists (communist youth organization for ages 7 – 9) and Pioneers. These Timurite groups were founded and promoted within the youth organizations following the publication of a youth novel called “Timur and His Team.” Timur and his buddies went around doing good deeds in secret for soldiers’ families and tried to undermine local “hooligans.” A movie based on the book appealed to the youth of the nation, and doing “good deeds” became part of communist youth culture. Interviewed leaders referenced the Timurite movement as influential to the prevailing notions of volunteering. One current NGO leader links her involvement in volunteering as an adult to this film.

“When I was 6 years old, I saw the film “Timur and his Team,” and I wanted to do something good, because if you do something good, you feel strong and as if you are magic. That’s how I decided I wanted to volunteer, and this desire to volunteer remained.”

There were avenues of nonpaid service for adults during the Soviet period as well, also strictly controlled by the party.

“Yes, the Soviet system affects us in how everything develops. Yeah, in the Soviet system we had organizations, and they were strong national government controlled organizations. Everyone knew about them and paid member fees and in general, if there was activity related with the organization, then it was always social activity and ... especially people who wanted to move up into leadership or further their career were active.”

A majority of the leaders expressed nostalgia for the values of collective identity and working for the common good, explaining that these values almost disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In their work with volunteers, they see this returning to a small degree.

“For some reason it seems to me that patriotism played a big role during Soviet times. Everyone went [volunteered] because the Soviet Union was a power, “one for all and all for one,” and there was more ideology. Now it’s more as if personal wishes lead a person to volunteer. The herd mentality is gone.”

“The system of education at schools and what was here in Soviet times taught that we should help. For a while this foundation disappeared. Today, it seems to me, this is returning a little, and people want to help and do something good.”

In addition to values, leaders express appreciation for Soviet experience in leadership, while also noting the benefits of a more open society.

“There was a lot of good knowledge and know-how that we got in the old system in government organizations. We need to keep that and transfer it to the new system.”

“Now there are probably more opportunities for volunteer work, more forms of volunteering, organizational forms, and volunteers and experience. Plus the lowering of the iron curtain, which allows us to communicate with foreign colleagues, share experience with other countries, and see what is happening there. Before that was problematic. Now the opportunities are open, plus the internet appeared, and skype, which have totally removed boundaries.”

However, leaders felt that the former Soviet system had a dampening effect on the development of NGOs in the area of funding. Because the vast majority of non-work organizations during the Soviet period were communist party-run social or professional organizations, people have not developed a concept of organizations that exist to provide a service to others, particularly social services. Even more, they have no understanding of how NGOs function or are financed. This lack of knowledge is coupled with the expectation that the government provide and fund all social services from a centralized system.

“People ask, ‘Olga, do you work? What, you work full time [at an NGO] and receive a salary?’ For people it’s all ... understand, volunteering in the Soviet Union was like, you have a job and you have free time, and in free time you can do some kind of work for society. But you shouldn’t receive any pay for it. If they hear that we get paid, they think, ‘What, you take money away from the children?’ There is no understanding that to provide quality services you need to pay professionals and people to run the organization.”

“The idea was that you did this work in addition to your main job. Because of this, it was and still is hard to develop the NGO sector, on the one hand, to be professional and have resources so that personnel can work full time and provide services. It’s hard to switch to provide quality professional services when the organization started with volunteers.”

“Here is the traditional understanding of NGO from those times -- that working in them is work on the side. You could say that people who finish university do things this way, because they understand that working in NGOs is not the most profitable option.”

Because of this generalized understanding, NGO leaders who receive compensation, no matter how little, expressed frustration and exhaustion at having to constantly justify their work and salary to others. In addition, they described a battle with discouragement that is always lurking in the background.

Leaders reported that some of their greatest difficulties arise out of a lack of public knowledge of volunteerism.

“Sometimes I write on a social networking site “volunteer activity” and someone immediately responds and asks, “What is a volunteer?” They don’t understand. Until a person personally has experience with a volunteer, he doesn’t understand.”

However, they do see progress in both understanding and in returning to ideas of collective responsibility.

“It seems to me, that when you talk about volunteering, like cleaning the neighborhood, people get skeptical, because before they forced us and all, and then, when we went through the period of our lives, our country’s I mean, that if we ourselves didn’t do anything then in principle no one else did either. Now the social responsibility of each person, well, the citizen’s responsibility is understood more. Now it’s easier. We went from one extreme to the other. We thought that everything from the Soviet times was bad, and now we understand more ... that you shouldn’t help just yourself, but help the weak so that you get stronger, too.”

While leaders felt that misunderstanding of volunteering created difficulties, they stressed that lack of knowledge and negative perceptions of NGOs had even worse consequences for their work. They perceived strong suspicion of NGOs by the general public. Some of it is due to lack of knowledge as described above, but in large measure it is fueled by government propaganda. As the leaders described, many early NGOs in Russia were international NGOs, while many others were founded with strong international funding and training. In fact, these training opportunities and sometimes funding trickled down to these small social service NGOs. The

majority of the leaders in my study have participated in some type of training led by foreign organizations, and most of them have received small grants from foreign sources for their NGOs. The NGO leaders became aware of these opportunities over time by connecting through the internet with NGOs in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Many international NGOs were political in nature, working in the fields of human rights and democracy development. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November 2004, the Russian government began passing stricter laws regulating NGOs in the country, fearing that NGOs receiving foreign funding would foment political unrest. One particular law, often referred to as the “foreign agent” law, requires that an NGO register with the government as a “foreign agent” if they receive any funding from foreign sources and are involved in “political activity.” “Political activity” is not defined in the law. The term “foreign agent” is a term used synonymously with “spy” in Russian, in particular Soviet, history. In addition to passing legal measures, the government intensified a campaign against NGOs, including negative coverage in news media to discourage the populace from participating in them. While the NGO leaders whom I interviewed were sympathetic to the government’s need to protect the country, they felt that these government policies had the unintended consequence of increasing suspicion of their organizations.

In their view, this generalized suspicion combined with the lack of knowledge of NGOs contributes to difficulty in finding donors, a drop-off in volunteer numbers, and lowering of morale. They find that individuals are less likely to trust organizations and in turn unlikely to make donations. In addition, while philanthropy from businesses is on the rise, organization leaders find that unless they have a long track record and some connections, businesses are cautious about contributing to NGOs. In fact, businesses often contribute directly to government

institutions such as orphanages and homes for the elderly. Likewise, potential volunteers are more cautious about becoming involved with NGOs. Finally, leaders describe increased questioning even from family members about their work in an NGO – instead of simple lack of knowledge of NGOs, family, friends, and acquaintances now make jokes about them being “foreign agents.”

“There are problems with the legal regulations of NGOs. In Russia there is a difficult political situation, where there is a lot of hypocrisy, where one thing is said, but a different thing is done. A lot of mass media presents things in such a light ... it is starting to remind me of the Soviet Union. There is news that NGOs are a scam, and in general the phrase NGO has become a curse word, like an organization that is registered but it’s not clear what they do. Even if you try to explain that it is a social organization, even though we provide social services, they don’t understand, and think you collect stamps or something.”

In general, NGO leaders have ambivalent feelings toward the federal government. They are encouraged by the great increase in grant programs for NGOs at all levels of the government, and for some strong relationships with local social service administrators. However, they are frustrated that the government has not fully embraced the contribution they make in the areas of social service, and wish that the government would help with educating the public about social service NGOs.

“The NGO sector is, in fact, not strong, and we can say that today the main problem is the promotion of the NGO sector.”

“We have a few really good NGOs in our city but there is a vacuum of knowledge; people don’t know that they exist or what they do.”

“There are these different organizations developing, but there is a vacuum, yes, a lack of knowledge among the people that these organizations exist and what they do. Support from various levels of government is lacking ... they could help get out the information. And in various ways – on television, on the internet, in printed media. Yeah? There are many ways. Then people would know to what organizations they could go for help, or go to if they are prepared to help.”

Leaders also find the political climate stressful and difficult to navigate.

“The politics in Moscow are now such that on the one side, one hand is supporting the development of NGOs, while the other is trying to drive them into a certain mold. If earlier control was maintained by force, now it’s done by economic means, which is just as tough. So now, the party policy is to ensure that on the one hand volunteering and NGOs develop in the direction of government-overseen organizations, by giving funding to those that fit into the system, and the other hand represses those that do not fit.”

At the same time, they described mainly positive relationships with local government officials and with most state-run social service institution administrators. These relationships exhibit great power differentials, with NGOs in the low power position. Despite this, their work is slowly moving forward, and both types of organizations, social service and volunteer center, remain optimistic about their ability to contribute to their society.

Civic Culture Frameworks

The civic culture frameworks emerging from the narratives of NGO leaders coincide with the two NGO types I have delineated, social service and volunteer center. In these frameworks one can hear echoes of themes of Soviet background, foreign influence, and current political climate. Social service volunteering led to the establishment of NGOs, and over time NGO leaders began to see the bigger picture of social structure, including the impediments to social change. NGOs then began to diverge subtly in ways that have had lasting consequences in their current missions, with one type of NGO focusing on providing services and advocacy, and the other focusing on promoting civil engagement to support the government and facilitating personal growth opportunities.

Social Service NGO Leaders’ Civic Culture Framework

Social Service NGO (SSNGO) leaders believe that the government should be responsible for addressing social problems and meeting needs, but it should do so with public-private partnerships, and by acknowledging the benefits of NGOs in recognizing and defining problems, creating solutions, and providing services. Social service leaders also included in their

frameworks a high priority for advocacy for a legal system that protects marginalized groups, for better enforcement of policy, and for creation of funding streams for social service NGOs.

SSNGO leaders agree that funding of NGOs should be a priority for the government through grants and contracts, although funding/support should also come through citizen participation in the form of volunteering & donations, foundation support, and business philanthropy. This framework evinces strong ideas of both government responsibility for solving social problems and citizen participation in governance. This framework is evidenced in their descriptions of how things should work or do work in the areas of professionalization of services, funding, management of their organizations, advocacy, focus of volunteering, and mission of the organization.

Professionalization of Services of Social Service NGOs

Leaders of SSNGOs describe how they came to understand the need to move from volunteer-based to more professional services, though the organizations are still in the midst of this transition. In their narratives, we can see their civic culture frameworks regarding both government responsibility and citizen involvement emerging. As leaders recalled the trajectory of their organization, they described a sharpening of their mission as they began to understand the underlying structural issues contributing to the problem. In this sharpening process, they recommitted to providing services to a specific group while also refining how they did so.

“Currently, our work is being built not only on volunteers, but to a greater degree on a professional understanding regarding what children in the care of the state really need. A large area of our work being developed this year is services with families in crisis. Work with children who are still living with their families. Why this change? People have wised up and seen that they are working with kids in orphanages, then these kids grow up, age out, and produce the same problems and give their children to the orphanage. We saw that the effectiveness of our work was low. Why not work with the families before the kids are in orphanages? Therefore, at this time our work with kids in orphanages is only about 30% of our work, whereas before it was 100%. And what we do in the

orphanages now is totally different than what we did at the beginning. ... 30% of what we do is through volunteers at the orphanages, and for the rest we have professionals.”

“We'd rather say we still work with orphanages but we try not to make it high-profile; we make low-profile. Now we are working with children in foster families, and they need help. This is something we quite recently started doing, maybe a year ago. And I think that after a few years maybe the public attention will also move into that direction. Also, what changed um uh the state policy changed. In 2012 the government put a priority on finding families for children to live in.”

“You understand, volunteers are people who work, have families, and who can participate and dedicate only a part of their time – each as much as they can. Over time we realized that there was too much turnover of carers for each child. It was not good for the child or for his medical care. We realized that we had to solve this problem more professionally, namely with professional carers who could be paid to be with a child in the hospital. Instead of trying to raise money from private individuals, we decided to establish a fund with transparent accountability and pay professional nannies. Until the government takes responsibility for providing this type of service, we will fill the gap.”

“We have to become more professional, high quality. There should be government financing. The social importance of the problem needs to be understood and then it will be possible to develop further. But for now, it's enough that volunteers keep the work going. But to help people with quality services, this work should be paid, and financing should come from local and national government as grants. Without this we'll never move to the next level.”

These organizations and others have made strides in creating innovative and formerly non-existent services. To some degree, all of them collaborate with a local government social service structure. The leaders of these organizations hold fast to their understanding that the government should be involved in addressing social problems, both in funding solutions and creating avenues for service provision. They also perceive NGOs as being “on the ground” and “close to the people and their problems” and as becoming more professional and competent in their work. One foundation of their civic culture framework is that NGOs should be key participants in policy formation and service provision.

Funding

SSNGO leaders continue to believe that the government has the bulk of responsibility in solving social problems, but at the same time they promote a system of public-private partnership. Particularly, they hold a strong opinion that the government should provide financing.

“Social problems are also the government’s problem, and they shouldn’t depend on the strength of volunteers to solve it; they need to provide financing for services.”

“There should be money set aside by the government on a competitive basis and NGOs would apply for it, and the best proposals would get the money.”

“The government cannot fund everything. It should be a government-private partnership. If the government cannot provide full support, it should provide office and facility space or pay for the rent for such a place. The organization can find other sponsors to help as well.”

This framework of partnership implies continued citizen involvement in the social service sphere.

Organizational Functioning

SSNGO leaders’ civic culture framework is also evidenced in how they manage their organizations. Due to their interaction with organizations in Moscow and St. Petersburg along with participation in training from and education from foreign organizations, they attempt to minimize the strongly hierarchical leadership style that they see coming from their Soviet past. Instead, they use a team leadership and participatory approach. However, they’ve had to educate their volunteers to this style of leadership and functioning.

“People aren’t used to the kind of volunteering we do. They expect someone to tell them what to do. But we understand volunteering to mean working together – solving problems and making decisions together.”

Advocacy

SSNGO leaders expressed that working in advocacy is part of their mission, exhibiting a

strong belief in citizen participation in governance. However, the form of advocacy taken by these leaders is strongly influenced by their context. On the one hand, they speak of advocacy as a taken-for-granted part of their work, such as raising a problem with government officials or working to pass a new law:

“We currently have a bill before the DUMA (Russian parliament) that will change the categorization of domestic abuse to its own criminal category, and will allow for orders of protection. Our organization and colleagues in other such organization around Russia have helped with this, and a lawyer is working with a Duma deputy to help pass this bill.”

“For example, there are families where a person is extremely ill but the family does not fall into the category of “crisis” or extreme poverty, but this is a family that needs help, just like the others. And of course, there is no help. Many times we have talked about this with government representatives. It’s a real problem in our time.”

“Plus, we’ve already talked with the government that they should raise the amount of social benefits and payments for citizens. It’s very important.”

“We often raise this topic with government granters.”

“No, that was, well we actually started going to orphanages in 2007 and we didn't register until 2010. But when we realized that we can't really go on, can't go to officials and can't be any um decision-maker in the industry, we can still go visit children and we can play with them, it's OK, but as soon as we want any legislative initiatives, as soon as we want to have dialog with the authorities or at least some influence, we need to be a legal entity. And that's how we started it [the organization].”

On the other hand, SSNGO leaders usually qualified their descriptions of advocacy-type work by alluding to issues of power, fear, and hesitancy. They recognize that the power differential between them and anyone with government authority is immense, and government authorities could withhold permission for their activities at any time. Because of this, they avoid participating in any type of political protest or confrontational advocacy, preferring to foster a cooperative approach to solving social problems. Leaders mentioned fear on both sides of the table – fear of the government by NGOs, and fear of NGOs by the government.

“Another thing, I think, is that NGOs should understand that the government and government structures are not the opposition, but simply another resource, a really good

resource, and that the goal of an NGO is to identify the problem and put it before the government, and tell the government that it has certain resources and suggest collaborating to solve it. But to say it not as if they have a position of power, but to recognize that both the government and NGOs have advantages and resources.”

One leader even described non-confrontational advocacy as stress-inducing for those not involved in an organization:

“I think that people see events that the mass media covers, like cleaning of some neighborhood or planting of trees, and they like that. They understand that to be volunteering. But if there is a part of volunteering that includes advocacy to change a social policy, I think that it brings up fear in the older generation.”

Government wariness of NGOs plays a part in the kind of advocacy SSNGOs choose as well.

“I want to add something. I have the impression that, let’s say, that the authorities as a whole understand that NGOs are necessary and that they’re important for the government. From the point of view that they are closer to the people, right? And NGO services lessen the social pressure. Together with that is, well, why hide it? There is fear [on the part of the government], right? Again, how much this is justified, it’s not for me to judge, maybe somehow NGOs will be used to interfere in the political system. Therefore the government has these rather strange initiatives that occur periodically, where they raid NGO offices and intimidate them.”

“You have to register. If you do any political activities you have to register as an international agent, which kind of hurts if you work with orphans. And political means anything. Advocating for human rights is political. Advocating for the rights of patients can be deemed political. So we had a lot of um, procurator's office checks, like the they uh pulled in dozens, like dozens of NGOs were checked

Me: Were you checked?

“No, we weren't fortunately, but some of our colleagues here in the city were. Just random checkups, they come and they check all computer files to see if you are doing any terrorist activities or get any international funding. Any funding that comes from an international source, and they uh they claim, for example, the procurators claim that some of the patient rights advocates were a political institution. The organization fought the procurators for that, and they won the case. They managed to prove that they were not political. But anyway, they had to stop their activity for a week.”

Such actions on the part of government, in addition to legal restrictions mentioned earlier, create uncertainty and fear in SSNGO leaders, leading to hesitancy in advocacy on their part.

“There is a tendency for NGOs to develop into more professional organizations. The qualifications of their staff are higher, new opportunities arise, and their system of financing develops. But I don’t know (pause) For example, the legal tendencies, they are contradictory. For example, the law about “foreign agents.” I, for one, am against it. On the grounds that participation in legislative activity is unclear. Can we, for example, communicate our views on the social protection of disabled people, or is this political activity? It’s unclear. Therefore it is a problem. The tendency is contradictory.”

In summary, the SSNGO leaders have a civic culture framework that values advocacy as a form of citizen participation with the state in solving social problems. Because of the political climate, they choose a form of advocacy that emphasizes cooperation with the state rather than confrontation.

“If you work as a staff member with an orphanage you cannot really do anything outside the main policy, the central policy. And if you're outside you get fresh ideas, you're independent, so you can't get fired by the Ministry of you don't have this boss. And it opens more possibilities, opportunities for changing it. It gives another viewpoint. If we speak about legislative changes for example, I think NGOs should definitely be consulted because it’s one thing to get the opinion of people who work in orphanages, we’ll take just one example, orphanages, and you get the opinion of NGOs who see the situation from a different angle.”

Focus of Volunteering

As SSNGO leaders described the way volunteers contribute to their work, it becomes apparent that the focus of volunteering is mission driven. Volunteers are oriented and trained to understand the social service mission of the organization, and contribute in a variety of ways, from planning or executing fund-raising events, helping with renovations, serving as organizational support, or providing direct services to clients. However, these leaders also emphasize their belief that their organizations should continue the move towards greater professionalization. They see the role of volunteering as more limited: “Volunteers can help the professionals who work for the NGOs,” and are more articulate about the drawbacks of volunteers: “Volunteers are not available on a regular basis,” and “Volunteers are not qualified to do a lot of the work, and also cannot give the amount of time necessary.”

Mission of Organization

The mission of SSNGOs are focused on providing direct social services, improving direct social services by training providers, and advocating for changes in policy or provision. In addition, they innovate with new services. Having grown from volunteer movements, they have moved towards more professional service provision, and while still welcoming and using volunteers in their organizations, their main focus is on their social service mission rather than on developing volunteers. “Ideally, we could unite the government and NGO with volunteers to solve problems.” SSNGO leaders have learned to look at both micro and macro structures and their interconnections, and want to put their knowledge and experience to work as citizen organizations collaborating with the state. One leader sums this up:

“The government should provide legal and policy foundations for society, and some institutions to help. Naturally, I think that the problems that the government should solve should be solved with the input of experienced NGOs who already do things and know how to do them. Not so that things are maximally inexpensive, but so that they are maximally effective AND economical, at the least.”

Volunteer Center Leaders’ Civic Culture Framework

Some early volunteer groups have solidified into volunteer centers. As articulated by leaders in these organizations, these centers promote volunteering in ways that support the government, while also providing “self-development” opportunities for individuals. The civic culture framework of volunteer center leaders is both more individually focused and more state-centric. They believe that the family or individual is responsible for solving their problems before they turn to the government. However, if they are still in difficulty, the government should provide monetary benefits and other services to those in need. In addition, the government should articulate a clear societal vision for the people to follow. Ideally, the government should provide most services, but in the event that this is not possible, it should turn

to citizen groups for help. Volunteer center leaders had a more diffuse vision of civic culture – there should be mobilization to increase citizen participation in helping each other in their neighborhoods, so as to increase social trust and organized volunteering efforts. Some NGOs will be in the system to fulfill specific social service functions and the government should oversee and fund them.

Government Should Lead Society with a Vision

The most striking difference between SSNGO leaders' civic culture framework and that of volunteer center leaders is in the centrality of the government. Volunteer center leaders express a desire for the government to form and communicate a strong national vision for society. The role of NGOs in general is to support the implementation of this vision. SSNGO leaders never mentioned such an idea.

“I think that there should be social policy, policy of the government, that everyone understands and can follow.”

Volunteer center leader answering the last scenario question:

“The government, as the head, should ... we're accustomed to everything coming from above. There's some kind of order and we try to fulfill it. Even when we have some kind of event, you invite business to it and also a representative of the government. Business people will come if a government authority will be there, because it will look like the event is worthwhile – ‘a representative from the administration was there, wow, how cool, that means it was something important and necessary!’ All the same, some kind of mutual purpose should be propagated by the government, as we live in one country and shouldn't do things separately. It seems to me that it's not right when we don't agree; we should be united toward one goal, and strive towards it, so that we develop together. Certainly, local society and volunteers and NGOs should be involved in the creation of this society and together we can build something good on the island.”

View of Social Service NGOs

Volunteer Center leaders affirmed the value of social service NGOs, while at the same time exhibiting a civic culture framework that places responsibility for solving social problems on the government. It was as if NGOs were good but only insofar as the government was not

fulfilling its responsibility. In their ideal world, the government would take the lead and citizen organizations would “help.”

“The responsibility should be on the government. You could say that NGOs are simply quality executors of government tasks. So naturally, the financing should be different. The question is what the quality assessment criteria should be, and the plans for development and all of that. But we have a strong centralized system, and through this central system you should look to solve things.”

“As I said before, if we’re creating a society, then you’ll be helped. But the responsibility in this case should be put on the government. If we look to NGOs, well, they’re just fulfilling the state’s responsibility.”

“The government should finance services and run most of them.”

“NGOs and volunteers are solving problems that the government should actually be solving.”

Government Taking Active Involvement in Volunteer Movement

In Russia, the government began paying more attention to the general increase in volunteering in the 2000s and took steps to guide its development, and leaders mentioned this activity. The government created an annual summer camp, “Seliger” that brought together thousands of young people from across the country for training in organizational management, culture, technology, the arts, and politics, among other things. Because it is sponsored by the ruling party of Russia, the camp used the opportunity to communicate the worldview and political views of the government. Volunteer center leaders mention that a number of their volunteers have gone through this training. Another initiative of the government is to provide a national registry of volunteers. Although not legally required, any organizations that utilize volunteers are encouraged to give volunteers the official volunteer booklet and to have them register themselves online. Volunteer centers are becoming part of the government system through close collaboration with local administrations. Leaders cite both benefits and drawbacks of these developments.

“There has been a change in our country after which the government has paid attention to its [volunteering’s] development.”

“We have a centralized government, everything is at the center, and the central authorities have paid attention to volunteering. Propaganda for volunteering has begun among school children in a rather tough manner, and we’re supposed to fill out a ‘volunteer book’ and register it, if you participate. The initiative is fine, but now the local government is setting goals, and if the leader can’t fulfill them, then he gets worried, and everyone else gets worried.”

“Now it’s even easier to get into university if you have one of these volunteer booklets.”

A leader mentioned another bill being considered in the Duma:

“In Russia they’re getting ready to pass a law on volunteering where they plan to have government training of volunteers and will support volunteering, but I’m not sure how they will do this. They’ll have to develop a program and finance it. This is a federal law.”

Mission of Organization

Volunteer center leaders never mentioned advocacy or advocacy type activities in their narratives, instead focusing on promoting civic involvement and individual development.

“We are a resource center for the development of volunteering and philanthropy. We develop new methods, show how things are done, so that other organizations can do it as well. And we help supply volunteers for other organizations when they have events.”

“We exist to develop volunteering at the institutional and system-wide level. It is like propaganda of volunteering and through volunteering -- it’s like an instrument of personal development and development of civil society.”

“Volunteer center have a somewhat different purpose. They, of course, work with people, but in general they work with specific groups of people, for example young people, or people who come to take part in some kind of initiative. There are people who want self-fulfillment, and the center gathers them and gives them this opportunity.”

“The mission of our organization is also to promote the development of the people, mostly young people, through volunteering. We’re not a place to help people [not a social service organization], but a place for self-improvement. Helping people is just a side benefit.”

Focus of Volunteering

When volunteer center leaders described the focus of their volunteering, they mixed the narrative of individual development and societal development. In fact, the focus on individual development was in stark contrast to a focus on fulfilling a social mission, and was so strong that advocacy had no room in the picture.

“We have the approach that volunteering is a tool for development of people.”

“At first it wasn’t conscious, and I didn’t totally understand what volunteering is, but just took part in some events when someone said let’s go with these people and help with something. Now I have a deeper understanding; volunteering is not just helping someone, but it’s helping yourself most of all. Volunteering is not only that you were asked and did something, but it’s personal development, the development of yourself through this activity. In my opinion, this is a good space and a good chance to try something new that you want to do, and volunteering gives you this opportunity.”

“What does the volunteer get? He gets a feeling that he is needed in the world, and also feels joy in doing good, and that brings him hope that all is not so bad.”

Some statements allude back to ideals of Soviet times, in which the citizen was involved in building the nation state, and in return the state took care of the citizen.

“We try to let people know that when they help others, they are helping themselves also.”

“The thing is, until then we need to grow in our understanding that people should contribute to the development of society.”

“People should understand that everyone should participate in taking care of each other. In helping society to develop. This point of view needs to grow.”

Evidence for the return of volunteer center leaders towards a framework closer to the middle of the civic culture spectrum is found in websites and through participant observation. Two NGOs particularly stand out in terms of website change over time. One of them (we will call it NGO CO), mentioned in Chapter 2, was historically a resource center for other NGOs, providing seed money for the founding of organizations and ongoing training. Since late 2012, this organization has shifted its focus to introducing methods of community organizing to

already existing neighborhood centers. These neighborhood centers are holdovers from the Soviet era, and are generally run in an authoritative manner. NGO CO is revitalizing these neighborhood centers by introducing more democratic ways of functioning and mobilizing volunteers. They are moving the neighborhood centers from a government control/government provision framework to a more central framework of government control with citizen assistance, with a dash of citizen initiative within government defined parameters. While they are moving neighborhood centers towards the center of the continuum, this NGO leader is moving their own organization back towards the center from the opposite side of the continuum. The former goal of NGO CO as mentioned on their website was to empower citizens to form NGOs and to strengthen these independent organizations. The current goal on the Russian language version of the website is “not to create new NGOs or government organizations or agencies, but rather to use principles of community organizing to involve the population in already existing organizations.” However, the English language version of the website does not mention this narrowing of goals.

Another example involves an organization I will call NGO VC. Five years ago this organization was primarily focused on developing services for young people in the care of the state (institutionalized children). They developed programs and recruited volunteers to help carry them out. Their web site and published public relations material described their social mission and the opportunities to make a difference through innovation in services and advocacy for new social policy. Within the past five years, NGO VC has discontinued providing direct services, but as their current web site describes, focuses on cooperating with local governments to create volunteer centers. These government-directed volunteer centers funnel volunteers toward

approved types of activity. The NGO VC website also emphasizes the personal benefits of volunteering for participants, including personal and skill development.

In summary, the civic culture framework of volunteer center leaders includes a belief in a strong government that communicates a social vision. The responsibility of citizens and volunteer organizations is to help in the fulfillment of this vision. They expect social change to be guided by the government. Social Service NGOs and volunteers could and should have a place in the structure to fill in gaps, and they should do this with government support. Volunteer Center leaders also hope that an ethos of collective social responsibility returns to the population, and allude to Soviet to the past when talking about this. In conjunction with this civic culture framework, the volunteer center leaders have steered their organizations toward a mission of promoting civic engagement that concentrates on individual development in the service of fulfilling a social vision. They avoid advocacy aimed at government institutions or policy, instead focusing on cooperation with local officials. In effect, they help to channel volunteering in a safe direction.

Discussion

The historical context of the Soviet system, interaction with foreign organizations, and the current legal and policy climate serve as influences cited by NGO leaders in describing the development and trajectory of volunteering and of their organizations. In addition, each of the NGO types that have emerged are connected to different civic culture frameworks.

Among social service NGO leaders a pattern arises in which volunteering led to a change in civic culture framework which led to social service NGO formation and advocacy which in turn reinforced their new civic culture framework. SSNGO leaders began their volunteering careers with a framework that expects the government to provide social services, but felt that

since the country was in a time of transition, they should pitch in and help where they saw gaps. As they were providing services, they began to see structural issues, and due to policy and legal changes, realized that to better serve their populations, they needed to formalize their organization. They registered and became SSNGOs. As SSNGOs they had greater opportunity to interact with government officials and institutional leaders/directors, and saw the opportunity to influence policy and practice. Since they were interacting on the front lines and creating previously non-existent services, they understood that they had valuable experience and a perspective that could contribute to policy discussions. Although SSNGOs hold a very low power position in the system, the leaders of these organizations believe that it is essential for the development of their society that citizen-led organizations and NGOs have a voice in social policy-making. They believe the government should consider these organizations as participating partners.

SSNGO leaders see the Soviet past as playing both a positive and negative role in the trajectory of their organizational development and functioning. They find that the collective mentality and some history of volunteering, even if it was state-directed volunteering, is helpful in people understanding the volunteering that happens in their organizations. However, they find that lack of prior nongovernmental organizational models hinder public and government understanding and trust of NGOs. Coupled with a lack of understanding stemming from the Soviet past is the reaction of the government to foreign influence in NGO development in the Russian and Eurasian region. This has led to a stricter political climate and policy towards NGOs.

Volunteer center leaders start at a similar place with a framework that expects the government to provide social services, but that citizens should pitch in while the country was in a

time of transition. However, they adopted a civic culture framework similar to Soviet times in which the government at the national and local levels is involved in the movement. This has led to a move away from providing any type of social service to a focus on promoting volunteering and emphasizing “self-development” of volunteers as a goal. Similar to Soviet times, the Putin government has offered youth development camps in the form of “Seliger” and other such retreats for the purpose of training volunteers with a focus on patriotism and loyalty to the government. Since 2005, the government has provided funds to more established volunteer centers to fulfill a goal of starting such centers around the city and in smaller cities in the region. For example, I attended a training weekend with young people from six small cities in the region. These young people were accompanied by either teachers or other employees of the city. The training focused on team building, promoting volunteering, and leadership and organizational development skills. Each city came up with one or two projects that they wanted to do in their city. Volunteer centers emphasize good deeds and short-term projects that improve the community in some way, from having a day of “good deeds” to cleaning a park. In fact, some of the centers are even named “City of Good Deeds.” These centers, whether located in schools or other institutions, are closely linked to local administrators who approve projects and funding. Because of this tight relationship with government officials, volunteer centers shun advocacy.

This in-depth look at the concurrent process of change in civic culture frameworks and the development of NGOs in this Russian city shows the importance of this concept in understanding NGO development in contexts of emerging civil society. It is obvious that civic culture frameworks play a role in the choice of mission of these organizations over time. The question is, in which direction does the relationship flow? Did volunteer center leaders already have a state-control-with-citizen-assistance framework that only grew stronger, and therefore

they chose to phase out of social service provision and concentrate on working with local administrations in channeling volunteer energy? Or did their frameworks shift over time, moving from the center of the continuum closer to the right side, and then back again as the political climate changed? In the case of social service NGO leaders, it seems clear that their frameworks moved further to the right over time, with a current expectation that NGOs should participate as partners in policy-making and service provision. In their case, frameworks changed over time as they learned about the system, and this became a self-reinforcing cycle – the more they knew, the more they expected an involved role and power-sharing with the government, and the more they had a role, the more their frameworks were solidified as preferable over their former frameworks.

Conclusion

Civic culture frameworks and the concept of glocalization are intimately related. Civic culture frameworks make up the mental discourses of actors in the local, global, and glocal spaces of social services and social policy. In the glocal area particularly, civic culture frameworks are in flux, as people interact with a variety of actors, structures, and discourses, trying to navigate old ideas, global influence, and innovation. Indeed, as described in this dissertation, the influence of local and global forces interacting in the glocal played a part in the forming and changing of civic culture frameworks of various stakeholders in the social service system.

I began this dissertation with a macro picture of globalization theories, arguing that glocalization as a conceptual framework provides a clearer explanatory lens through which to understand processes taking place in Russian social work education and practice. In addition, I argued for glocalization's superiority due to its rejection of the hegemonic discourse around globalization as it is generally understood. Globalization discourse often paints the process of globalization as an irresistible force acting upon a local context. Glocalization describes global processes as an element in the creation of a new space in which local and global ideas and practices mix and produce ever newer forms. The power and agency of local actors and structures is acknowledged when using the concept of glocalization.

I also contrasted the concepts of glocalization and indigenization, describing how indigenization is limited to specific practices being introduced into a local space. Indigenization does not see the local space as being a place of creation and innovation, but rather as a place of

minor adjustments to a practice. Indigenization also does not account for the emergence of new forms and their contribution to a greater discourse or to the global space. This is not to say that the process described by indigenization does not take place, but rather that it is an activity taking place in the local space.

In concluding the chapter on glocalization, I advocated for the practice of critical glocalization by social workers. Critical glocalization involves an approach to a new context, particularly an international context, that takes into account ALL of the players, global and local. This approach recognizes and looks for how actors and power interact, with an emphasis identifying those with less power. In addition, it respects that the active space of glocal interaction produces innovation and change.

Glocalization as a conceptual framework is applicable around the world. In the Russian context, the story of glocalization in social work education and practice reveals a multitude of actors in the system, including local practitioners, Russian academics who began working in the field recently, foreign “experts,” government social policymakers, professional and governmental curriculum committees, local administrators, international funders, and international NGOs. In addition, discourse originating from both global and local culture and professional spheres mixed with national political agendas and anti-Western propaganda. Social structures in place for decades influenced whether and how new structures were introduced and accepted. In this context, politics and propaganda played an outsized role in how social work education and practice developed, although the other factors were involved as well. In other countries and cultures, political pressure may not play as large a role.

Part of glocalization in the Russian context has to do with civic culture frameworks. Civic culture frameworks are understandings of the roles of the citizen and the state in solving

social problems. In Russia, social service provision outside of government control is new, so citizen and NGO involvement is still being negotiated. In chapter four, I illuminate how the civic culture frameworks of various stakeholders interact with power and lead to various outcomes in provision of services, collaboration, and utilization of services. Frameworks are found to lie on a continuum, with preference for strong state control and state provision of services on one end and preference for state and citizen mutual participation on the other. I show how civic culture frameworks serve as rationalizations for the actions of stakeholders in the system, and how in some instances the stakeholders described a shift in their frameworks over time.

In chapter five, I analyze the shifting frameworks arising in the narratives of NGO leaders, dividing them by type of organization that they are currently leading. Social service NGO leaders exhibited a move from a central framework of government control with citizen assistance to a more democratic framework of government-citizen mutual participation. They remained focused on their missions of service provision. Starting from a similar initial position, volunteer center leaders described a shift in the same direction as social service NGO leaders, only to reveal a reverse course back toward a central position. While the initial movement of both leader groups was influenced by international influence and new opportunities in the social system, it appears that changes in political discourse, funding, and government regulation played a role in the divergence of these NGOs. The strong commitment of social service NGOs to their specific client base led these leaders to find innovative ways of working in the system and advocating for change, whereas volunteer center leaders latched on to familiar ideologies of state-building and self-development, moving away from providing social services but instead helping to channel volunteerism in a state-approved direction.

As described above, glocalization and civic culture frameworks are conceptualizations that can be used to understand processes. Why are these conceptualizations important? Ideas have power. How people make sense of their world in the real and the ideal will influence their actions. Civic culture frameworks are elements within a glocalization paradigm. Glocalization makes room for the agency and creativity of actors, whereas civic culture frameworks provide a way to understand the ideas motivating their action. An approach of critical glocalization allows for the analysis of power dynamics between actors and groups. Such an approach is consistent with social work practice and a focus on social justice. As practitioners, we need to think big picture, taking into account structures, actors, and political, economic, and cultural discourse in a social system. In an increasingly interconnected world, this macro account will necessarily involve global and local forces, with an emphasis on understanding what is happening in the glocal space of innovation. It is only in this way that we can make sure to include vulnerable groups in the process of making policy and creating interventions.

These conceptualizations have implications for social work teaching as well. As educators, we provide the frameworks by which our students will analyze their worlds. The frameworks we give them will to some degree constrain their definition of social problems, creation of solutions, and discovery of opportunities. If they understand globalization as a force that homogenizes cultures, they will not be curious about innovations springing from glocal spaces. They will miss the resistance of local actors and the work of those synthesizing and creating interventions in the glocal space.

Teaching about civic culture frameworks is critical as well. For example, if a community has had bad experiences with NGOs, people in that community may have a framework that prefers government provided services to NGO services. They may also distrust any efforts by

NGOs to organize the community, seeing them as disrupting a stable system. Conversely, a community may distrust any form of government service and prefer self-organized help. Since communities around the world and in our own cities have experienced various forms of government – citizen relations in their context, it stands to reason that our students will be confronted with varying civic culture frameworks. Priming students to think about these issues will enable them to get a fuller picture of a community and the subgroups within it.

While the concepts of glocalization and civic culture frameworks are universal in nature, their expressions are confined to specific contexts. The flip side of the richness provided by a case study of one city is that the findings are not necessarily representative of all cities in Russia or other post-communist states. However, the city chosen for the study was carefully selected. It is not a major international city of Russia, and has not had near the number of foreign organizations, consultants, or international collaborations of either Moscow or St. Petersburg. Therefore, I was able to participate in grassroots organizations and interview people who have not had as dramatic of a worldview shift as in the major cities. Another limitation is that I was only able to interview two government administrators on the record. The rest of the insight gained regarding their frameworks came from participant observation. Having more interviews with government administrators would have provided richer data on their frameworks and on government – NGO collaboration.

Despite these limitations, the findings of this dissertation show how integral it is for researchers, consultants, and practitioners both inside and outside a context to critically evaluate what is happening in the glocal sphere, how the actors think about the government and citizen/NGO responsibility, and how these things influence actual service provision to vulnerable populations.

Appendix: Interview Protocols (in English)

Six interview protocols below – one for each subgroup interviewed, although the majority of the questions are the same.

Interview questions for volunteer organization leaders

“Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, and Implications for Family and Child Welfare: A case study of XXX City, Russia.” Through this research I hope to gain an understanding of how Russian citizens, those working with children and families, and city and regional government leaders perceive the development of the volunteer organizations and their impact on social services to families and children in Russia.

Collect basic information on age, gender, education, employment status

QUESTIONS

How long have you been with _____ organization?

What kinds of things does this organization do?

Please describe how you became interested in volunteering.

What was it like when you started? What is different now? Why do you think it has changed?

Do you know people outside of your organization who volunteer? Who are they? What types of things do they do?

How do you find volunteers for your organization?

How would you describe the commitment of volunteers? How often do they participate? How long on average do they stay involved with your organization? (one month, two years??)

How would you describe the characteristics of people who volunteer with your organization?

What do you think the generation over age 60 thinks about your organization and volunteer activity?

What kind of trainings have you been to?

Does your organization collaborate with other organizations, churches, or with local government programs? If not, have you heard of any collaboration between organizations or between organizations and the government? Please describe.

What do you see as the benefits and limitations of service provision by volunteers and volunteer organizations?

What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming a volunteer in your city?

Sometimes people “officially” volunteer with an organization, but many people also do informal things to help their families, friends, or people in their communities, maybe once a year or on a regular basis. In what ways are you involved, either now or in the past, in these less formal ways of volunteering?

Which social problems do you think are most important in Russia today?

In your opinion, how much is religion a factor in the motivations of volunteers? Which religions?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how people think about volunteering today?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how volunteering and NGOs are developing?

SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

One topic in the news has been the problem of unsupervised children. Sometimes families cannot afford to send their children to after school activities, but since the adults work, the children are not supervised after school. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of unsupervised children, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We’ve talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let’s talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you’ve said, what do you think should be done about unsupervised children?

Scenario 2

Another challenging issue in society is how to help single-parent households with children. . There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of helping single parent families, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be to help single parent families?

Scenario 3

Another topic in the news is bullying between children, or groups of teenagers that are violent to other teenagers. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of bullying and violence among young people, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for preventing bullying and violence among young people, and how can citizens or organizations help? What groups in society do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to improve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about bullying and violence among young people?

Scenario 4

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for giving the time for this interview. I just have two more questions. First, I plan to do more interviews with other people, and I was hoping that you could tell me your reaction to this interview. How comfortable did you feel talking about these issues?

Do you have any suggestions about how I could make the interview process better for others?

Interview questions for volunteers

“Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, and Implications for Family and Child Welfare: A case study of XXX City, Russia.” Through this research I hope to gain an understanding of how Russian citizens, those working with children and families, and city and regional government leaders perceive the development of the volunteer organizations and their impact on social services to families and children in Russia.

Collect basic information on age, gender, education, employment status

QUESTIONS

How long have you been volunteering with _____ organization? How often do you do things with them?

What kinds of things do you do when you are volunteering with _____ organization?

Please describe how you became interested in volunteering.

What was it like when you started? What is different now? Why do you think it has changed?

Do you know other people who volunteer? Who are they? What types of things do they do?

What do you think the generation over age 60 thinks about your volunteer activity?

What kind of trainings have you been to?

What do you see as the benefits and limitations of service provision by volunteers and volunteer organizations?

What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming a volunteer in your city?

Which social problems do you think are most important in Russia today?

Have you heard of non-commercial organizations collaborating with other organizations, churches, or with local government programs? Please describe.

In your opinion, how much is religion a factor in the motivations of volunteers? Which religions?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how people think about volunteering today?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how volunteering and NGOs are developing?

SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

One topic in the news has been the problem of unsupervised children. Sometimes families cannot afford to send their children to after school activities, but since the adults work, the children are not supervised after school. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of unsupervised children, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about unsupervised children?

Scenario 2

Another challenging issue in society is how to help single-parent households with children. . There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of helping single parent families, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be to help single parent families?

Scenario 3

Another topic in the news is bullying between children, or groups of teenagers that are violent to other teenagers. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of bullying and violence among young people, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for preventing bullying and violence among young people, and how can citizens or organizations help? What groups in society do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to improve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about bullying and violence among young people?

Scenario 4

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for giving the time for this interview. I just have two more questions. First, I plan to do more interviews with other people, and I was hoping that you could tell me your reaction to this interview. How comfortable did you feel talking about these issues?

Do you have any suggestions about how I could make the interview process better for others?

Interview questions nonvolunteers

“Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, and Implications for Family and Child Welfare: A case study of XXX City, Russia.” Through this research I hope to gain an understanding of how Russian citizens, those working with children and families, and city and regional government leaders perceive the development of the volunteer organizations and their impact on social services to families and children in Russia.

Collect basic information on age, gender, education, employment status

QUESTIONS

Do you know people who volunteer? Who are they? What types of things do they do?

What do you know about non-governmental/non-commercial/social organizations? What have you heard? Are there any in Nizhnii Novgorod? What are they called?

Have you ever participated in a volunteer activity that was organized by a volunteer organization? What did you think about it?

What do you think the generation over age 60 thinks about volunteer activity or organizations that are for volunteers?

Have you heard of non-commercial organizations collaborating with other organizations, churches, or with local government programs? Please describe.

What do you see as the benefits and limitations of service provision to families and children, for example to children in a priyut, by volunteers and volunteer organizations?

What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming a volunteer in your city?

Which social problems do you think are most important in Russia today?

In your opinion, how much is religion a factor in the motivations of volunteers? Which religions?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how people think about volunteering today?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how volunteering and NGOs are developing?

SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

One topic in the news has been the problem of unsupervised children. Sometimes families cannot afford to send their children to after school activities, but since the adults work, the children are not supervised after school. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if

anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of unsupervised children, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about unsupervised children?

Scenario 2

Another challenging issue in society is how to help single-parent households with children. . There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of helping single parent families, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be to help single parent families?

Scenario 3

Another topic in the news is bullying between children, or groups of teenagers that are violent to other teenagers. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of bullying and violence among young people, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for preventing bullying and violence among young people, and how can citizens or organizations help? What groups in society do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to improve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about bullying and violence among young people?

Scenario 4

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for giving the time for this interview. I just have two more questions. First, I plan to do more interviews with other people, and I was hoping that you could tell me your reaction to this interview. How comfortable did you feel talking about these issues?

Do you have any suggestions about how I could make the interview process better for others?

Interview questions for paid service providers

“Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, and Implications for Family and Child Welfare: A case study of XXX City, Russia.” Through this research I hope to gain an understanding of how Russian citizens, those working with children and families, and city and regional government leaders perceive the development of the volunteer organizations and their impact on social services to families and children in Russia.

Collect basic information on age, gender, education, employment status

QUESTIONS

How long have you been with _____?

What kinds of things does _____ your workplace _____ do?

Does your organization collaborate with non-commercial organizations or churches, or with other local government programs? If not, have you heard of any collaboration between organizations or between organizations and the government? Please describe.

Please describe your interaction with volunteers and/or volunteer organizations.

What was this interaction like when you started? What is different now? Why do you think it has changed?

Do you know people who volunteer? Who are they? What types of things do they do?

How would you describe the characteristics of volunteers with whom you have interacted?

What do you think the generation over age 60 thinks about volunteer organizations and volunteer activity?

What do you see as the benefits and limitations of service provision by volunteers and volunteer organizations?

What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming a volunteer in your city?

Have you ever participated in a volunteer activity that was organized by a volunteer organization? What did you think about it?

Which social problems do you think are most important in Russia today?

In your opinion, how much is religion a factor in the motivations of volunteers? Which religions?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how people think about volunteering today?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how volunteering and NGOs are developing?

SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

One topic in the news has been the problem of unsupervised children. Sometimes families cannot afford to send their children to after school activities, but since the adults work, the children are not supervised after school. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of unsupervised children, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about unsupervised children?

Scenario 2

Another challenging issue in society is how to help single-parent households with children. . There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of helping single parent families, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be to help single parent families?

Scenario 3

Another topic in the news is bullying between children, or groups of teenagers that are violent to other teenagers. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of bullying and violence among young people, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for preventing bullying and violence among young people, and how can citizens or organizations help? What groups in society do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to improve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about bullying and violence among young people?

Scenario 4

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for giving the time for this interview. I just have two more questions. First, I plan to do more interviews with other people, and I was hoping that you could tell me your reaction to this interview. How comfortable did you feel talking about these issues?

Do you have any suggestions about how I could make the interview process better for others?

Interview questions service recipients

“Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, and Implications for Family and Child Welfare: A case study of XXX City, Russia.” Through this research I hope to gain an understanding of how Russian citizens, those working with children and families, and city and regional government leaders perceive the development of the volunteer organizations and their impact on social services to families and children in Russia.

Collect basic information on age, gender, education, employment status

Do you know people who volunteer? Who are they? What types of things do they do?

Have you ever participated in a volunteer activity that was organized by a volunteer organization? What did you think about it?

What do you think the generation over age 60 thinks about volunteer activity or organizations that are for volunteers?

What do you think about the things that the volunteer organization X does? What have been the positive and negative aspects of your interaction with them?

If you could give organization X some advice on how to improve their program, what would you suggest?

If you could choose either a government-run program or this program run by the volunteer organization (if both existed), which would you choose? Why?

Have you heard of non-commercial organizations collaborating with other organizations, churches, or with local government programs? Please describe.

What do you see as the benefits and limitations of service provision to families and children by volunteers and volunteer organizations?

What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming a volunteer in your city?

Which social problems do you think are most important in Russia today?

In your opinion, how much is religion a factor in the motivations of volunteers? Which religions?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how people think about volunteering today?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how volunteering and NGOs are developing?

SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

One topic in the news has been the problem of unsupervised children. Sometimes families cannot afford to send their children to after school activities, but since the adults work, the children are not supervised after school. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of unsupervised children, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about unsupervised children?

Scenario 2

Another challenging issue in society is how to help single-parent households with children. . There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of helping single parent families, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be to help single parent families?

Scenario 3

Another topic in the news is bullying between children, or groups of teenagers that are violent to other teenagers. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of bullying and violence among young people, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for preventing bullying and violence among young people, and how can citizens or organizations help? What groups in society do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to improve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about bullying and violence among young people?

Scenario 4

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for giving the time for this interview. I just have two more questions. First, I plan to do more interviews with other people, and I was hoping that you could tell me your reaction to this interview. How comfortable did you feel talking about these issues?

Do you have any suggestions about how I could make the interview process better for others?

Interview questions for government administrators

“Civic Culture Frameworks, Volunteerism, and Implications for Family and Child Welfare: A case study of XXX City, Russia.” Through this research I hope to gain an understanding of how Russian citizens, those working with children and families, and city and regional government leaders perceive the development of the volunteer organizations and their impact on social services to families and children in Russia.

Collect basic information on age, gender, education, employment status

QUESTIONS

How long have you been with _____?

What kinds of things does _____your workplace_____ do?

Does your office collaborate with non-commercial organizations or churches, or with other local government programs? If not, have you heard of any collaboration between organizations or between organizations and the government? Please describe.

Please describe your interaction with volunteers and/or volunteer organizations.

What was this interaction like when you started? What is different now? Why do you think it has changed?

Do you know people who volunteer? Who are they? What types of things do they do?

How would you describe the characteristics of volunteers with whom you have interacted? How about volunteer organizations?

What do you see as the benefits and limitations of service provision by volunteers and volunteer organizations?

What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming a volunteer in your city?

Have you ever participated in a volunteer activity that was organized by a volunteer organization? What did you think about it?

Which social problems do you think are most important in Russia today?

In your opinion, how much is religion a factor in the motivations of volunteers? Which religions?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how people think about volunteering today?

In your opinion, how does the former Soviet system influence how volunteering and NGOs are developing?

SCENARIOS

Scenario 1

One topic in the news has been the problem of unsupervised children. Sometimes families cannot afford to send their children to after school activities, but since the adults work, the children are not supervised after school. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of unsupervised children, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about unsupervised children?

Scenario 2

Another challenging issue in society is how to help single-parent households with children. . There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of helping single parent families, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for helping single parent families, and how can citizens or organizations help?

What groups do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to resolve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be to help single parent families?

Scenario 3

Another topic in the news is bullying between children, or groups of teenagers that are violent to other teenagers. There is disagreement over what the government should do (if anything) or what people in the community should do about this. When you think about this issue of bullying and violence among young people, what comes to mind?

Would you say that this issue has affected you personally or any of your friends and relatives?

We've talked about this issue and how it might have affected us or people we know. Let's talk about society now. Who should take responsibility for preventing bullying and violence among young people, and how can citizens or organizations help? What groups in society do you think would gain or lose depending on what policies are developed to improve this issue?

Thank you for telling me what you think about this issue. To sum up what you've said, what do you think should be done about bullying and violence among young people?

Scenario 4

This last scenario requires the use of your imagination. Let's imagine that a group of 10,000 people were moved to an island that was formerly uninhabited. This group begins to build their lives on this island. After a few years, a challenge arises with children who need to be taken care of. Some of the children don't have parents because they have died. Others have parents but the parents for some reason do not take care of the children's basic needs. Finally, some children are being beaten regularly by their parents, and the people on the island don't think it is safe for them to live with their parents. You live on this island, and have been asked to be on a committee to help develop ways to take care of these children. What ideas do you have? There are several levels of society that could be involved: relatives, neighborhood members, citizen organizations, local government, and the island government. Who should do what?

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for giving the time for this interview. I just have two more questions. First, I plan to do more interviews with other people, and I was hoping that you could tell me your reaction to this interview. How comfortable did you feel talking about these issues?

Do you have any suggestions about how I could make the interview process better for others?

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